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Abstract:  This study is based upon a three year ethnography with the 9/11 Truth 
Movement involving field work in their online and offline milieus.  In addition, a 
critical discourse analysis of texts produced by their countermovement 
antagonists has been employed to highlight movement-countermovement 
interactional dynamics.  The 9/11 Truth Movement questions the official and 
commonly agreed upon narrative of how the events of September 11, 2001, 
occurred.  The questions are posed to the public, public officials, media, 
themselves, and to their countermovement antagonists.  For posing such 
questions as, “Did you know a 3rd tower fell on 9/11,” and asking why the 
collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 was excluded from The 9/11 
Commission Report, countermovement antagonists employ the conspiracy label.  
Terms such as “conspiracy theorists,” “conspiracy theories,” “conspiracists,” and 
“conspiracism” are regularly used to discredit the 9/11 Truth Movement and its 
members.  The 9/11 Truth Movement’s members and countermovement 
antagonists recognize the discursive function of the conspiracy label, which is to 
limit debate and impede critical attention to the movement’s empirical claims 
about the problematic nature of the events of September 11, 2001.  The present 
study emphasizes the presence of a discursive field in the movement’s public 
problems marketplace that tilts an already unlevel communicative environment 
further in disfavor of the 9/11 Truth Movement.  Continued use of the 
conspiracy label to categorize and discredit people who doubt or who ask 
socially disturbing questions about official stories, like that found in The 9/11 
Commission Report, undermines ethical treatment of human subjects in the social 
and behavioral sciences, and it threatens to disrupt communicative actions and 
the free flow of information necessary for democracies to function.  Unless their 
empirical claims can be proven false, “conspiracy theorist” is nothing less than a 
derogatory slur used to avoid direct, rigorous assessment of troubling arguments 
that potentially uncover systemic forms of corruption, domination, and 
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In May of 2006, a social movement organization (SMO) within the 9/11 Truth 
Movement (911TM) commissioned Zogby International to conduct the first1 nationally 
representative survey to ask U.S. adults about their beliefs regarding a possible cover up 
of the actual events of September 11, 2001 (see 9/11Truth.org 2006).  The following item 
was one of several 9/11Truth.org included in the survey: 
World Trade Center Building 7 is the 47-story skyscraper that was not hit by any 
planes during the September 11th attacks, but still totally collapsed later the 
same day. This collapse was not investigated by the 9/11 Commission. Are you 
aware of this skyscraper's collapse, and if so do you believe that the Commission 
should have also investigated it? Or do you believe that the Commission was 
right to only investigate the collapse of the buildings which were directly hit by 
airplanes? 
Forty-three percent of the respondents reported that they were not aware of World 
Trade Center Building 7's collapse, thirty-eight percent were unaware of its collapse but 
believed the 9/11 Commission should have studied it, and fourteen percent said that 
while they were aware of it they believed that it was appropriate that the 9/11 
Commission only investigated the buildings directly hit by airplanes.  A popular refrain 
within the 911TM is, “two planes, three buildings:  you do the math,” and a recent 
campaign by one of its SMO’s, ReThink911 (2013), focuses exclusively on this subject by 




In the year following its first inquisition into the public’s knowledge of the third 
tower to have collapsed on September 11, 2001, 9/11Truth.org (2007) once again 
commissioned Zogby to include a survey item about this fact: 
World Trade Center Building 7 was the 47-story skyscraper a block away from the 
Twin Towers that housed the mayor's emergency management center and offices of 
the SEC, Secret Service and CIA. It was not hit by any airplanes during the 
September 11th attacks, but still collapsed nearly eight hours later that day. FEMA 
did not explain this collapse, the 911 Commission ignored it, and the promised 
official study is now 2 years overdue. Do you think that the 911 Commission was 
right to concentrate their investigation on the collapse of buildings which were 
directly hit by airplanes or should they have also investigated the collapse of 
Building 7? 
Currently, I am among the sixty-seven percent of the 2007 poll who believe that the 9/11 
Commission should have investigated the collapse of the World Trade Center Building 7.  
Even though its collapse was eventually given an official investigation (NIST 2008), the 
911TM remains unsatisfied with the conclusions (see AE911Truth 2011; Chandler 2012; 
Griffin 2010a; Ryan 2012).  Even though the 911TM has produced several texts taking issue 
with it, defenders of the official story rely upon NIST’s (2008) report when they “debunk” 
the 911TM’s claims (Popular Mechanics 2011) and ridicule its members (Kay 2014).  From the 
many other issues upon which the 911TM and its adversaries debate, throughout this 
dissertation I will focus on this one empirical claim by the 911TM vis-à-vis the anti-
conspiracy discourse (Goshorn 2000; Truscello 2011) that populates its discursive field. 
Truthers and Deniers of 9/11 
Many in the 911TM believe that World Trade Center 7 (WTC 7), or Building 7, is  
“smoking gun” proof that “9/11 was an inside job,” or, at the very least, that the official 
explanations of the events of September 11, 2001 (see NIST 2008; Zelikow2 2004), are 
incomplete (e.g., see Griffin 2005) or fraudulent (e.g., see Griffin 2010a).  Many within the 
movement also believe that “9/11 is the litmus test”3 in that it defines where one stands in 
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relation to multiple facets and dimensions of social reality, including relations to our fellow 
humans, knowledge of history, assumptions about power, and our willingness to be critical 
and reflexive about what it means to live in the 21st century.  On one side of the test stand 
so-called “9/11 Truthers,” a moniker proudly adopted by some of the 911TM’s members, 
but on the other side of the litmus test the label of “9/11 Truthers,” or sometimes just 
“truthers” or “twoofers,” is a pejorative term akin to “conspiracy theorists” or 
“conspiracists.”  In order to stigmatize and discredit the movement, which is a strategy well 
understood by sociologists (Becker 1963; Ferree 2004; Goffman 1963; Grattet 2011; Husting & 
Orr 2007), these labels are employed by the 911TM’s challengers, whom members of the 
911TM sometimes refer to as “Debunkers” or “Deniers”4 of 9/11 Truth.  
In the dramas of social movements (Benford & Hunt 1992) and conspiracy (Wexler & 
Havers 2002), 9/11 Truthers have cast themselves as protagonists in their public attempts at 
raising questions about, for example, the collapse of WTC 7 as a missing element from the 
dominant narrative of “9/11”5 and the official explanation(s) of the events of September 11, 
2001 (hereafter September 11)6.  9/11 Deniers (e.g., see Aaronovitch 2010; Berlet 2009; Byford 
2011; Kay 2011; Popular Mechanics 2011; Shermer 2011; Taibbi 2008) cast themselves as 
rational analysts in defense of facts and reality from “conspiracy theorists” or 
“conspiracists.”  The interactional dynamics between these groups, which are the 911TM 
and its countermovement antagonists, unfold in large part on a discursive stage where 
language is used in texts and talk to interpolate the public and lambast interlocutors who 
cross acceptable boundaries of discourse.  (Throughout this dissertation, quotation marks 
are used to highlight the discursive nature of various signifiers.)  “9/11 Deniers” are cast by 
some in the 911TM as “dupes,” “willfully ignorant,” “gatekeepers,” “limited hangouts,” 
“sock puppets,” “disinfo agents,” and “shills,” terms that progressively identify those who 
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attempt to discredit the movement as more and more actively involved in a continuing 
cover-up of the events of September 11.  “9/11 Truthers” are cast by their rivals in the 
marketplace(s) of ideas as “conspiracy theorists,” “conspiracists,” “crazies,” “loons,” 
“kooks,” “paranoiacs,” “deranged,” and “anti-Semitic,” terms that identify those who 
would disrupt or destroy the current meaning of “9/11” as disputatiously disingenuous and 
dangerous to the social order.   
The term(s) of focus in this dissertation is/are “conspiracy” and variations of it that 
function as a label (i.e., “conspiracy theorists,” “conspiracy theories,” “conspiracists,” 
“conspiracism,” and somewhat more obscure terms, such as “conspiratorialists” and 
“conspiratards”).  Variants of “conspiracy,” when used to designate an individual or group 
as illegitimate, untruthful, or unworthy of serious or rigorous public attention for other 
reasons, operate as the conspiracy label (deHaven-Smith 2010; Husting & Orr 2007), and this 
label is regularly used to stigmatize and discredit the 911TM (e.g., see Kay 2011; Meigs 2006, 
2011; Popular Mechanics 2006, 2011; also see Pelkmans & Machold 2011; Truscello 2011).  The 
911TM is acutely and intimately aware of this, and, while they take steps to counteract its 
use, their adversaries continue to rely upon it as a valuable discursive source of power.  
Ultimately, the conspiracy label functions as an important symbolic resource for “9/11 
Deniers” to cauterize social boundaries between “9/11 Truth” as a discursive act and 
whatever effects the dominant narrative of “9/11” has had on the 21 st century.   
Importantly, due to the nature of anti-conspiracy discourse (Goshorn 2000; Truscello 
2011) the 911TM does not have access to similarly powerful, symbolic resources.  The 
911TM seek to redefine, or reframe, a dominant narrative of the 21 st century, i.e. that the 
events of September 11 were the result of unwarranted and unexpected attacks on an 
innocent nation by Usama bin Laden and 19 agents from his Al-Qaida network.  In addition 
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to anti-conspiracy discourse, the dominance of this narrative also acts against the efforts of 
the 9/11 Truthers.  9/11 Deniers interpret the talk and text (i.e., discourse) of 9/11 Truthers 
as signs of conspiracism, even when claims are centered on empirical facts based upon 
forensic evidence analyzed by professionals and experts.  Due in part to their activities 
through street activism, the efforts of the 911TM’s many SMO’s, and through publications 
by its intellectual organizers, the 911TM has already affected the legitimacy of the dominant 
narrative, and so it is the task of the 9/11 Deniers to counteract these accomplishments.   
Jonathan Kay, one of the 911TM’s most proactive antagonists, sees fallout in the 
recognition of the legitimacy of the dominant narrative of “9/11” as “nothing less than a 
countercultural rift in the fabric of consensual American reality” (2011:xix), and he is not the 
only one to see “9/11 Truth” as a main fissure in contemporary U.S. society.  As one 
journalist from Time Magazine stated around the time of the first 911Truth.org (2006) Zogby 
poll, 9/11 Truthers and defenders of the official story of “9/11” inhabit very different 
worlds: 
Take a look, if you can stand it, at video footage of the World Trade Center 
collapsing. Your eye will naturally jump to the top of the screen, where huge 
fountains of dark debris erupt out of the falling towers. But fight your natural 
instincts. Look farther down, at the stories that haven't collapsed yet. 
In almost every clip you'll see little puffs of dust spurting out from the sides 
of the towers [see Figure 1]. There are two competing explanations for these puffs of 
dust: 1) the force of the collapsing upper floors raised the air pressure in the lower 
ones so dramatically that it actually blew out the windows. And 2) the towers did not 
collapse from the impact of two Boeing 767s and the ensuing fires. They were 
destroyed in a planned, controlled demolition. The dust puffs you see on film are the 
detonations of explosives planted there before the attacks. 
People who believe the second explanation live in a very different world 
from those who believe the first.  (Grossman 2006:na) 
While I take issue with how this passage is framed, for example by leaving out any 
indication that the phrase, “the World Trade Center collapsing,” should also refer to WTC 7 
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in addition to the “falling towers,” my overall argument in this dissertation is that this final 
observation is true.  
Figure 1.  Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth Claim “Puff of Dust” During the Collapse of WTC 
Twin Tower is Pulverized Building Debris, Evidence of Controlled Demolition. 
 
 
“The material being ejected below the collapse front is not merely a ‘puff of dust’ – it is pulverized building 
debris” [italicized in original] (Rocco 2012)7. 
There are those who believe “9/11 was an inside job,” they see “puffs of dust” and 
interpret them as “pulverized building debris,” and they plead with the public to 
“investigate 9/11” so that they will come to know these “facts” for themselves.  If successful 
in their claimsmaking and (re)framing attempts, the 911TM will alter the meaning of 
“9/11,” potentially instigating a new official investigation with subpoena power (e.g., see 
NJ911Aware.org 2013).  If policymakers can be convinced to do this, and if agents other than  
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of al-Qaeda are found to have been complicit in carrying out or covering up the events of 
September 11 (see Ryan 2013), then U.S. law enforcement, prosecution, and other, 
international parties will be called upon to apprehend, try, judge, and sentence the suspects.  
If reported by mainstream news outlets, the public will likely engage in heated debates 
about the truth-value of the new claims, investigations, court hearings, etc., and these issues 
will likely be debated for some time.  If those who actively oppose the 911TM’s activities are 
successful, arguing instead that it is the 911TM that is the public’s problem, U.S. and other 
societies will likely proceed on their current trajectories, whatever that might be.   
In this discursive bidding contest, the 911TM and its members constitute outsider 
claimsmakers with relatively less power than the loosely coupled network of insider 
claimsmakers who act as their countermovement antagonists.  Both parties are vying for a 
monopoly over “9/11” in the marketplace of public problems (Benford & Hunt 2003), but 
the public will be persuaded not by what is perceived to be the more legitimate argument, 
but who is perceived to be the more legitimate claimant (Johnson, Dowd & Ridgeway 2006).  
The discursive field is already tilted in the favor of the 911TM’s countermovement 
antagonists due to the nature of how the official story of “9/11” is accepted as a cultural 
truism (Denzin & Lincoln 2003; Entman 2004; Snow 2004a).  In addition to this, it is the 
discursive function of the conspiracy label that will likely sway public opinion in favor of 
the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists due to how the label immediately calls into 
question the legitimacy of a claim via the claimant’s status as a “conspiracy theorist” 
(deHaven-Smith 2013; Husting & Orr 2007).  Speculations aside, the discursive field of the 
911TM is shrouded in anti-conspiracy discourse (Goshorn 2000; Truscello 2011) designed to 
dissuade rigorous attention to empirical claims that “9/11 was an inside job.”  9/11 Deniers 
claim to have already published works that debunk 9/11 Truth (see Popular Mechanics 2006, 
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2011), yet these works entail counterframing tactics that ultimately deny the public 
problems work of the 911TM in efforts to attack its collective character (Benford & Hunt 
2003).  This dissertation is an investigation into these affairs. 
The Conspiracy Label in the Marketplace of Public Problems 
In this study, I utilize Robert Benford and Scott Hunt’s (2003) modification of Joel 
Best’s (1990, 2008) model of the claimsmaking process in the construction of social problems.  
Using one-way arrows to indicate the various audiences or targets that claimsmakers desire 
to influence, Best’s (1990, 2008) model (reproduced here in Figure 2) depicts the differential 
Figure 2.  Claimsmaking by Outsider and Insider Claimsmakers 
 
access that insider and outsider claimsmakers have with the public, policy makers, and 
media outlets.  For outsiders, the bolded line pointing at the media indicates that social 
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movements rely more heavily upon this social institution than their counterparts due to 
lower levels of visibility and credibility.  Social movements work hard to form positive and  
culturally congruent messages, or frames, in the minds of the public so they may recruit 
participants and gain sponsorship of their goals (Benford & Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 
1988), but because social movements often seek social change by challenging the status quo 
and systems of authority (Best 2008; Snow 2004b), and because movement members and 
activists often hail from and operate outside core social institutions (Snow & Soule 2010),  
they position themselves as outsiders to the existing social order.  Insider claimsmakers are 
typically credentialed professionals who represent dominant institutional orders.  If they are 
not asked to serve as experts in media coverage of social issues, their direct or indirect ties to 
media outlets and policymakers gives them easier access to these social actors than outsider 
claimsmakers.   
An example already presented is Grossman’s (2006) Time article as compared to 
AE911Truth’s Internet-based claimsmaking attempts through the sharing of image-based 
memes (Figure 1; see also Figure 4 and Figure 12) and blog articles (Rocco 2012).  “In 
general,” Best (1990:16) explains, “the advantage belongs to the insiders, the owners of well-
established social problems, with ready access to policymakers and the media.  Outsiders 
are at a disadvantage.”  The dominant narrative of “9/11” was established through framing 
activities by powerful actors legitimated by core social institutions (Entman 2004) and 
discourses centered on fear, terrorism, and national security (Altheide 2006; Kellner 2003).  
The events of September 11 were used to construct a narrative that paved a path for the 
United States’ federal government and military into two wars and numerous military 
actions (Krebs & Lobasz 2007; Meyer 2009), and this narrative serves as a continuing 
justification for the growth and dominance of the national security state within the United 
10 
 
States (Connor 2012).  Those who publicly challenge this narrative are often met with 
resistance by those who defend it, and guardians of the dominant paradigm often use their 
given mediums to explain away claims that ‘“9/11” is not what it has been made out to be’ 
by recourse to anti-conspiracy discourse and the conspiracy label.  By virtue of the status of 
“9/11” as the official, dominant paradigm, challenging it position’s one as an outsider, but 
defending it elicits few challenges from others who share this interpretation of “9/11;” such 
is the nature of objectivity and the dominant paradigm (Parenti 1978, 2005, 2007).  
At base, competition between the 911TM and its adversaries begins with the 
claimsmaking process.  Figure 2 depicts one representation of the claimsmaking process, but 
it does not take into account certain complexities of social reality.  These complexities have 
been recognized by Benford and Hunt (2003), and they are discussed at length in their 
chapter, “Interactional Dynamics in Public Problems Marketplaces.”   Adjustments that 
Benford and Hunt (2003) make to Best’s (1990, 2008) model can be seen in Figure 3, which is 
a reproduction of their first of two variations (the second of which is discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter, see Figure 5).  Before discussing their initial modifications, 
Benford and Hunt emphasize that “Best’s model of the public problem marketplace is 
illuminating and provides a solid foundation for elaborating the interactions that take place 
in the public problems marketplace” (2003:157).  The public problems marketplace is the 
social arena in which social movements and countermovements struggle for attention, 
influence, and hegemony over mass media, policymakers, and the public’s interpretations of 
reality.  Unlike social problems, which are understood to be accomplishments by 
claimsmakers at convincing audiences that one or more issues is a problem for society (Best 
2008; Spector & Kitsuse 1977), public problems are issues and concerns that are discussed 
and debated in open, as opposed to closed, public, as opposed to private, social spaces.   
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Figure 3.  Modified Public Problems Marketplace Model, Interactions between Claimants 
   
Moreover, the marketplace of public problems is not a scene of one-way streets, but rather it 
is a carnival, arcade, or galleria where multitudes of social actors interact in multifaceted 
networks of varying combinations.  As we can see from the two figures above, Benford and 
Hunt’s (2003) initial modification retains the overall structure of Best’s (1990) model,  but key 
additions make it more isomorphic to social reality, both of which are worth discussing. 
First, we see that the same social actors are present in both models, and that the same 
bolded arrows are retained.  Taking up from Best’s work (1990), Benford and Hunt (2003) 
agree that insider and outsider claimsmakers, the public, media, and policymakers comprise 
the essential social actors on the public problems marketplace.  In the U.S., policymakers are 
typically employed in the legislative branch of government, or they are those people who 
work closely with it; these include elected officials along with their appointees in various 
agencies.  The social institution of the media, as opposed to “media” referring to journalists, 
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includes all those groups and organizations involved in disseminating information to the 
public through technological means.  Finally, the public is roughly interchangeable with 
civil society, or overlapping spheres of “dynamic and responsive public discourse between the 
state, the public sphere consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market sphere concerning 
private firms and unions” [italicized in original] (Janoski 1998:12).  In a more complex 
representation of this model (see Figure 5), Benford and Hunt (2003) represent how civil 
society is dispersed throughout each claimant domain where constituents of the collective 
claimsmakers, media, public, and policymakers interact with each other while their 
respective domains interact as well.  Moreover, this model is dynamic, yet not progressive; 
i.e., Benford and Hunt (2003) are not depicting the process of claimsmaking formation and 
contestation, but rather they identify key actors and relationships involved in the public 
claimsmaking process.   
In the logic of these models, we might think of insider claimsmakers as lobbyists, 
firms, corporations, and other types of pressure groups, and outsider claimsmakers as street 
activist and collective claimsmakers, or social movements, who oppose the social order 
sponsored by insiders.  An example related to war and militarism will serve the purpose of 
a clarifying claimsmaking among insiders and outsiders.  For this particular example, 
individuals and groups representing the organizations and institutions engaged in the 
production of bullets, bombs, vessels to transport personnel and weapons, and other 
technologies (e.g., computer software, body armor, etc.) would make claims that their 
products are needed for the public good, and, in contemporary industrial societies, these 
claims would typically be made to the public and policymakers via mass media and 
lobbying, respectively.  These insider claimsmakers might outright own certain media 
organizations (e.g., GE’s one-time ownership of NBC), and/or run advertisements on 24 
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hour news networks and other television stations for military recruitment purposes and to 
display the state of the art in weaponry advancements.  The armaments/defense industry 
regularly has professionals aligned with its interests to serve as expert witnesses in court 
cases and news stories, and it employs full-time lobbyists to work with policymakers whose 
campaigns they contribute to.  This is in conjunction with the general cultural symbols and 
practices of militarism found in the action figures and toy guns in shopping centers, the 
Pentagon sponsored Hollywood movies, the video games that simulate military combat and 
war time strategies, and the conjoining of militaristic defense and intelligence agencies with 
national sporting events (for resources on the preceding discussion, see Adams 1981; 
Carruthers 2000; Der Derian 2009; Jones & Marsh 2011; Kamalipour & Snow 2004; Robb 
2004; Schimmel 2012; Stahl 2010; Wilson 2005).   
Peace movements resisting a particular war or military action do not only find 
themselves opposing social actors whose interests are tied to the military, military actions, 
war, and national defense/security, but they also operate within a cultural environment 
where militarism shapes values, attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge about those dealings, 
largely in ways that support militaristic tendencies.  Operating against a widely shared 
ideology such as militarism positions one outside of the dominant culture, which makes 
peace/anti-war movements’ efforts all the more complicated when engaged in their specific 
claimsmaking activities (Falk 2008; Martin & Steuter 2010; Steuter & Wills 2008; Sudbury 
2004; Woehrle, Coy & Maney 2008).  In order to convince the public, and thereby influence 
policymakers reliant upon their constituencies in the public domain, that some cause, such 
as peace/anti-war or anti-militarism, is worth entertaining as a legitimate subject and worth 
adopting as a cause for social change, outsider claimsmakers are reliant upon media to 
disseminate their views, because while street activism might influence the passerby and 
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their social networks, media coverage can disseminate the movement’s claims to many 
thousands (upon thousands) more people.  Therefore, the relative positions of insider and 
outsider claimsmakers relates to social structural positions as well as to the issues or causes 
they advocate.   
Secondly, and more to the point of the modifications of Best’s (1990, 2008) model, all 
arrows in Benford & Hunt’s (2003) model, except those pointing to and from the media, are 
replaced with double-ended arrows, indicating two-way social interactions.  Claimsmakers 
do not just make claims and wait to see what happens, they interact with parties who might 
put forward counterclaims or reframe the original claim.  Instead of two-way, double ended 
arrows, the arrows coming from media have dashed lines that represent secondary claims, 
indicating that there is no direct access for claimsmakers through this aspect of the model to 
the other social actors.  Media actors can and do reformulate claims as news stories in the 
agenda setting process, or they might drop the issue altogether (Best 2008).  In the case of 
opposing wars or military actions, media outlets owned or funded by military, defense, 
and/or security interest groups do not have a material interest in portraying a movement 
and its frames, and neither do policymakers elected by constituents who subscribe to 
militarism and/or whose campaign contributions include funds from industries that profit 
from war, military actions, and/or militarism.       
Third, and of most relevance for this dissertation, Benford and Hunt (2003) draw an 
interaction between both claimsmakers, which is the focal point of this dissertation, and 
thus it is discussed in further detail in the following chapter.  An important point to note, 
though, is that interactions between insider and outsider collective claimsmakers takes form 
through movement-countermovement dynamics that are typically discursive in nature 
(Snow 2004a; Steinberg 1998).  Countermovements form in response to the actions and 
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agendas of social movements, and they tend to primarily exist as loosely coupled networks 
of individuals from disparate institutional arenas who share interests in opposition to a 
particular social movement (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996).  Lastly, Benford and Hunt (2003) 
recognize the complexity of interactions in their public problems framework, but they also 
recognize that each actor is composed of constituent actors who interact within each 
claimant domain.  This is represented in a third model, which is presented in the following 
chapter (see Figure 5) where I discuss theoretical implications of the inclusion of a 
discursive field for movement-countermovement dynamics.  It is worth noting here simply 
that at the heart of the issue is the complexity of each actor involved in these interactional 
processes between and among each node in the overall model (Figure 5). 
By making claims that threaten to disrupt the status quo or some system of authority 
(Best 2008; Snow 2004b), social movements often experience repressive tactics and strategies 
from their adversaries (Boykoff 2007; Earl 2003; Ferree 2004; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996), 
especially when their claims are contentious (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001).  Social forces 
opposing social movements construct discursive obstructions in attempts to limit what is 
sayable by social movements and what messages or frames from movements are 
comprehensible to their targets or audiences (Shriver, Adams & Cable 2013).  Oppositional 
forces can rely upon cultural values, beliefs, and knowledge from an array of social 
institutions to formulate their retaliatory discourse (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008), and their 
reframing strategies, which are discursive efforts to dissuade audiences from recognizing or 
accepting the original message of a social movement, do not necessarily need to follow 
formal rules of debate, science, or logic (Ibarra & Kitsuse 2003).  Finally, social movements 
often become aware of countervailing forces, and they sometimes engage their assailants in 
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discourse directly (e.g., in debates and correspondence) or indirectly through adapting to 
the unfolding discursive landscape (Hunt, Benford & Snow 1994; Benford & Hunt 2003).     
These issues are exemplified for the 911TM when some of its intellectual organizers 
and activists interacted with Jonathan Kay for his book and during a live debate.  Kay 
describes the core of his book, Among the Truthers:  A Journey Through America’s Growing 
Conspiracist Underground, as dealing “primarily (though not exclusively) with systemic 
conspiracy theories, such as 9/11 Truth, since they are far more damaging to the marketplace 
of ideas [than are conspiracy theories about discrete events]” [emphasis mine] (2011:21).  
Already we can see Kay’s (2011) framing tactic of signaling to his readers that “9/11 Truth” 
is, ostensibly, not about the events of September 11, but about the entire narrative that 
explains why they happened and what the appropriate responses should have be and 
continue to be.  So even though key informants, such as Richard Gage and David Ray 
Griffin, indicated in their interviews with Kay that their primary concerns with 9/11 Truth 
are closely tied to the official explanation of the events of September 11, Kay’s (2011) text is 
altogether a reframing strategy that attempts to persuade his audience that “9/11 Truth” is 
about questioning “the operation of whole societies, and often the entire planet” (2011:21).   
Throughout his book, Kay employs the conspiracy label as an explanation of his 
subjects’ divergent beliefs about what happened on September 11, and he clearly states at 
the outset that his “book is not intended as a rebuttal to conspiracists” (2011:20), because 
those already exist in the form of The 9/11 Commission Report (Zelikow 2004), Debunking 9/11 
Myths (Popular Mechanics 2006), and “the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s 
exhaustive Final Reports of the Federal Building and Fire Investigation of the World Trade Center 
Disaster” [italicized in original] (Kay 2011:20).  This is why instead of responding to Gage’s 
and Griffin’s empirical claims about the events of September 11, he represents their entrance 
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to and operation with ‘9/11 Trutherdom’ as “sketches of a few typical specimens” in his 
“typology of the different varieties of conspiracists” (Kay 2011:150).   In a debate during an 
episode of The Agenda with Steve Paikin, titled “The Truth is Out There” (Paikin 2011), 
Jonathan Kay was confronted by three of the people he interviewed for his book, Richard 
Gage, Paul Zarembka, and Barrie Zwicker, all of whom are credentialed professionals and 
intellectual organizers of the 911TM in their own rights8.  Each pointed out that Kay (2011) 
went to great lengths to lump them in with conspiracy theorists generally, such as those 
who believe the moon landing was a hoax, which is something that they say they do not 
believe.  They further took issue with how Kay (2011) avoided addressing the evidence they 
put forward in preference of using “all sorts of sly putdowns of all sorts of really good 
people,” as Zwicker commented (see Paikin 2011).  Kay accepted Zwicker’s charge that his 
book was condescending toward “Truthers,” because, as he states on Paikin’s (2011) show, 
he does not “take the idea of George Bush and Dick Cheney bombing the World Trade 
Center seriously, and, as a result, [he] has written a book that, by necessity, may appear 
condescending to those who do.”   
This is an example of the tactic of problem denial that countermovements use to 
bypass direct treatment of the claims of social movements (Benford & Hunt 2003), and it is 
elaborated upon with the theory and data presented in this dissertation.  Along with this 
counterframing tactic, in interacting with members of the 911TM, Kay (2011; Paikin 2011) 
displays what Husting & Orr (2007) explain is a central feature of the discursive function of 
the conspiracy label, which is to allow one to go meta by sidestepping empirical claims in 
favor of the ad hominem.  Lance deHaven-Smith’s (2010, 2013) work on how the conspiracy 
label shapes interpretations of reality clues us into the fact that it is often used as a rhetorical 
device to limit recognition of relevant contextual factors when thinking about important 
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historical events, such as assassinations and terrorist attacks.  Furthermore, an entire anti-
conspiracy discourse is known to exist in which the conspiracy label is used to bolster 
antagonism and derision of people who question official or commonly accepted narratives 
about historical events (Aistrope 2013; Goshorn 2000; Pelkmans & Machold 2011; Truscello 
2011).  As I bring together in the following chapter, literatures on movement-
countermovement dynamics and anti-conspiracy discourse explain how the discursive field 
of the 911TM develops and what it is likely to produce in terms of counterframing and 
reframing strategies.  Whereas researchers should search out the types of discourse that do 
or are likely to dominant other social movements’ discursive interactions with their 
countermovements, anti-conspiracy discourse has been proposed to be an important 
component of the 911TM’s activities (Pelkmans & Machold 2011; Truscello 2011).    
So thoroughly has anti-conspiracy discourse soaked and penetrated U.S. culture, 
“given the media attention conspiracy deniers and debunkers attract” (deHaven-Smith 
2013:2), that often any counterclaim to those put out or adopted by official sources is treated 
as just one more example of the pernicious persistence of conspiracy theories (see also 
Pelkmans & Machold 2011).  As explained by deHaven-Smith, 
[t]his is because most of the criticism directed at conspiracy beliefs is based on 
sentimentality about America’s political leaders and institutions rather than on 
unbiased reasoning and objective observation.  Most authors who criticize conspiracy 
theories not only disagree with the theories’ factual claims, they find the ideas 
offensive.  Among the most common conspiracy theories are allegations of U.S. 
government complicity in terrible crimes against the American people, crimes that 
include the assassination of President Kennedy and the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  For 
conspiracy deniers, such allegations constitute outlandish slurs against America’s 
leaders and political institutions, slurs that damage the nation’s reputation and may 
encourage violence against U.S. officials at home and abroad.  (2013:2)     
For people who challenge officially sponsored claims about important historical events, 
such as those people and organizations who constitute the 911TM, the conspiracy label is a 
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slur that invalidates its arguments and delegitimizes its issuers without due merit of 
logically consistent and factually substantiated direct rebuttals to its claims specifically.      
Kay (2011) is one example of myriad others who employ the repressive tactic of the 
conspiracy label in their (re)production of anti-conspiracy discourse directed toward the 
911TM (see Aaronovitch 2010; Banas & Miller 2013; Berlet 2009; Byford 2011; Shermer 2011; 
Taibbi 2008; Warner & Neville-Shepard 2014), many of whom take issue with the 
“offensive” or “disturbing” questions raised by the 911TM.  As part of the anti-conspiracy 
discourse its countermovement antagonists produce, this rhetorical device is meant as an 
attack on the collective character of the 911TM, and this backlash is to be expected when 
social movements operate to affect social change:     
Social movements frequently face opposition.  Movements seek to promote change, 
and the status quo inevitably has its defenders.  The most vigorous defenses usually 
come from those who have vested interests in the status quo; these opponents benefit 
from existing social arrangements in ways that would be threatened if the changes 
promoted by the movement were to occur.  (Best 2008:66)  
In terms of our focus on movement-countermovement dynamics, Benford and Hunt’s (2003) 
expansion on Best’s (1990) work, especially with the addition of concepts like “rhetorical 
idioms” and “counterrhetorical strategies” (Ibarra & Kitsuse 2003:27-33), focuses our 
attention on interactions between movements and countermovements in a complex social 
environment.  To this model (Figure 5), I add David Snow’s (2004a) conception of discursive 
fields, which can be thought of the communicative environment and symbolic terrain upon 
or within which movement-countermovement dynamics unfold and are contextualized.  For 
the 911TM, this addition highlights how the conspiracy label performs a discursive function 
as part of the anti-conspiracy discourse of the 911TM’s discursive field(s), which, as Ginna 
Husting and Martin Orr (2007) describe, is a transpersonal strategy of exclusion.   
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The 911TM has challenged key texts that produced the official explanations for why 
and how the events of September 11 occurred and what that meant for U.S. society and its 
role in the global order (for examples of these claims, see Chandler 2010; Griffin 2005, 2010a; 
NIST 2008; Ryan 2012; Zelikow 2004).  By interchanging “9/11 Truthers” with “conspiracy 
theorists” or “conspiracists,” and “9/11 Truth” with “conspiracy theory” or “conspiracism,” 
the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists can avoid dealing with the empirical questions 
about the events of September 11 and why they were not explained or adequately addressed 
in the official narrative of “9/11.”  Countermovement actors representing a diverse array of 
social institutions can rely upon the cultural practices of their respective institutions (i.e., 
“institutional logics,” see Thornton et al. 2012) when attempting to counteract social 
movements (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008), but these actors can also access symbolic 
resources diffuse throughout the cultural landscape of society in a way that social 
movement actors cannot (Snow 2004a).  A journalist writing a book (Aaronovitch 2010; Kay 
2011), or a team of researchers publishing peer reviewed articles (e.g., Swami, Chamorro-
Premuzic & Furnham 2010; Wood & Douglas 2013), about the 911TM can use the conspiracy 
label to explain its members’ purported psychological dispositions, but the 911TM’s texts 
and talk cannot perform an analogous semantic tactic because doing so will be interpreted 
as a further sign of conspiracism (e.g., see Meigs 2006, 2011).  This discursive reservoir of 
symbolic power further tilts the symbolic and social battlegrounds of movement-
countermovement interactions in favor of defenders of the status quo, and for the 911TM, 
due to their efforts to undermine one of, if not the guiding narrative of the 21st century, the 
assortment of oppositional forces they face is not only broad but emboldened by their 
position on the opposite side of “conspiracy theorists.” 
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To be clear, the 911TM’s central claim—that “9/11 was an inside job,” meaning that 
it was a “false flag, domestic terror operation”—is contentious.  By contentious9 I mean that 
the 911TM causes, involves, and is characterized by controversy because its claims lead to 
arguments, strife, and quarrels.  This tautological statement highlights a central position of 
sociologists of deviancy, i.e. that deviancy is a product of societal reactions and not some 
inherent quality of those labeled as deviants (Grattet 2011).  Members of the 911TM are 
regularly labeled as “conspiracy theorists,” and therefore as disreputable and illegitimate 
interlocutors, even when they focus almost exclusively on empirical facts of September 11 
that call into question the official narrative of “9/11 .”  For example, Richard Gage’s work 
with his SMO, Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth (AE911Truth), is routinely dismissed 
as mere “conspiracism” (Kay 2011, 2014), even though he and his organization position 
themselves as primarily only interested in the physical occurrences of September 11 in 
Manhattan, i.e. the collapse of the three World Trade Center towers, WTC 1, 2, and 7.  The 
following is from AE911Truth’s (2012) Frequently Asked Question page under the first 
question, “Who demolished the Twin Towers and Building 7 and why?”:  “We at 
AE911Truth are technical and building professionals. We do not speculate about who may 
have been responsible for destroying these buildings.  However, we do point to 
overwhelming evidence of a cover-up of the crime.”  Even when the 911TM recruits the 
types of experts and professionals who usually occupy insider statuses, such as an architect, 
Richard Gage, and university professors, David Ray Griffin and Paul Zarembka, they are 
dismissed as conspiracist cranks experiencing midlife crises and exercising debate skills 
learned while earning tenure (Kay 2011).  Thus, insiders are relegated to the outsider 
claimsmaker status due to the discursive power of the conspiracy label. 
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The 911TM is supported by peer reviewed research and other professionally 
published texts when it puts forward claims that the Global War on Terror was prosecuted 
illegally (Bugliosi 2008; Kramer & Michalowski 2005), and that the narrative of “9/11” was 
manipulated and exploited by political and media elites to alter U.S. foreign and domestic 
policy toward its course during the past decade (Altheide 2006; Connor 2012; Entman 2004; 
Kellner 2003; Krebs & Lobasz 2007; Meyer 2009; Rampton & Stauber 2003).  However, in 
stating that the official explanation by the 9/11 Commission (Zelikow 2004) and other 
agencies (NIST 2008) of the events of September 11 was distorted with the omission and 
distortion of facts and evidence that point toward some type of insider complicity in 
carrying out the attacks (Chandler 2012; Griffin 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 
2011a; Harrit et al. 2009; Hoffman 2005a; Jones 2006, 2007; Jones et al. 2008; Ryan 2007, 2012; 
Ryan, Gourley & Jones 2009), under the logic of anti-conspiracy discourse (Goshorn 2000; 
Truscello 2011), this latter group of citations will more easily be considered as a signal of 
“conspiracism.”  These sources directly challenge the veracity of the official explanation for 
the empirical, physical events of September 11, which calls into question the impetus, 
genesis, and/or foundation to the entire narrative of “9/11.”   
911TM countermovement antagonists construct and reinforce symbolic boundaries 
(Lamont & Molnar 2002; Pachucki, Pendergrass & Lamont 2007) around the narrative of 
“9/11” so tightly that any amount or type of evidence put forward by the 911TM that raises 
questions about the official account is considered evidence of “conspiracism,” or what is 
more commonly known as “conspiracy theory” (Pelkmans & Machold 2011; Truscello 2011).  
These boundaries exist as social mores in the form of the tabooi in U.S. culture of questioning 
                                                                 
i Social mores contain the ethical generalizations as to how to maintain social welfare, or the well -being of the 
in-group.  Social mores prescribe what paths of action are suitable and not, but an extreme type of social more 
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the received narrative of 9/11, as well as of any major event that influences U.S. foreign and 
domestic policy, and these sanctions are put forward discursively in the form of the 
conspiracy label (deHaven-Smith 2013; Husting & Orr 2007).  The associated ridicule, 
stigmatization, and silencing that the 911TM’s antagonists engage in are to be expected 
when a radical social movement threatens the status quo (Best 2008; Ferree 2004; Tarrow 
1994), but, consistent with how sociologists understand social deviance to be a product of 
the social construction of reality (Adler & Adler 2000; Becker 1963; Grattet 2011), the 
designation of the 911TM as an out-group necessitates the involvement of rule makers and 
rule enforcers.  When focused on maintaining the dominant narrative of “9/11,” or 
repairing any damage done to it, these latter groups collectively act as the 911TM’s 
countermovement, and, along with the 911TM, it comes under analysis in this dissertation, 
because at the meso-level of analysis taken up here it is one of two necessary parties in the 
terrain of contestation over the meaning of “9/11” that forms the discursive field of the 
911TM.   
Sociology, the 9/11 Truth Movement, and its Countermovement 
This study is based upon my ethnographic work with the 911TM.  I gathered 51 face-
to-face interviews with its members on the 10 th and 12th memorials of the events of 
September 11 in NYC.  I have also engaged in an extensive online participant observation 
with the 911TM Facebook group, fully joining the movement in the meantime.  And, finally, 
I have gathered and analyzed several texts from 911TM countermovement antagonists that 
                                                                 
is the taboo:  “The mores necessarily consist, in large part, of taboos, which indicate the things which must not 
be done” (Sumner 1907:30).  Taboos can be prescriptive (e.g., in superstitious behaviors l ike throwing salt over 
one’s shoulder or in making the sign of the Holy cross over one’s body), but they are typically restrictive in 
content.  Taboos “contain inhibitions of what will  be injurious to the group” (Sumner 1907:31), and in the 
present case, whether true or not, pleading with the public to “investigate 9/11” because it what official 
sources have made it out to be is taboo. 
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reveal how the movement’s oppositional forces operate.  I do not portray the following 
analysis to be an example of objectivityii in the sense that it is free of bias.  In part, this is due 
to the nature of the profession, for value-free sociology has long been known to be 
impractical or impossible (Becker 1967; Gouldner 1962, 1968; Gray 1968), but this is also due 
to my status as a “9/11 Truther.” 
Every sociological inquiry necessarily brings with it select epistemological, 
axiological, and ideological assumptions that shape which and what types of questions are 
asked and how they are answered (Hill 1984).  And, just as facts do not ‘speak for 
themselves’ (Lattimore 1932; Tuchman 1972), “[a]ll knowledge of cultural reality, as may be 
seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view” (Weber 1949:81).  With respect to 
the meaning(s) of “9/11,” I take up lenses of social constructionism (Berger & Luckman 
1963) and symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969).  Meaning is constructed through 
interactions, it is mutable, and meaningful symbols have powerful effects on social 
interactions and social structures (Dennis & Martin 2005; Musolf 1992).  Therefore, “9/11” is 
socially constructed, and its meaning has changed and can continue to change over time.  
This is an important consideration in terms of social problems work (Best 2008; Spector & 
                                                                 
ii Max Weber’s (1949) lengthy essay on the value of objectivity in the social sciences helps us distinguish 
between the empirical evaluations that are made “independent of all  individual contingencies” (85),  that are 
not based upon particular standpoints or cultural systems.  “Presuppositionless” (92) statements about 
“concepts such as ‘individualism,’ ‘imperialism,’ ‘feudalism,’ ‘mercantil ism,’ ‘conventional,’ etc., and 
innumerable concepts of l ike character by means of which we seek thoughtfully and empathically to 
understand reality constructed substantively by the ‘presupposition-free’ description of some concrete 
phenomenon” (92) either ‘do not exist or are i l lusory’ (93).  I would add the ideal -typical construct of 
“conspiracism” to this l ist, for it “is a conceptual construct which is neither historical reality nor even the ‘true’ 
reality” (Weber 1949:93), these are ideal -types.  Ideal-typical constructs abstract to a digestible description of 
such myriad empirical instances that the ideal -type construction can only serve as a heuristic.  With especially 
complicated constructs, such as “conspiracism,” the construct can “be formulated precisely only in the form of 
an ideal type, since empirically it exists  in the minds of an indefinite and constantly changing mass of 
individuals and assumes in their minds the most multifarious nuances of form a nd content, clarity and 




Kitsuse 1977) that takes place during the interactions between social movements and their 
countermovements on the public problems marketplaces (Benford & Hunt 2003).  These 
perspectives shift attention to subjective and rhetorical aspects of the phenomenon under 
question (i.e., to movement-countermovement dynamics within a discursive field as 
compared to the societal effects of the 911TM’s claims), and it is not without a certain degree 
of ontological gerrymandering (Woolgar & Pawluch 1985) that I take into account such 
claims as that WTC 7 is problematic to the official accounts of September 11 or that “9/11 
Truth” is equivalent to a type of “systemic conspiracism.”   
With these theoretical and methodological issues taken into account, what is more of 
a threat to my objectivity is the fact that I am a member of Scholars for 9/11 Truth & Justice, 
which is a “group of scholars and supporters endeavoring to address the unanswered 
questions of the September 11, 2001 attack through scientific research and public education” 
(STJ911 2007:n.a.).  As a sociologist, I seek an integration of sociological perspectives in 
order to produce greater insights for future research and more discussion for the discipline’s 
practitioners (Buroway 2007), but as an advocate for 9/11 Truth, I want to raise awareness 
about problematic occurrences during the events of September 11, namely the collapse of 
WTC Building 7.  I discuss further in the third chapter how these factors played out in 
collecting and reporting data, and it is with no small consideration that I reveal my dual 
status.  How these revelations reflect my ability to analyze the discursive field of the 911TM 
depends as much upon my sociological abilities at producing meaningful texts as it does on 
how this text is read. 
Certain unavoidable biases will be present in this study due to the practice of 
sociology, such as that my partisanship will put into question the legitimacy of this study 
and focus attention toward the “underdog” in the drama between the 911TM and its 
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countermovement antagonists (Lumsden 2012).  If the reader avoids the genetic fallacy, the 
merits of this dissertation will be judged on its content, not the social status of its 
source.  My reflexivity as an insider within the 911TM can be viewed as a sign of rigor and 
trustworthiness (Koch & Harrington 1998; Rolfe 2006), or, depending on one’s standpoint in 
relation to “9/11,” it can be viewed as a sign of inherent bias and unreliability.  In this 
study, I distinguish purported facts about the 911TM that are constructed by their 
antagonists from data I have collected by bringing sociological attention to these 
phenomena through literature and theoretical analysis within the areas of social movements 
and social problems.  Ultimately, my conclusion is, first, that discursive fields are important 
factors to take into consideration for how social movements (can) operate within a given 
social context, and secondly that the conspiracy label is an illegitimate means for addressing 
the 911TM’s claims as well as for further use in peer reviewed research to identify research 
participants or subjects where their empirical claims have not been or cannot be 
demonstrably proven false.     
Many of the results of this study will not come as a shock to the line of researchers 
who have produced bodies of literature that explain and illustrate how the conspiracy label 
functions and how anti-conspiracy discourse operates (see Aistrope 2013; Asadi 2010; 
deHaven-Smith 201, 2013; Goshorn 2000; Husting & Orr 2007; Jones 2010, 2012; Pelkmans & 
Machold 2011; Truscello 2011; Wexler & Havers 2002), nor will members of the 911TM be 
surprised to learn that the conspiracy label is used to avoid rigorous treatment of their 
claims.  If it is a radical assertion that the 911TM is not a “conspiracist phenomenon” by its 
own accord, then somewhat less controversially I demonstrate in this dissertation that the 
concept of discursive fields (Snow 2004a), along with the institutional logics (Thornton et al. 
2012) of multiple institutional orders (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008), should become part of 
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the model of interactional dynamics of the public problems marketplaces (Benford & Hunt 
2003).  In terms of the 911TM, this dissertation is among the first scholarly sources to present 
data gathered from movement members and to have analyzed their claims from a 
sociological perspective.  
Of all the attention paid to the 911TM, only one peer reviewed source is known to 
exist where a social scientist has interviewed its members.  Laura Jones’ (2010 , 2012) 
fieldwork with the 911TM in 2006 and 2007 consisted of interviews and participant 
observation with 911TM members, and it is the basis of the two following definitions of the 
movement to which I adhere: 
The 9/11 Truth Movement is the umbrella term for a coalition of individuals, based 
both in the US and abroad, who promote the belief that the US government was to 
some degree involved in orchestrating the terrorist attacks of September 11 th 
2001…in order to justify a subsequent course of action including the Iraq War and 
curtailing of civil liberties in the US.  (2010:360)  
And 
The 9/11 Truth Movement are a particularly multifaceted example of how 
conspiracy can be practiced in contemporary society, having developed an online 
presence incorporating hundreds of individual and group websites, discussion 
forums, Listservs, blogs, Internet radio channels, downloadable films (such as Loose 
Change) and online journals through which conspiratorial imaginaries are circulated, 
debated and modified.  This fluid network is at the same time grounded through 
particular offline locations, as members of the 9/11 Truth Movement have employed 
more traditional forms of street protest and staged conference events.  (2012:50) 
Jones’ (2010, 2012) work addresses how conspiracy that is embodied in the everyday 
practices and discourses of ordinary, non-elites is often treated as illegitimate (i.e. as 
“conspiracy theory”) whereas conspiracy as discussed and embodied by elites is considered 
geopolitical strategy or nonexistent.  As some 911TM countermovement antagonists assert, 
“[t]here are powerful forces that shape our reality.  Conspiracies and secret plots do take 
place” (Berlet 2009:43).  However, their final analyses are typically that the citizen sleuths 
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who attempt to expose elite conspiracies are usually mistaken if not disingenuous and 
dishonest in their allegations (Byford 2011; Olmsted 2011; Sunstein & Vermuele 2009).   
As a consortium of individuals and organizations, the 911TM espouses through a 
variety of means a wide range of claims about how or why “9/11 was an inside job,” or why 
people need to “investigate 9/11.”  My interests in this dissertation are not with theories 
about secret plots or the alleged actors in the conspiracy itself, because to focus on those 
aspects of their claims would be to risk producing an analysis too easily discredited as yet 
another “conspiracy theory.”  Rather, I focus on empirically verifiable claims that do not 
have as a referent an object of analysis that in the end or at base involves human agency or 
human action, namely the uncontestable fact that WTC Building 7 collapsed in Manhattan at 
5:20pm on September 11, 2001.  This fact operates as a meaningful actor (Latour 2005) in the 
network that connects the 911TM’s members, that eventually produced its 
countermovement, and that brings these two groups together to produce a discursive field.  
The fact itself, and the claims to it, are of importance for this dissertation, not who was 
ultimately responsible, and therefore we can treat the collapse of WTC 7 as an object in the 
Latourean sense as opposed to a physical process of motion; however, further consideration 
is given, and this is necessary in terms of identifying a central claim upon which to focus.     
NIST (2008), Popular Mechanics (2006, 2011), and others who defend the official 
explanations for the events of September 11 (e.g., see Shermer 2011), claim that, ultimately, 
debris from the collapse of the North Tower, WTC Building 1, ignited fires in WTC 7 that 
eventually “caused steel floor beams and girders to thermally expand, leading to a chain of 
events that caused a key structural column to fail. The failure of this structural column then 
initiated a fire-induced progressive collapse of the entire building” (NIST 2011:n.a.).  Since 
the 9/11 Commission (Zelikow 2004), and those who support and defend The 9/11 
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Commission Report (e.g., Kay 2011), designate al-Qaida agents as ultimately responsible for 
the collapse of the Twin Towers, it could be said that human agency is ultimately 
responsible for the collapse for WTC 7, and this same conclusion can be reached for the 
911TM since it claims that WTC 7 collapsed due to a controlled demolition from high grade 
explosives (e.g., see AE911Truth 2011; Harrit et al. 2009; Jones 2006, 2007; Jones et al. 2008; 
Ryan et al. 2009).  However, regardless of which human agents and actions ultimately 
caused WTC 7 to collapse, the fact of the matter is that the collapse of WTC 7 occurred 
several hours after the Twin Towers collapsed, and that fact is often used by the 911TM to 
initially contest the official accounting for the events of September 11.       
During my interviews and participant observation with the 911TM, WTC 7 was very 
often mentioned as a reason as to why the particular member of the 911TM began 
questioning “9/11,” as to why people should “investigate 9/11” for themselves, and/or as 
to why what they believe about what happened on September 11 cannot be written off as 
merely a “conspiracy theory.”  Members of the 911TM often argue (e.g., see Figure 4) that  
because there is no prior example of a building collapsing primarily due to fire or structural 
damage, that further investigation will reveal the collapse of WTC 7 as a “smoking gun that 
9/11 was an inside job.”  911TM activists use WTC 7 in their repertoires of protest in their 
online (Figure 4) and offline (Figure 10) activities, and several SMO’s within the 911TM have 
focused their attention almost exclusively on WTC 7, such as ReThink911 (2013a)10, 
Remember Building 7 (2011)11, and New York City Coalition for Accountability Now’s 
(NYC CAN) High-Rise Safety Initiative (2014)12.  The 911TM has dedicated much effort to 
exposing this particular fact to the public because, as noted by another research, for many in 
the movement “it is the patriotic duty of members of the Truth Movement to bring this  
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Figure 4.  Examples of Internet-based Repertoires of 9/11 Truth and the Participant Observation 
with the 9/11 Truth Movement Facebook Group13 
 
knowledge to the attention of their fellow citizens, both in America and around the 
world…” (Jones 2010:367).  Therefore, the collapse of WTC 7 makes sociological sense to 
focus on as a claim because (a) it limits analysis to claims to a physical occurrence rather 
than to human actions and agency, and (b) it is at the center of the 911TM’s claims that 
“9/11 was an inside job” and/or that the public needs to “investigate 9/11.” 
Jones’ (2010, 2012) work with the 911TM captures and expresses much of what I 
have observed, and I concur with her definitions listed above, but they are not the only 
ways to define and approach this movement.  Reflecting on his revelation that members of 
the 911TM “aren’t the loners of X-Files stereotype…” because he had “long assumed that 
abnormal theories came from abnormal minds,” [italicized in original] Jonathan Kay 
(2011:6-7) provides an interesting insight after studying the 911TM for three years.  “Only a 
small minority of the Truthers [Kay] encountered seemed out-and-out insane.  This should 
not be surprising:  The 9/11 Truth movement is a socially constructed conspiracist 
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phenomenon—cobbled together on the Internet from the contributions of thousands of 
different people” [italicized in original] (2011:183).  That the Internet is an important factor 
in the rise and successes of the 911TM is not contested in this dissertation, in fact it is one of 
my criticisms of Benford and Hunt’s (2003) model (Figure 5) of the public problems 
marketplaces.  The 911TM is a socially constructed phenomenon, to the extent that it is a 
“conspiracist phenomenon” relies much more on the activities of its countermovement 
antagonists than upon those of its own members and SMO’s.  This is clearly shown in Kay’s 
(2010, 2011, 2014) own work.    
Among the many contributors to “America’s growing conspiracist underground,” as 
Kay states in the subtitle to his book, “[m]ost infamously, there is the 9/11 ‘Truth 
movement,’ whose members have concluded that the September 11 attacks were actual part 
of an ‘inside job’ hatched by ultra-hawkish elements within the U.S. government in order to 
secure a pretext for war abroad and draconian repression at home” (2011:xxi).  “Despite this 
otherworldly premise,” Kay goes on to say, 
the 9/11 Truth movement has become a mass phenomenon in the last ten years, 
spawning best-selling books, conferences, a pseudo-academic journal, and dozens of 
heavily surfed websites.  A 2006 Scripps Howard poll of over one thousand U.S. 
citizens found that 36 percent of Americans believe it was either “somewhat likely” 
or “very likely” that “federal officials either participated in the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, or took no action to stop them.”  About one-sixth of 
the respondents also agreed it was at least “somewhat likely” that “the collapse of 
the twin towers in New York was aided by explosives secretly planted in the two 
buildings.”  (2011:xxi) 
We should notice that like Grossman’s (2006) passage above, Kay bears no mention of the 
collapse of WTC 7 and the 911TM’s claims to it.  Kay’s book is not written to rebut the facts 
and evidence that have led so many members of U.S. society to 9/11 Truth, but rather he 
takes to the task of documenting and mending the “countercultural rift in the fabric of 
consensual American reality, a gaping cognitive hole into which has leaped a wide range of 
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political paranoiacs previously consigned to the lunatic fringe—Larouchites, UFO nuts, 
libertarian survivalists, Holocaust deniers, and a thousand other groups besides” (2011:xix).  
Taking a somewhat different approach, Matt Taibbi (2008) provides the following 
negative definition of the 911TM: 
The 9/11 Truth Movement, no matter what its leaders claim, isn’t a grassroots 
phenomenon.  It didn’t grow out of a local dispute at a factor or in the fields of an 
avocado plantation.  It wasn’t a reaction to an injustice suffered by a specific person 
in some specific place.  Instead it was something that a group of people constructed 
by assembling bits and pieces plucked surgically from the mass-media landscape—
TV news reports, newspaper articles, Internet sites.  The conspiracy is not something 
anyone in the movement even claims to have seen with his [sic] own eyes.  It is 
something deduced from the very sources the movement is telling its followers to 
reject.  (p. 236) 
Kay (2011) and Taibbi (2008) are similar in several regards:  Both are journalists, both have 
written books antagonistic of the 911TM, and both claim to have spent time interviewing, 
participating with, and observing movement members.  Likewise, neither offers their reader 
a detailed explanation of the methods they used to gather data about or from the movement, 
and neither employed a clear theoretical framework to analyze the movement.  The 911TM 
is a socially constructed phenomenon, but this arises from the movement’s activities as well 
as what its antagonists produce in discourse about it. 
Journalists (Aaronovitch 2010; Grossman 2006; Kay 2011, 2014; Morello 2004; Taibbi 
2008), law professors (Sunstein 2014; Sunstein & Vermeule 2009), philosophers (Clarke 2007; 
Keeley 2007), communication professors (Banas & Miller 2013; Warner & Neville-Shepard 
2014), psychologists (Byford 2011; Swami et al. 2010; Wood & Douglas 2013), and other 
members of the intelligentsiaiii, such as members of think tanks (Berlet 2009; Tobin 2007) and 
                                                                 
iii The ‘socially unattached intell igentsia’ is “a relatively classless stratum which is not too firmly situated in the 
social order” (Mannheim 1936:154)—they are public intellectuals or pundits who do not share in l ifestyles 
centered around working in the service, manufacturing, managerial, or other labor intensive occupations.  
Although “they are too differentiated to be regarded as single class, there is, however one unifying 
sociological bond between all  groups of intellectuals, namel y, education” (155).  Intellectuals, which 
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trade magazines (Chertoff 2005; Meigs 2006; Molé 2006; Shermer 2011), stand in direct 
opposition to the 911TM, acting as countermovement antagonists in their use of 
claimsmaking and framing tactics well-known to social movement scholars (Benford & 
Hunt 2003; Dixon 2008; McCaffrey 2000; Shriver et al. 2013).  The operation of social 
movements tends to bring forward their own countermovements that are either loosely or 
tightly coupled networks of social actors who oppose the goals, actions, and outcomes of 
movement activities (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996).  Social movements typically seek some 
type of change in society, whether that be a relatively small change in the use of a word or a 
larger change such as the implementation of a law or social policy (Snow & Soule 2010), and 
thus their opposition typically defend the status quo or existing state of society (Best 2008).   
The 911TM seeks to change the dominant narrative of “9/11,” from that of an 
outside job of Middle Eastern terrorist hijackers to that of an “inside job” of clandestine 
groups and networks within the U.S. federal government and its agencies, or, at the least, 
some members argue that it was an “outsourced job” in which the attacks of September 11 
were allowed to happen on purpose (for a discussion on this spectrum, see Griffin 2007b; 
Tarpley 2007).  The 911TM’s countermovement antagonists are a loosely coupled network of 
individuals and teams of writers who publish essays, articles, and books, and who appear in 
media to demonize and discredit the 911TM and its members.  In this dissertation, I 
                                                                 
Mannheim uses interchangeably with “intell igentsia,” are “recruited from an increasingly inclusive area of 
social l ife” (156), namely, the educational arena, and, far from being immune to “all  those interests with  which 
social l ife is permeated” (157), intellectuals afford the politico-economic arena, much as the way Mills ([1956] 
2000:245-6, 319-325, 329-342) describes it, the ‘practical demands’ (Mannheim 1936:160) of elites or “an 
empty glorification of naked interests by means of the tissues of l ies spun by apologists” (159 -160).  
Intellectuals face a dilemma as to how they will  apply their education and/or intellectual powers, and 
subservience to elites and/or to institutional orders from which elites derive their power and influence is one 
application of educational credentials, and “[t]he second way out of the dilemma of the intellectuals consists 
precisely in becoming aware of their own social position and the mission implicit in it” (160), i .e. to come to a 
“conscious orientation in society” (160).  The intell igentsia I describe here are decidedly the former of the two.    
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compare claims about the 911TM with statements collected from them during face-to-face 
interviews and online participant observations, and along with this I highlight direct and 
indirect interactions between these two groups.  I show that although the movement’s 
antagonists position themselves as rational actors (Wexler & Havens 2002) with the 
scholarly ambition to separate ‘fact from conspiracy theory’ (Popular Mechanics 2011), their 
tactics and strategies resemble those of anti-peace (Benford & Hunt 2003) and anti-
environmental (McCright & Dunlap 2000) countermovements with the intent to disrupt and 
eradicate the movement (Banas & Miller 2013; Berlet 2009; Byford 2011; Kay 2011; Sunstein 
& Vermeule 2009; Warner & Neville-Shepard 2014).     
 Many of the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists are uninterested in supporting 
or even seriously interrogating the movement’s empirical claims, for example, about the 
anomalies in the official explanations for the collapse of the three WTC buildings.  Their 
analyses designed to debunk the myths of 9/11 conspiracy theories often rely upon the very 
reports the 911TM hold in contention, and (social) psychological explanations of where they 
go wrong in their thinking are inevitably issued to explain why the movement believes the 
official story of “9/11” is a lie.  There are those who interrogate the actual empirical claims 
of movement members (Molé 2006; Popular Mechanics 2011; Shermer 2011), but, even after 
these types of treatments occur, the inquisitor nearly always falls back to some final analysis 
rooted in (social) psychological explanations of “conspiracy theories.”  The main 
problematic in this regard is that the 911TM tends to directly rebut their antagonists (e.g., 
see Griffin 2007a), but if there is a response it tends to continue to employ rhetorical fallacies 
as part of the counterframing strategy.  Often, the final strategy is to psychologize the issue 
by explaining that while experts (e.g., NIST 2008) have already reached a consensus on the 
collapse of WTC 7, “conspiracists” view anomalies in the official report as a confirmation of 
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an ominous conspiracy.  “For many conspiracists,” as one team of psychologists conclude, 
“there are two worlds: one real and (mostly) unseen, the other a sinister illusion meant to 
cover up the truth; and evidence against the latter is evidence for the former” (Wood & 
Douglas 2013:8). 
Regarding the likelihood that “9/11” is not what official sources have made it out to 
be, many of my research participants make claims first and foremost to the problematic 
nature of such things as the collapse of WTC Building 7.  For the movement as a whole, the 
salience of this issue can be seen most clearly in the ReThink911 campaign (see ReThink911 
2013a).  This campaign is designed to spread awareness by plastering posters and billboards 
in public places of cities throughout the world that ask, “Did you know a 3rd tower fell on 
9/11?”  The importance of WTC 7 for the 911TM can be seen in the work of another SMO 
within the movement as well.  Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth (e.g., see AE911Truth 
2011a) currently (June 9, 2013) has the tag for AE911Truth.org, upon a Google search for 
their organization, as “World Trade Center Building 7 Demolished on 9/11?”  A 320 page 
book by one of the 911TM’s most prolific intellectual organizers, David Ray Griffin (2010a), 
was entirely devoted to investigating The Mysterious Collapse of World Trade Center 7 through 
discussing how the official report on it (see NIST 2008) contains factual errors and scientific 
fraud.  And, finally, the contestation of how the collapse of WTC 7 was explained by NIST 
(2008) was discussed in two chapters (see Chandler 2012; Ryan 2012) of the 911TM’s version 
of The 9/11 Commission Report, which is titled The 9/11 Toronto Report:  International Hearings 
on the Events of September 11, 2001 (see Gourley 2012).  One of the 911TM’s opponents 
considers the collapse of WTC 7 to be “the Truthers’ strongest card” (Kay 2011:153), and 
even Kay (2011) and other countermovement antagonists (NIST 2008; Popular Mechanics 
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2011) admit that most architectural and engineering professionals consider it unusual for a 
steel structure to fully collapse due mostly to fire.   
In terms of the substantive merit of this dissertation on the side of the 911TM, how 
should we interpret situations where, for example, psychologists discount the above claims 
a priori, without even citing one source as to why the collapse of WTC 7 is not problematic, 
and then reifyiv the symbolic and social boundaries of the conspiracy label with conclusions 
such as that while “[c]onspiracists [are] less overtly hostile than their conventionalist 
counterparts, [they do] not appreciate being called conspiracy theorists” (Wood & Douglas 
2013:8)?  What are we to make of situations where law professors who propose to disrupt 
the group through government-sponsored programs claim that 9/11 conspiracy theories are 
“demonstrably false” (Sunstein & Vermeule 2009:206) without actually demonstrating their 
falsity or citing a viable source that attempts to do so (see Griffin 2011b; Hagen 2011)?  What 
are we to make of situations where communications professors propose to inoculate the 
public against 9/11 conspiracy theories because they are, at base, considered absurd and 
offensive (Banas & Miller 2013)?  Based upon methodological norms institutionalized within 
the social sciences, I conclude that the continued use of the conspiracy label within peer 
reviewed research programs that involve human subjects undermines the respect for human 
subjects and social justice that should be part of the behavioral and social sciences (Denzin 
& Lincoln 2008; Mastroianni & Kahn 2001).  Without first demonstrably proving as false the 
                                                                 
iv “Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non -human or 
possibly supra-human terms.  Another way of saying this is that reification is the apprehension of the products 
of human activity as if they were something else that human products —such as facts of nature, results of 
cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will.  Reification implies that man [sic] is capable of forgetting his own 
authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is 
lost to consciousness.  The reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized world” [italicized in origina l] (Berger 
& Luckmann 1966:89). 
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911TM’s claims of the errant nature of the official story of “9/11” (for these claims, see 
Gourley 2012; Griffin & Scott 2007; Zarembka 2008), the continued use of the pejorative 
conspiracy label undermines scientific rigor and ethical treatment of human subjects.  
In this dissertation I argue that there is a discursive field that favors tendencies to not 
rigorously interrogate the claims of the 911TM due to the simultaneous presence and 
functions of the conspiracy label (deHaven-Smith 2010; Husting & Orr 2007) and the 
hegemony of the “9/11” narrative (Altheide 2006; Entman 2004; Kellner 2003; Krebs & 
Lobasz 2007).  Discursive fields, or the “terrain(s) in which meaning contests occur” (Snow 
2004a:402; Spillman 1995: 140-1; Steinberg 1999:748), provide the opportunity structures 
(Koopmans & Olzak 2004; McCammon et al. 2007) and obstructions (Shriver et al. 2013) that 
enable and constrain movement and countermovement claimsmaking and framing 
practices.  It is for these reasons that the concept of discursive fields (Snow 2004a) is an 
important aspect to add to Benford and Hunt’s (2003) public problems marketplace 
framework.  In this way, I show that one reason that insider claimsmakers have an upper 
hand over outsider claimsmakers (Best 1990) is that they are often in a position to draw from 
institutional and cultural resources (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008; Thornton et al. 2012), 
which, in the present case, come to be a self-sealing discursive field that tips the “terrain of 
contested claims” (Benford & Hunt 2003:160) in their favor.  Thus, even when an 
organization like AE911Truth (2012) claims to only be interested in the empirical evidence of 
the likely involvement of pre-planted explosives in the collapses of WTC Buildings 1, 2, and 
7, its members can be dismissed offhand as conspiracists or conspiracy theorists for no other 
reason than that they challenge the official explanation of the events of September 11.  
conspiracists tend to focus on errant data at the expense of some known reality (Byford 
2011; Kay 2011; Keeley 2006; Meigs 2006). 
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Research Question & The Coming Chapters 
What I am presenting in this introduction is a case for why the 911TM should be of 
interest for a sociological investigation.  Due to this being among the first ethnographies with 
the 911TM in the social sciences, there are basic research questions that should be addressed.  
These might include the following:  Who are or what is the 9/11 Truth Movement?  What is 
the demography of its constituency, and what spectrum of beliefs and claims are held by its 
members?  Although texts exist where authors report their experiences with the movement 
(Kay 2011; Jones 2010, 2012; Taibbi 2008), no peer reviewed work is known yet to exist that 
definitively outlines the breadth and depth of this movement.  Existing works that attempt 
to define the 911TM are clearly antagonistic, not peer reviewed, and unscientific (Kay 2011; 
Taibbi 2008), and, on the other hand, the existing scientifically informed and somewhat 
sympathetic works do not analyze the 911TM as a social movement nor in the context of its 
antagonists (Jones 2010, 2012).  The existing theoretical frameworks within social 
movements literature suggest that radical social movements will experience backlash from 
countermovements with insider statuses relative to society at large (Armstrong & Bernstein 
2008; Benford & Hunt 2003; Ferree 2004; McCright & Dunlap 2000, 2003, 2010, 2011; Shriver 
et al. 2013).  This leads to the questions of what social forces operate against the 911TM, how 
do they operate, and what is it about the 911TM that inspires these social control agents to 
mobilize?  This, though, is largely a descriptive set of questions, and they do not necessarily 
inform sociological theory.   
The 911TM and its countermovement antagonists are engaged in a discursive 
bidding contest within the marketplace of public problems (Benford & Hunt 2003).  This is 
to say that while the 911TM seeks to convince U.S. and international publics that “9/11 was 
an inside job” (and/but/or that they need to “investigate 9/11”), the 911TM’s antagonists 
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seek to protect the public from such claims by attempting to dismantle the arguments and 
discredit the movement.  It is known that discursive fields, claimsmaking, and framing 
activities play important roles in whether or not social movements succeed in mobilizing 
support (Snow & Benford 1988; Best 1990; Snow 2004a), and it is also known that the 
conspiracy label functions in limiting what topics are permissible to discuss and who is 
permitted to discuss them (deHaven-Smith 2010; Husting & Orr 2007; Jones 2010).  Taking 
into account the preceding discussion, my research question is as follows:  How does the 
conspiracy label function within the discursive field of the 9/11 Truth Movement?   
In the following chapter, I delve into social movements and social problems 
literature in order to provide a framework for movement-countermovement interactions.  I 
discuss social constructionist orientations to social problems as an epistemological 
foundation for this study (Best 2008; Spector & Kitsuse 1973, 1977).  In this discussion, I 
present Benford and Hunt’s (2003) modified public problems marketplace model that 
depicts interactions between and among claimants (Figure 5).  I modify this model to form 
my basic unit of analysis for this dissertation (see Figure 9), which is the discursive field 
produced by the movement-countermovement dynamics between the 911TM and its 
countermovement antagonists.  I integrate Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008) multi-
institutional politics approach as a way to highlight the complexity represented by Benford 
and Hunt’s (2003) analysis of the interactional dynamics of the public problems 
marketplace.  I elaborate on the institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al. 2012) as it 
explains the material and symbolic structures of the multiple institutional orders that make 
up the public problems marketplace, and I add to these frameworks Snow’s (2004a) 
conception of discursive fields to explicitly tie (multi)institutional logics (Armstong & 
Bernstein 2008; Thornton et al. 2012) to social movements literature.  It is the discursive field 
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that surrounds the multiple institutional spheres from which social actors draw their 
strategies and legitimacy that provides symbolic power for insider claimsmakers over 
outsider claimsmakers.  Anti-conspiracy discourse within the discursive field of the 911TM 
facilitates the use of the conspiracy label so often employed by the 911TM’s 
countermovement antagonists, and this is a resource not available to the 911TM.  
In the third chapter I discuss my data collection techniques along with 
methodological issues related to each method I have used.  This study includes critical 
ethnographic and critical discourse analyses couched in grounded theory methods, and 
each method contributes to the data I present in the fourth chapter.  My presentation of data 
is in a narrative format consistent with critical approaches to both ethnographic and 
discourse methods.  Working with the 911TM posed certain methodological issues that I 
discuss in the following chapter, and these should be kept in mind while reading the data I 
present.  The contentious claims of the 911TM are varied and far-reaching, and I only 
attempt to deal with very few of them, namely the collapse of Building 7.  In the final 
chapter I discuss what my data mean in light of the literature review I present in the 
following chapter.  My data are discussed in terms of the movement-countermovement 
interactions as contextualized within the discursive field generated by the conspiracy label.  
I conclude this dissertation in the final chapter with a discussion of how my data inform 
Benford and Hunt’s (2003) model of interactional dynamics on the public problems 
marketplace, and I also discuss the limitations of this study and where future research 
should be directed.  Essentially, this is among the pilot studies that have involved members 
of the 911TM in ethnographic research, and future studies should involve other methods as 






LITERATURE & THEORY   
Social movements and social problems have a history of being treated in tandem 
(Bash 1995; Benford & Hunt 2003; Best 2008; Mauss 1975).  Two main perspectives of 
social problems are the objectivist/realist (Merton 1976) and subjectivist/constructionist 
traditions (Best 1990; Spector & Kitsuse 1977).  Harmful, disruptive, or unjust social 
conditions considered objectively real under one perspective are considered to be the 
product of a variety of claims made about those purported conditions under the other.  
Social movement scholarship contains a variety of perspectives as well (Benford & Snow 
2000; Cohen 1985; Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta 2001; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996; 
McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001; McCarthy & Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994), with that taken up 
here tied to the multi-institutional politics approach (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008) and 
the framing perspective (Benford & Hunt 2000; Johnston & Noakes 2005).  Finally, social 
movements have been treated as collective claimsmakers in the constructionist approach 
to social problems (Best 2008), and the idea of public problems has been articulated in 
which competing claimsmakers engage in discursive or communicative competitions 
over the hegemony of a narrative or frame in open, socially accessible arenas (Benford & 




The literature presented in this chapter outlines the theoretical foundation for my 
analysis of the 911TM and its countermovement antagonists.  In the first section, I 
address literature on social problems by identifying the nature of the work of collective 
claimsmakers (i.e. social movements and countermovements) in public problems 
marketplaces.  While social problems are accomplishments of the claimsmaking 
activities of social actors, a public problems marketplace involves claimsmaking in 
public domains where various interested parties make claims and counterclaims “out in 
the open.”  In the second section, I address the need for a multi-institutional politics 
approach to studying the 911TM, and then I expound upon what that approach looks 
like in the literature and what it means for the current topic.  This involves a discussion 
of new social movements, institutional logics, and discursive fields, and these are 
framed in terms of dramaturgical vernacular of protagonists, antagonists, and audiences 
(Benford & Hunt 1992).  Essentially, it is argued that social movements do not operate in 
a social vacuum (Benford & Hunt 2003), but because they must compete with 
adversaries in their attempts to gain access to mass media, garner public support, and 
influence policymakers, analysts should take into account the social environment within 
which social movements operate.   
Social Constructionism and the Marketplace of Public Problems 
This section moves from a discussion of the social constructionist approach to 
social problems to how collective claimsmakers do social problems work in the 
constructionist context.  This bears a central assumption in this dissertation, that social 
reality is socially constructed, and therefore it is mutable and open to various 
interpretations by myriad social actors.  I close this section with a discussion of framing 
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processes and how they factor into the social problems work of the 911TM and its 
countermovement antagonists.  
Social Constructionism & Social Problems  
“Social reality,” as Peter Berger (1963) famously stated, “turns out to have many 
layers of meaning” (Pitt 2010:23; see also Boettke 2010; Grosby 2010)).  Social reality is an 
always-already socially constructed product of the historical and ongoing human 
interactions imbedded within social institutions and organizations where socialization 
and association occurs (Berger & Luckmann 1966).  Anything that can carry meaning, 
from the natural environment, to categories of bio-physical human beings, to the 
collective identities of social movements, can be socially constructed to carry one or 
more meanings, and typically this is accomplished by powerful actors with political-
economic means and motives (Freudenberg 2000; Hunt et al. 1994; Merskin 2004; 
Muscati 2002; Nathanson 1988; Steuter & Wills 2008, 2011).  However, social reality is 
also socially constructed through the mundane interactions people engage in during our 
daily routines and rituals (Bourdieu 1980; Knottnerus 2011).  Meaning is coherent but 
always in development, the product of symbolic interactions between social actors, 
including two or more individuals, groups, organizations, and social institutions 
(Blumer 1969). 
A social constructionist perspective leads us to know that the meaning of 
anything is not a natural product of physical reality, but that it comes into being through 
communicative negotiations (Shalin 1991).  This means that socially constructed 
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phenomena can be deconstructedv (Culler 1982; Norris 2002), reconstructed or repairedvi 
(Benford & Hunt 1994; McLeod 2004), and annihilated or obliteratedvii (Baudrillard 2008; 
Feldman 2000).  “The 9/11 Truth movement,” as one of its opponents has noted, “is a 
socially constructed conspiracist phenomenon,” [italicized in original] (2011:183), and this 
is exemplified in a recent incident.  When the “9/11 ‘truther’” (Hubbuch 2014) and 
“kook” (Roth 2014), Mr. Matthew Mills, recently interrupted a popular annual ritual in 
order to combat the symbolic violenceviii of “9/11,” his actions, like those of the rest of the 
911TM, while meant to redefine the meaning of “9/11,” produced a situation where he 
could be labeled and shown as an example of the deviancy of the movement and its 
members.    
                                                                 
v To deconstruct a text or meaningful practice is to position the intent against its possible functions or 
effects.  Peter Philips and Mickey Huff’s (2010) response to Chip Berlet’s (2009) essay, “Toxic to 
Democracy,” is one example. 
vi Individuals and collectivities sometimes experiences threats to their identity, such as when they grow or 
change due to their own actions, or when they are the target of scrutiny, ridicule, and/or exclusion.  They 
then must (re)formulate their identities in the context of the new situation, combatting threats and 
building new narratives that posit a new or renewed concept of their character. 
vii Meaning can cease to exist for a number of reasons.  External forces can literally destroy a group or 
category and ‘write it out of history,’ and/or commit cultural imperialism to the extent that a population is 
forced to cease practicing its native or indigenous culture and to adopt the dominant culture.  In other 
respects, meaning changes and is reformulated due to multiple intersections of societal changes that 
result in a metamorphosis of an authentic object and/or practice into a simulation of that practice, and, 
finally, a completely fabricated object or practice that has no original referent can take over the meaning 
of constructed practices and objects. 
viii “In the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly of 
legitimate naming as the official—i.e. explicit and public—imposition of the legitimate vision of the social 
world, agents bring into play the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles, in 
particular all the power that they possess over the instituted taxonomies, those inscribed in people’s 
minds or in the objective world, such as qualifications.  Thus all  the symbolic strategies through which 
agents aim to impose their vision of the divisions of the social world and of their position in that world can 
be located between two extremes:  the insult, that idios logos through which an ordinary individual 
attempts to impose his point of view by taking the risk that a reciprocal insult may ensue, and the official 
naming, a symbolic act of imposition which has on its side all  the strength of the collective, of the 
consensus, of common sense, because it is performed by a delegated agent of the state, that is, the 
holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence” [italicized in original] (Bourdieu 1991:239).  
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As the classic sociological maxim goes, “if [people] define situations as real, they 
are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas 1929:572).  It is through the social 
construction process that things—people, groups, (inter)actions, social processes, events, 
and situations—become meaningful.  However, the process can be, and has often been, 
used by powerful interests to construct myths and farces (Greisman & Mayes 1977; 
Hamilton 1996) and to spread ignorance (Proctor 2008) through consciousness lowering 
activities (Schnaiberg 1994), sometimes with the consequences of war (Altheide 2006; 
Entman 2004; Kellner 2003) and genocide (Fearon & Laitin 2000; Waller 2007).  Through 
socially constructing the definition of a situationix, things such as the Holocaust and other 
mass acts of terror only become comprehensible within a universe of shared symbolic 
codes, beliefs, and narratives (Alexander 2002; Berger 2002).  Along with this, but not to 
draw an ontological connection between the two (although some have, e.g., see Berlet 
2009; Kay 2011), the phenomena of “conspiracy theories” and “conspiracy theorists” are 
products of vested institutionalized interests that have employed the terms as socio-
linguistic terminating devicesx designed and used to discount arguments and discredit 
their interlocutors through the rhetorical assault of the ad hominem alone (deHaven-
Smith 2013; Goshorn 2000; Husting & Orr 2007; Truscello 2011).   
                                                                 
ix The implication of this phrase is “that there is no one-to-one correspondence between an objectively 
real world and people’s perspectives of that world, that instead something intervenes when events and 
persons come together, an intervention that makes possible the variety of interpretations which Schutz 
[1962] calls ‘multiple real ities.’  According to this view, the same events or objects can have different 
meanings for different people, and the degree or difference will  produce comparable differences in 
behavior” (McHaugh 1968:8).  Therefore, “9/11” invokes the idea of Middle Easter, Islamic terrorist 
threats to the homeland for many, but for others it means something like “an inside job, a self -infl icted 
wound, a false-flag domestic terror operation,” which are two incompatible beliefs about the same event.  
x “Society provides individuals with terminating devices in terms of which they can cut out meaningful 
objects out of the field of experience. Their meaning does not inhere in things; nor is it ordained by God; 
rather it is a cultural product of historically situated individuals” [emphasis mine] (Shalin 1991:237). 
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The meanings of such things as “9/11” and “conspiracy theories” are constructed 
in top-down (by power structures), bottom-up (emergent norms via everyday 
interactions), and horizontal (discursive fields) situations, but their meanings also 
depend upon the knower’s situatednessxi.  The implicit and explicit epistemological, 
axiological, and ideological assumptions a researcher brings to an analysis will shape 
how such things as “9/11” and “conspiracy theorists/ies” are represented and 
understood (Hall 1985; Hill 1984).  Certain scholars (Swami et al. 2010; Wood & Douglas 
2013), journalists (Kay 2011), and other knowledge workers (Berlet 2009; Meigs 2011) 
claim that those who pose critical questions and alternative accounts of how the events 
of September 11 transpired are, in reality and by their nature, “conspiracists,” 
“conspiracy theorists,” “Truthers.”  These claims do not arise nor operate within a socio-
cultural vacuum, but rather they are part of a process in the social construction of social 
problems, a process with which sociologists are acutely familiar (Best 1990, 2008; 
Holstein & Miller 2003; Spector & Kitsuse 1977). 
Depending on how it is defined, social problems can be viewed as objectively 
real and measureable phenomena or as the product of claimsmaking and framing 
activities, with most contemporary sociologists leaning decidedly toward the latter 
                                                                 
xi That a given perspective is always a perspective from somewhere (Weber 1949:81) is to say that the 
situation(s) an individual occupies affect(s) his or her worldview, beliefs, ideas, perspectives, attitudes, 
and va lues.  These are conditioned by one’s location in social structure, or the social institutions, 
organizations, networks, groups, and statuses.  Thus, situatedness refers to the social positions and 
situations that affect thinking and behavior.  “The situations that give rise to one’s situatedness can be 
counted as outside forces that influence subjectivity and one’s view of subjectivity, elements of what is 
otherwise called determination, ideology, environment, history, discourse, and so on.  But they are a lso 
open to the sorts of response or reactions that can change one condition into another, act back on the 
world in the way that has sometimes and traditionally been described as a gesture of freedom or agency.  
Situations, and the dwelling in situations that is situatedness, then denote a measure of the unstable and 
indecisive, in descriptive and philosophical terms, at the same time as they signal a measure of comfort 
and manageability.  They are given to us but also open to amendment; we occupy a situati on but can 
move on or imagine moving on to others” (Simpson 2002:20). 
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position (Best 2008).  The objectivist or realist position treats social problems as those 
conditions that threaten the social order, disrupt social organization, are harmful or 
injurious to multitudes of people, or that are beliefs and behaviors that are contrary to 
social values (Merton 1972).  One problem with this position is that it is normative, in 
which case assessments of the appropriate or “functional” order of society are based 
upon the ideological position of the analyst (Horton 1966).  Another issue is that even if 
the social analyst attempts to account for his or her value-orientation by relying upon 
replicable statistical indicators of the value-orientations of a particular society to gauge 
whether or not an issue or event is considered by a popular majority to be a social 
problem, they have merely traded one set of value-based assumptions for another 
(Manis 1974).  Even when groups of people actually harm and kill “innocents” or 
bystanders, which some might consider to be clear examples of obvious and objective 
social problems, powerful actors sometimes use those opportunities to amplify negative 
attributes of the “evil doers” (Bush 2002; Kramer & Michalowski 2005; Roscigno 2011), 
avoid problematic occurrences with how the events transpired (Cavender, Jurik & 
Cohen 1993), and seek to promote and achieve what were previously unattainable or 
difficult goals (Jenkins 2003). 
Fundamentally, social problems are products of collective definitions (Blumer 
1971).  Social problems can arise from shared beliefs or popular myths held in common 
by multitudes of individuals, and public interpretations of those social problems can be 
amplified, exacerbated, and/or ameliorated by knowledge workers (Best 1990, 2008).  




determines whether the condition exists as a social problem.  The societal 
definition gives the social problem its nature, lays out how it is to be approached, 
and shapes what is done about it.  Alongside these decisive influences, the so-
called objective existence or makeup of the social problem is very secondary 
indeed.  (1971:300) 
This is the fundamental importance of concepts like the definition of the situation and social 
constructionism, which denote that people can and do collectively define some situations 
as problematic and others as not, and then an emergent situation is therein produced, or 
not, based upon those definitions (McHugh 1968; Perinbanayagam 1974; Thomas & 
Thomas 1928).  It is, nevertheless, important to bear in mind that societal elites operating 
in the seats of powerful organizations within the social institutions of media, military, 
and policymaking have continuously relied upon the manipulation of information 
available and disseminated to the public in order to achieve political-economic and 
militaristic ends (Kamalipour & Snow 2004; Snow 2003), sometimes the death of a 
nation-state is a result of these types of practices of social constructionism (Parenti 2000; 
Wilmer 2002).   
For a social problem to gain credence with the public it must be legitimated by 
the institutional orders of “the press, other media of communication, the church, the 
school, civic organizations, legislative chambers, and the assembly places of 
officialdom” (Blumer 1971:300).  Contemporary U.S. society’s interinstitutional system is 
composed of these and other (e.g., the corporation, the military, science, etc.), 
interinstitutional orders (Thornton et al. 2012), and social movements operate within, 
among, and between them in their collective claimsmaking attempts at defining 
situations as problematic or not (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008; Benford & Hunt 2003).  
One more key passage from Blumer highlights the importance of the legitimation process 
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(see Johnson et al. 2006) in the collective identification and articulation of social 
problems: 
If a social problem manages to pass through the stages of societal recognition 
and of social legitimation, it enters a new stage in its career.  The problem now 
becomes the object of discussion, of controversy, of differing depictions, and of 
diverse claims.  Those who seek changes in the area of the problem clash with 
those who endeavor to protect vested interests in the area.  Exaggerated claims 
and distorted depictions, subserving vested interests, become commonplace.  
Outsiders, less involved, bring their sentiments and images to bear on their 
framing of the problem.  Discussion, advocacy, evaluation, falsification, 
diversionary tactics, and advancing of proposals take place in the media of 
communication, in casual meetings, organized meetings, legislative chambers, 
and committee hearings.  All of this constitutes a mobilization of the society for 
action on the social problem.  (1971:300-301) 
Probably more than any of the other early statements on the social construction of social 
problems, this passage depicts what has been discussed and debated in contemporary 
conceptions of how collective claimsmakers interact in the market place of public 
problems (Benford & Hunt 2003; Best 2008). 
 Like Herbert Blumer (1971), John Kitsuse and Malcom Spector’s move toward a 
constructionist approach to social problems beckons sociologists to treat them as 
discursive productions with “critical contingencies that impede or facilitate” (1973:418) 
their historical development.  Their reformulation of social problems from a realist to a 
constructionist orientation treats social problems not as reflected in official statistics of 
objectively measured rates of crime, poverty, domestic abuse, or other such issues, but 
as “generated and sustained by the activities of complaining groups and institutional 
responses to them” (Spector & Kitsuse 1973:158).  The claimants, though, do not have 
equal access to the legitimacy of societal institutions as, for example, they show in their 
representation of how the American Association of Medical Directors of Institutions for 
the Feebleminded created a taxonomy of the “feebleminded” in terms of the ordinal 
statuses of “morons,” “imbeciles,” and “idiots” (Spector & Kitsuse 1977).  Just as the 
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definition of the situation and social constructionism produce meaningful and 
consequential realities, it was these types of institutional constructions that facilitated 
conditions in which, as related in the book, A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness, “if 
people act in a way others cannot readily understand they run the risk of being 
dismissed as a ‘nutter,’ a ‘loony’, ‘crazy’, ‘mad’ or even ‘mental’ (Rogers & Pilgrim 
2010:26).  Labeling individuals or groups as “conspiracy theorist(s)”  serves a similar 
purpose in that it dismisses interlocutors as unworthy of serious attention and regard 
(Husting & Orr 2007). 
Before moving on, outstanding critiques of the social constructionist orientation 
to social problems are important to keep in mind for the current analysis.  Steve Woolgar 
and Dorothy Pawluch’s (1985) critique of the social constructionist, or definitional 
perspective, on social problems sparked a lasting controversy, and it is an important 
aspect to consider when analyzing the social construction of social problems (Best 2003).  
Essentially, Woolgar and Pawluch’s (1985) argument is that constructionists make 
convincing arguments about why or how a given “fact” is a social construction, but all 
the while these constructionists engage in ontological gerrymandering.  “The successful 
social problems explanation,” explain Woolgar and Pawluch, “depends on making 
problematic the truth status of certain states of affairs selected for analysis and 
explanation, while backgrounding or minimizing the possibility that the same problems 
apply to assumptions upon which the analysis depends” (1985:216).  Described by 
Holstein and Gubrium, Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) “contended that analysts too often 
invoked social ‘conditions’ as objective features of the social world that were then used 
as unproblematic resources for explaining the construction of other social realities—
social problems” (2003a:188).  Thus, to ontologically gerrymander with a constructionist 
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argument, one pushes back the boundaries of which facts or social conditions are 
considered social constructions and which are considered objective or independently 
valid, and this leads to either the privileging of certain facts or conditions over others or 
to admitting that the explanatory facts or conditions are social constructions along with 
the explanandum.   
Rebuttals included direct responses that addressed purported confusions in 
Woolgar and Pawluch’s (1985) analysis, with one response highlighting their misreading 
of constructionist approaches to how definitions arise (Schneider 1985).  Another, more 
radical response claims that their critique of the relativism of the truth-claims of 
constructionist research misses the point that there are no “truths,” that all of social 
reality is a discursive product of symbolic interactions (Pfohl 1985)—I reject the 
assumption that there are no capital-T truths in objective, physical reality, but social 
reality is ontologically different and distinct from physical reality, thus there are certain 
truths in society that are dependent upon subjectivity and one’s position in the social 
structure (see Bhaskar 2011).  Regardless of what is ontologically “real,” the ways social 
problems are defined by various interested claimsmakers (Spector & Kitsuse 1977), and 
the “language games” of rhetorical and counterrhetorical strategies of claimsmakers 
(Ibarra & Kitsuse 2003), are important factors in the studying the construction of social 
problems.  In light of this, Best suggests a way out is through the “traditional model for 
qualitative researchers, staying close to the data, and developing grounded theories 
through analytic induction (cf. Glaser and Strauss 1967)” (2003:66).   
Collective Claimsmaking, Movement-Countermovement Dynamics & Public Problems 
In terms of the historical progression or stages of the development of a social 
problem (Blumer 1971; Kitsuse & Spector 1973; Spector & Kitsuse 1973, 1977), Joel Best 
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(1990, 2008) has outlined and elaborated in detail how the process unfolds.  First, 
claimsmakers formulate and articulate claims, which is to say that “someone must bring 
the topic to the attention of others, by making a claim that there is a condition that 
should be recognized as troubling, that needs to be addressed” (Best 2008:15).  For 
example, news media, citing expert and professional testimony, acted as claimsmakers 
for a period of time in the 1980’s convincing many people that child abductions 
constituted a real and serious social problem in need of collective solutions, and after a 
period of time these claims became recognized and treated as signifiers of an actually 
occurring social problem (Best 1990).  The events of September 11 served as the catalyst 
for elite actors to begin claiming within hours of the attacks, and continue to claim into 
the present, that the responsible parties were Islamic fundamentalists, Middle Eastern 
terrorists, and/or Jihadi hijackers working at the behest of Usama bin Laden, Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed, and the al-Qa'ida network (Zelikow 2004).  The events served as 
justifications for impingements upon domestic civil liberties, the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and for the Global War on Terror, and these actions, like those of imputing 
responsibility of the events, were the result of protracted public relations campaigns 
(Ahmed 2005; Altheide 2006; Entman 2004; Kellner 2003; Snow 2003; Zwicker 2006).    
Credible claims from legitimate institutional orders represent one end of the 
spectrum of claimsmaking activities, but at another extreme “we can imagine a claim 
that no one finds convincing:” 
picture a man standing on a street corner warning passersby [sic] that invisible, 
undetectable aliens from planet Zorax have infested the very air that they’re 
breathing.  This may be a claim, but if everyone who hears it dismisses or ignores 
it, it will have no impact.  The social problems process requires not only that 
someone make a claim, but that others react to it.  (Best 2008:15)  
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The acceptance or denial of a claim as indicating a real (actually existing) or unreal 
(nonexistent) troubling condition is based upon the credibility or legitimacy of the 
source of the claim, an audience’s perceptions of the truth-value of the claim, and how 
well the claim fits with an audience’s background assumptions or the climate of opinionxii. 
There also exists a “hierarchy of credibility” (Becker 1967:245), within which social 
actors lower in social status more experience lower credibility when making claims than 
do people with relatively higher levels of prestige or regard.  Social actors in the dramas 
of social movements compete for audience interpretations of reality (Benford & Hunt 
1992), and a large part of being successful in this work depends upon maintaining a 
positive or credible collective identity in the public’s perception (Hunt et al. 1994).  
Maintaining a veneer of legitimacy is especially important for social movements when 
making claims that run counter to some predominantly accepted truth or reality 
(McAdam et al. 2001).  Therefore, the nature of a claim is important to consider in terms 
of whether or not it might be measured as a serious issue by an audience, but the source 
of a claim is of importance as well in terms of the fate of a social problems work.  
                                                                 
xii In The Culture Struggle, Michael Parenti (2005) discusses related notions to what many have referred to 
as a “climate of opinion,” which takes on different meanings depending on which school of thought to 
which one subscribes (e.g., see Becker 1963:145-6; Coleman 1961; Denham 2005; Smith 1973; Tsfati 
2003).  For Parenti (2005), the climate of opinion resembles objectivity for those who rarely, if ever, 
engage in unorthodox, radical, and/or heterodoxic discourse.  Aside from the idiosyncratic development 
of personal opinions and perceptions, “[m]ost of our seemingly personal perceptions are shaped by a 
variety of things outside ourselves, such as the prevailing culture, the dominant ideol ogy, ethical beliefs, 
social values and biases, available information, one’s position in the social structure, and one’s material 
interests” (126-7).  Parenti goes on to say that the “notions and perceptions that fit the prevailing climate 
of opinion are more likely to be accepted as objective, while those that clash with it are usually seen as 
beyond the pale and lacking in credibility.  So, more often than we realize, we accept or decline an idea, 
depending on its acceptability within the dominant culture” (127).  Thus, a “unanimity of bias” prevails in 
which people’s “background assumptions” come to fi lter out unorthodox and radical claims from those 
more in l ine with what has been presented by “legitimate” sources as factual, true, and/or objective.  
“Our readiness to accept something as true, or reject it as false, rests less on its argument and evidence 
and more on how it aligns with the preconceived notions embedded within dominant culture, 
assumptions we have internalized due to repeated exposure” (Pa renti 2005:127).  This analysis falls in l ine 
with arguments laid out in The Social Construction of Reality (Berger & Luckmann 1966).   
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 During the claimsmaking stage of the process of constructing a social problem, 
claimsmakers “argue that a particular troubling condition ought to be recognized as a  
social problem, and that someone ought to do something about that problem” (Best 
2008:18).  Best (2008) further points out that claimsmakers are typically thought of as 
activists and social movements, but he notes that this is not always the case, for experts 
and professionals (e.g., physicians, scientists, lawyers, professors, journalists, etc.) can 
also act as claimsmakers.  Unlike most activists and social movements, these “insider 
claimsmakers” can rely upon the legitimacy of their statuses and institutional 
affiliations, as well as their respective training and expertise in their fields, to formulate, 
articulate, and propagate claims.  As this logic goes, an ordinary or normal person in 
appearance making a radical claim on street corner is less likely to be believed, or attract 
attention, than a person donning a doctor’s white lab coat or other professional garb, 
especially if (s)he is serving as an expert witness for news media; an analogy can be 
carried over for collective claimsmakers.  If social actors hold some amount of perceived 
legitimacy, they are often asked to give expert testimony in news reports and court 
proceedings, and in consequence they often have direct access to media outlets whereas 
activists and social movements might only gain intermittent and unattended 
appearances in select newscasts (Best 2008).   
Accordingly, the contestation between insider and outsider claimsmakers is a 
bidding contest within the social problems marketplace where insiders are at a distinct 
advantage from the start (Best 1990, 2008; Hilgartner & Bosk 1988).  Due to lacking 
credentials, not having institutional affiliations, deviating from societal norms, and/or 
to the reception of stigmatizing labels, outsider claimsmakers must work harder than 
insiders to build their legitimacy in the minds of their audiences.  Moreover, because 
55 
 
they are not regularly called upon to promote mediated agendas, outsider claimsmakers 
must compete against ‘Wall Street, Washington, and Wars’ (i.e., dominant news stories) 
for time and exposure in the mass media in order for their claims to reach broader public 
audiences.  In addition to competing for time during a newscast or for other media 
exposure, at any given time, myriad claims (e.g., the legal statuses of abortion, 
marihuana, and the President; wars, genocide, and murder; hunger, poverty, and 
inequality; etc.) by multiple claimsmakers compete for audience attention as to what 
should constitute a social problem.  The claimsmaking process impacts which issues 
become viewed as social problems and which are not, and this process is contextualized 
by various social actors (Best 2008; Blumer 1971).  In light of the fact that the events of 
September 11 transpired nearly fourteen years ago (as of June 13, 2014), with thousands 
of news stories arising in the meantime, the 911TM must compete with intervening 
claims to social problems, and this is in addition to the existing anti-conspiracy 
discourse (Goshorn 2000; Pelkmans & Machold 2011; Truscello 2011) that encourages 
people to perceive the 911TM as an incredible source of brazenly audacious claims.     
It has been taken-for-granted this far that the 911TM makes claims such as that 
“9/11 was an inside job,” which essentially means that (allegedly) social actors within 
the U.S. federal government had some type of involvement in bringing the events of 
September 11 to fruition (for the spectrum of these claims, see Griffin 2007b and Tarpley 
2007).  What is presently of concern is that the 911TM can be represented in the status of 
an outsider claimsmaker not due to the content of its claims, but by virtue of Best’s 
(2008) model of claimsmaking, the hierarchy of credibility (Becker 1967), and societal 
reactions to their claims (Becker 1963; Grattet 2011).  Thus, if and when counterclaims, or 
“arguments in direct opposition to the original claims” (Best 2008:50), emerge, especially 
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if they are presented within legitimated institutional settings (Blumer 1971), we can 
assume that they arise from insider claimsmakers who will be perceived, at the least, as 
a more legitimate source than the 911TM.  If claims are put forward in the collective 
action of social movements, then we can consider that movement to be a collective 
claimsmaker with an outsider, delegitimated status, and if counterclaims are put 
forward in the collective efforts of that movement’s opponents, then we can consider 
them as well to be collective claimsmakers in terms of a countermovement that enjoys a 
legitimated insider status (Dixon 2008; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996).   
As collective claimsmakers, social movements can be defined in various ways, 
such as “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity, partly 
outside institutional or organizational channels, for the purpose of challenging extant 
systems of authority, or resisting change in such systems, in the organization, society, 
culture, or world system in which they are embedded” (Snow & Soule 2010:6), and/or as 
“collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 1994:3-4).  The 911TM fits 
these definitions due to the fact that it is a collectivity composed of individuals and 
organizations who actively seek to redefine in the public imagination what “9/11” is or 
was and what happened on September 11.  Its activities directly challenge the authority 
of the state, state actors, and supporting institutions, such as media and the military, and 
the sought after change in the definition of “9/11” will likely impact the nature of the 
relationship between U.S. civil society and its federal government, military, and media.     
Of the many consequences of their collective claimsmaking, when social 
movements challenge systems of authority they invite or invent their own opposition 
(Meyer & Staggenborg 1996; Snow 2004b).  Best (2008) argues that the collective 
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challenging of a system of authority wrapped in and propping up the status quo is what 
distinguishes a social movement from its countermovement.  Hence, a 
“‘countermovement’ is a movement that,” simply put, “makes contrary claims 
simultaneously to those of the original movement” (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996:1631).  
The 911TM’s countermovement is a network of mostly weak associations among 
individuals, often embedded within central social institutions of media, academia, and 
government, who support each other, directly or indirectly, in their collective assertion 
that the 911TM is mostly or completely, empirically or morally, wrong in its 
claimsmaking activities.  In the end, social movements and countermovements attempt 
to undermine their opponent's positions through direct or indirect confrontation, 
neutralization of claims, and/or discrediting the oppositional movement’s collective 
identity (Zald & Useem 1987).   
Social movements open identity fields for each of the social actors involved in 
their claimsmaking efforts (Hunt et al. 1994), and this becomes all the more clear when 
we apply the language of dramaturgical analysis (Benford & Hunt 1992,).  While 
members of social movements tend to think of themselves and their movement as the 
protagonist, their opponents as antagonists, and the public and bystanders as the 
audience, countermovements position themselves before the same audiences as the true 
protagonists and position the social movement as the unwarranted aggressor on the 
social order.  In the drama of social movements, the ultimate competition is over how 
reality is interpreted by audiences.  A social movement enters the stage in Act 2, after 
initial conditions have been set in the physical and/or social worlds, and it challenges 
the existing, often dominant narrative of why those conditions exist, how they came 
about, and what this means for the status and future of society.  “Any social movement 
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of potential political significance will generate opposition” (Meyer & Staggenborg 
1996:1630), and this materializes when countermovements develop in attempts to 
defend the status quo and/or disrupt its challengers’ efforts.  Thus, while social 
movement protagonists work to stimulate “audiences to redefine their situations as 
unjust and mutable so that existing power structures can be altered” (Benford & Hunt 
1992:48), countermovement antagonists work to repress challengers, maintain original 
interpretations, and repair any damage to interpretations brought about by social 
movement activities.  
 “Thus,” say Benford and Hunt, “problems work entails an emergent drama 
between protagonists and antagonists as each seeks to establish its definitions of 
situations and imputations, to rebut and discredit their opponents’ claims, and to inspire 
individuals to either engage in collective action or stand fast and not act upon others’ 
problem claims” (2003:154).  This “problems work” takes place in the open public 
domain where social actors other than the protagonists and antagonists can spectate, 
speculate, and choose to join in, fall from, or abate the situation.  The public domain, 
composed at any given time of myriad social actors representing and operating by the 
logics of various institutional orders (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008; Thornton et al. 2012), 
is audience to the movement-countermovement dynamics, especially as they unfold in 
mediated settings (Benford & Hunt 2003).  It is only when the countermovement arises 
to oppose the social change that social movements seek to bring about that a new unit of 
analysis arises (Benford & Hunt 2003).  The discourse that arises among movement-
countermovement interactions produces a discursive field that contextualizes, 
constrains, and provides opportunities for movements and countermovements to 
engage each other and their audiences (Snow 2004a; Steinberg 1998)   
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New forms of organizations and institutions that arise during movement-
countermovement interactions can serve as units of analysis (Andrews 2002; Rao, 
Morrill & Zald 2000), but it is the movement-countermovement interaction that 
comprises the focus of this study.  Movement-countermovement dynamics are affected 
by institutional arrangements and how culturally-based assumptions can be used as an 
opportunity for or constraint upon action (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008).  For example, 
the growth of the Internet facilitated criticisms of religious beliefs and practices and 
rebuttals from countermovements in ways impractical before it existed (Cowan 2004; 
Peckham 1998).  Likewise, the availability of or closure to political opportunities in more 
or less democratic or authoritarian societies shifts the ebbs and flows of movement-
countermovement interactions (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996; Peleg 2000).  At their heart, 
movement-countermovement interactions involve claims and counterclaims of what 
should or should not be considered a social problem (Best 2008), and while these can 
take place in debates and other direct confrontations, they are typically loosely coupled 
interactions that involve protracted disputes in mediated settings (Rohlinger 2002; Zald 
& Useem 1987).  The back-and-forth claimsmaking and counter-claimsmaking between 
movements and countermovements produces its own social reality, one dependent 
upon interactions between these parties, but this reality can be analyzed on its own 
terms.  
Social movements and their countermovements engage in claimsmaking and 
framing activities in which they attempt to construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct the 
meaning of an issue, event, person, group, or idea (Benford & Hunt 2003).  Claims 
involve the use of rhetorical persuasion based upon the grounds (assertions of facts 
about a troubling condition), warrants (justifications about what ought to be done), and 
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conclusions (recommended changes) put forward by claimsmakers (Best 2008), and 
these mirror the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames that social movements 
employ to recruit audiences to their causes (Benford & Snow 1988).  When claims are put 
forward by a movement and/or movement activists, countermovements use 
counterclaims to contest the grounds upon which they are made, and these often take 
form through “counterrhetorical strategies” (Ibarra & Kitsuse 2003:33), which are 
attempts to reframe the claim and/or claimant as disreputable and unworthy of serious 
entertainment by audiences.  Counterrhetorical strategies, especially in the 
unsympathetic form that do not entertain the grounds, warrants, or conclusions of 
claims, move beyond counterclaims by shifting attention away from factual assertions 
and toward the logical or conceptual clarity of the claim and legitimacy of the 
claimsmaker.  That is to say, countermovements need not rely upon logical consistency, 
rhetorical clarity, reiterative coherency, or factual bases when formulating their 
counterclaims.  Once counterframed in these ways, movement activists are then obliged 
to reframe those counterframes as well as the claims they put forward to garner public 
support in the first place, which necessitates extra efforts on their part to succeed in their 
actions.  This is how contestation occurs in the marketplace of public problems (Benford 
& Hunt 2003). 
What distinguishes a public problem from a social problem is that while the latter 
is an accomplishment of one or more claimsmakers, the former helps “focus analytic 
attention on the interactions between and among collective claimsmakers as they 
attempt to advance or impede an imputed condition as a ‘problem’ in public domains” 
(Benford & Hunt 2003:155; see also Gusfield 1981).  We can think of “public” in this 
regard as similar to the concept of “civil society” (Janoski 1998), which is the collection 
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of individuals, groups, and organizations who voluntarily interact for recreational, 
market-based, and otherwise pro-social purpose.  Civil society, or the public, is the 
target of a plethora of claims from a diverse set of claimsmakers, thus there is a 
“carrying capacity” (Best 1990; Hilgartner & Bosk 1988) to how many claims can be 
entertained at once.  Taking up from Best’s (1990, 2008) model of the claimsmaking 
process (see Figure 2), Benford & Hunt (2003) show how claims directed toward the 
public are not unidirectional but interactional (see Figure 3).  Moreover, not only do the 
various social actors involved in the claimsmaking process engage in interactions, but 
each claimant domain (i.e., social movement, countermovement, media, public, and 
policymakers) is comprised of multiple constituents that engage in interactions as well.   
Benford & Hunt (2003) represent this complexity in a modified model of 
claimsmaking on the public problems marketplace that depicts interactions among and 
between claimants, as is reproduced here in Figure 5.  This model portrays a framework 





that is “the basis for understanding the complex interactions involved in the emergence 
of some imputed condition as a public problem” (Benford & Hunt 2003:159).  The 
multiplicity of actors and interactions within each claimant domain brings to attention 
the existence of multiple institutional settings and actors that constitute society 
(Thornton et al. 2012) and, thus, with which social movements interact and compete for 
hegemony over a given discourse (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008; Snow 2004a).  In Figure 
5, each box (claimant domain) can contain many more constituents (circles) and 
interactions (arrows) than shown here.  In order to “accurately capture the interactional 
dynamics between these multiple layers of public problem marketplaces would require 
a three-dimensional representation” (Benford & Hunt 2003:159).  To note, interactional 
dynamics are typically communicative or discursive in nature, which involves the 
framing, claimsmaking, reframing, counterclaiming, and/or counterframing activities of 
social movements and countermovements (Benford & Hunt 2003; Best 2008). 
 The focus of this study is on the left-hand portion of Figure 5.  It would be 
particularly difficult to attend to the interactional dynamics of all claimant domains, 
within or between.  The present study is focused on movement-countermovement 
dynamics among insider and outsider claimsmakers of those who contest and defend 
the official narrative of “9/11.”  The reason for this is practical rather than theoretical.  
My ethnography with the 911TM affords me data to analyze its claimsmaking and 
framing activities, but rarely do social movements engage in such enterprises without 
reprisal.  In point of fact, the existence of countermovements shape social movement 
activities because, once counterclaims and counterframes are issued, social movements 
must reissue claims and reframe counterframes (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996).  Moreover, 
the presence of discursive fields within which movement-countermovement dynamics 
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emerge shapes the discourse, or exchange of communicative interactions, that social 
movements and their opposition use to engage the public, malign each other, and deflect 
oppositional tactics and strategies (Snow 2004a).  Thus, as I express below in Figure 9, 
my focus is particularly on the discursive field of the 911TM. 
Framing and 9/11 Truth 
Of the many practices of social movements, which range from organizing and 
engaging in street protests to producing texts used to promote their causes, framing 
activities are key methods of recruiting new members, winning attention of and support 
from audiences, and deflecting negative attributions from antagonists (Benford & Hunt 
1994; Benford & Snow 2000).  Put differently, social movements “frame, or assign 
meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to 
mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to 
demobilize antagonists” (Snow & Benford 1988:198).  In terms of this, three core tasks 
are diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing, which work in conjunction with 
each other to alter interpretations and perceptions of social reality:  “Diagnostic framing 
involves identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality” [italicized 
in original] (Snow & Benford 1988:200); the “purpose of prognostic framing is not only to 
suggest solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics, and targets” 
[italicized in original] (1988:201); and the task or function of mobilizing framing is “the 
elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the diagnosis and 
prognosis” [italicized in original] (1988:202).  Lastly, discursive “fields contain the 
genres that collective actors can draw upon to construct discursively diagnosis, 
prognosis, and motivation” (Steinberg 1998:856), thus discursive fields are an important 
aspect in the consideration of framing practices.   
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In their diverse activities, individuals and SMO’sxiii engage in frame alignment 
processesxiv, which are thought to be “a necessary condition for movement participation” 
(Snow et al. 1986:464), but when a movement seeks to or must transform a dominant or 
established frame in order to garner support for their cause, they reframe the meaning of 
a symbol and/or practice through keyingxv (Benford & Hunt 2003:170; Goffman 1974:43-
5; Snow et al. 1986:474).  When not considered as a counterrhetorical strategy, keying is 
similar to reframing in that both are attempts to change or alter the meaning of some 
given thing.  If a social movement is successful in keying, their audience(s) will 
reinterpret social reality or some aspect of it (Benford & Hunt 1994), and in redefining 
the situation collective claimsmakers, in effect, challenge the existing social order and 
(threaten to) replace it with a new or different one (McHugh 1968). 
The central claim of the 911TM, that “9/11 was an inside job,” is a diagnostic 
frame, and the call to action found in another central claim, that people need to 
                                                                 
xiii An SMO is “a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social 
movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement these goals” (Zald & McCarthy 1987:20).  
David Snow and Sara Soule (2010) add to this, stating that “[w]hether the SMO is a formal organization or 
a loose group of associates who come together occasionally, we can think of an SMO as a bounded entity 
of individuals who have come together because of a shared goal concerning one or more grievances” 
(151).  And along with individual SMO’s come social movement industries (SMIs), “the set of social 
movement organizations that are working toward change in the same basic area” (152); the social 
movement sector (SMS), which “encompasses all  extant social movement organizations, associated with 
all social movements or issues, in a particular time and place” (153); and the social movement 
organizational field, which is “that set of organizations that share overlapping constituencies and interests 
or to which a focal organization is l inked, whether this is in a facil itative or antagonistic fashion” (153).   
xiv This process involves “the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of 
individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO a ctivities, goals, and ideology are congruent and 
complimentary” (Snow et al. 1986:464). 
xv Keying can refer to various things within the universe of social movements.  In general framing 
activities, keying “redefines activities, events, and biographies that are already meaningful from the 
standpoint of some primary framework, in terms of another framework, such that they are now ‘seen by 
the participants to be something quite else’” (Snow et al. 1986:474).  With regard to movement-
countermovement interactions, “keying occurs when movement participants restate claims made by 
antagonists in such a way as to give them new meanings that subvert or stand in opposition to the ones 
originally conveyed” (Benford & Hunt 2003:170). 
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“investigate 9/11,” is a prognostic frame.  The former keys “9/11,” and the latter directs 
people to reconsider what they know to have happened on September 11.  Together, 
these act as a motivational frame, because if upon investigation a mole network within 
the U.S. government is found to have been complicit or instrumental in the events of 
September 11 (e.g., see Tarpley 2007), or, at the least, if people recognize that the 
evidence of controlled demolitions in the three WTC buildings points to some type of an 
“inside job” (AE911Truth 2011; Chandler 2012; Griffin 2010a; Ryan 2012), then something 
needs to be done.  Summing this up, one prominent member states with regard to the 
events of September 11 that members of the public should “discover and speak the truth:  
I would suggest,” states Griffin, “that such people should—if they have not done so 
already—study about both 9/11 and the American empire to see if they find the claims 
made here [Griffin & Scott 2007] about them true.  If they do, then they should do 
everything in their power to make others aware of these facts” (Griffin 2007b:17).   
The intended consequence of these framing activities is a transformation of domain-
specific interpretative framesxvi with regard to how the events of September 11 are typically 
understood in terms of the narrative of “9/11.”  The widely accepted narrative of 
“9/11,” produced and promoted by U.S. elites and central institutions, has been at the 
root of pervasive social transformations in the 21 st century, and so reframing “9/11” 
would likely lead to a transformation of global interpretive framesxvii.  The change in 
                                                                 
xvi “By transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames, [Snow et al. 1986] refer to fairly self-
contained but substantial changes in the way a particular domain of l ife is framed, such that a domain 
previously taken for granted is reframed as problematic and in need of repair, or a domai n seen as 
normative or acceptable is reframed as an injustice that warrants change” (Snow, Rochford, Worden & 
Benford 1986:474). 
xvii In this type of frame alignment process, “the scope of change is broadened considerably as a new 
primary framework gains ascendance over others and comes to function as a kind of master frame that 
interprets events and experiences in a new way” (Snow et al. 1986:475).  A conversion takes place  
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worldview that can accompany beliefs in conspiracy theories is claimed to be 
detrimental to individuals, groups, institutions, and society (Abalakina‐Paap et al. 1999; 
Douglas & Sutton 2008; Goertzel 1994; Jolley & Douglas 2014), and so it is the public 
problems work of 911TM activism that some attempt to frame as an existing and 
growing social problem (Banas & Miller 2013; Berlet 2009; Kay 2011; Sunstein & 
Vermeule 2009; Taibbi 2008; Warner & Neville-Shepard 2014).  Whereas the 911TM 
attempts to mobilize the public and transform domain (and global) interpretive frames, 
a countermovement has formed to oppose those actions.  In step, these actors engage in 
claimsmaking and counter-claimsmaking (Best 2008), framing, counterframing, and 
reframing process (Benford & Hunt 2003; Snow & Benford 1988) activities.  Just as it 
would be impossible to collect and analyze data from the entire 911TM and from all of 
its countermovement antagonists, it would be infeasible to utilize the entire repository of 
analytic concepts that the claimsmaking and framing literatures offer.  Those I take up 
here, as suggested by Benford & Hunt (2003), are the counterframing and reframing 
strategies movements and countermovements use during their interactions. 
The social problems work of social movements regularly elicits countervailing 
social forces who put forward rhetorical obstacles and barriers to movement activity 
(Gamson 1988; Ibarra & Kitsuse 2003; Shriver et al. 2013).  Of these social forces, some 
organize, however loosely coupled, into countermovements who operate as agents of 
social control (Lo 1982; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996; Mottl 1980).  Assuming the 911TM’s 
claims that “9/11 was an inside job” already exist and are contentious, and assuming 
that a countermovement has formed to oppose those claims, we can focus on rhetorical 
strategies this countermovement employs to counteract the 911TM’s claims, namely its 
counterframing strategy.  This strategy is an effort to “rebut, undermine, or neutralize a 
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person’s or group’s myths, versions of reality, or interpretative framework” (Benford 
1987:75), and Benford and Hunt (2003) identify four tactics within the counterframing 
strategy.  The “first three involve attacks on the movement’s ideology… [and the] fourth 
generic counterframe entails attacks on the collective character of the movement or 
organization advocating change” (Benford & Hunt 2003:162).  I will elaborate on two of 
these, which are problem denial and attacks on collective character. 
The easiest way to counterframe a claim is to simply deny that the problem exists 
or to ignore the claim or (purported) problem altogether.  If a social movement claims 
that X is a social problem or that widely recognized social problem Y is caused by X, a 
countermovement can rely upon the tactic of problem denial by arguing that X is not a 
problem or that X does not cause Y.  Benford and Hunt elaborate on the tactic of 
problem denial with the following passage:   
By denying the existence of a problem or denying injury (Sykes and Matza 1957), 
movement antagonists essentially question a movement’s raison d’être.  If there is 
no problem then there is no need for a movement.  Thus, the identity 
implications of problem denial are that claimsmakers are ill-informed, irrational, 
or insincere.  [italicized in original] (2003:163) 
If a countermovement can convince its audience that a social movement or its members 
believe in non-existent phenomena, then they (potentially) stop the audience from 
adopting the movement’s frames by painting the movement as unworthy of serious 
attention.  If problem denial does not work, or if it does not pull off the task of 
impugning the movement’s credibility or legitimacy well enough, a countermovement 
can directly make attacks on the collective character of the social movement. 
 The collective character of a social movement can be thought of as “a collective 
identity component that fosters a sense of unity that includes a complex of behavioral, 
cognitive, and moral traits participants impute to an organization as a whole or to 
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particular performance teams” (Hunt 1991:255).  Social movements, especially those 
making claims incongruent with dominant cultural beliefs and values (McAdam et al. 
2001), must work hard to fashion a positive identity in the perceptions of its audiences, 
and because social movements are often composed of multiple SMO’s and individuals 
with a variety of backgrounds and interests, internal threats to a social movement’s 
identity exacerbate external threats (Hunt et al. 1994).  If a social movement’s identity is 
perceived as antagonistic toward or counter to dominant cultural values, then it will be 
more difficult for it to convince its audiences to adopt its frames, thus they must work 
hard to maintain credibility and relevancy (Benford & Hunt 1994).  Countermovements 
are aware of this, hence 
the most powerful counterframing tactic deployed by antagonists is an attack on 
the collective character of the movement group.  Such tactics occur in a variety of 
everyday life situations, especially in contentious relations or interactions.  The 
ploy, of course, is to discredit the claims of the other by discrediting her/his 
character (cf. Goffman 1955, 1959, 1963).  Thus, any potential persuasive power 
the other’s claims might yield can be undermined by the perception that the 
claimant is a discredited person (or collectivity).  [italicized in original] (Benford 
& Hunt 2003:166). 
The conspiracy label operates in this fashion, allowing its issuer the rhetorically-won 
moral high ground without resolve to rational discourse or rigorous examination of 
empirical claims (deHaven-Smith 2010; Husting & Orr 2007; Pelkmans & Machold 2011).  
In fact, an entire anti-conspiracy discourse exists in which the conspiracy label has been 
meticulously crafted to serve such a purpose (Goshorn 2000; Truscello 2011). 
 If social movements do not attempt to counteract or repair the damage wrought 
by counterframing strategies, especially attacks on their collective character, they run the 
risks of having their identify discredited and losing the contestation over what should or 
should not be considered a social problem (Coles 1998; Hunt et al. 1994; Klandermans 
1992).  Therefore, social movements spend considerable time engaged in reframing 
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activities, or “collective attempts to respond to the counterframes of movement 
opponents in ways intended to ward off, contain, limit, or reverse potential damage to 
the movement’s previous claims or attributes” (Benford & Hunt 2003:169).  At the 
extremes, social movements can ignore a counterframe outright so they do not lend it 
credence or more visibility than it already has, or they can embrace a counterframe as a 
sign that the movement’s activities are successful enough to warrant such attention.  
Social movement SMO’s and individual members might want to distance themselves 
from particularly troubling counterframes by embracing other counterframes, or they 
can key into a counterframe in an attempt to shift or transform its meaning.  Finally, a 
social movement can engage in countermaligning, which is the “fifth and final reframing 
process employed by movement actors [that] entails rhetorical attacks on antagonists’ 
ideology and identity claims” (Benford & Hunt 2003:174).   
 Generating their thesis from the work of several social theorists, including 
Herbert Blumer (1969), William Gamson (1988), and Peter Ibarra and John Kitsuse 
(1993), Benford and Hunt summarize the social problems work of collective 
claimsmakers on the public problems marketplace as 
an emergent drama between protagonist and antagonist claimants, [with] each 
trying to establish their claims, to rebut and discredit their opponents’ claims, 
and to move individuals, organizations, and/or agencies to do or not do 
something. 
The public problems marketplace is a terrain of contested claims.  Claims 
or frames are not merely proffered and then accepted or rejected.  Rather, 
opponents and allies respond to public claims and identity attributions made by 
claimants, giving new meaning to or even subverting old symbols .  (2003:160)     
In explaining this, Benford and Hunt note that “insufficient attention” (2003:159) in 
social movements and social problems literature had been given to Ibarra and Kitsuse’s 
(1993) concept of counterrhetorical strategies, which is elaborated further by Ibarra and 
Kitsuse (2003).   
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“Debunking practices are especially important” for counterrhetorical strategies 
Ibarra and Kitsuse (2003:26) point out, because counterclaimants often attempt to 
symbolically block as meaningful some imputed social problem.  Ibarra and Kitsuse 
state the following as one example of a counterrhetorical strategy: 
In using the counterrhetoric of insincerity, the counterclaimant suggests or declares 
that the claimant’s characterization is suspect because of a “hidden agenda” on 
his [or her] part; namely that he [or she] is participating in the social problems 
process as a means of advancing or guaranteeing his career or as a means of 
securing or gaining power, status, or wealth.  The successful use of this device is 
premised on the notion that claims forwarded by self-interested parties are by 
definition or tendency more reflective of the claimants’ designs than of what is 
“best for society.”  (2003:37). 
Another tactic of the counterrhetorical strategy is the counterrhetoric of hysteria, which 
“characterizes the claimants as members of a social category and then dismisses their 
claims as ‘typical’ expressions of [that category]” (Ibarra & Kitsuse 2003:38).  This latter 
strategy is encapsulated by counterframing tactics of problem denial and attacks on 
collective character.   
 The literature and theory discussed so far posit the existence of a public 
problems marketplace on which a competition between multiple claimsmakers occurs.  
The discursive bidding contest takes place between claimants with unequal access to 
audiences, with insider claimsmakers having higher visibility via media and easier 
accesses to policymakers than outsider claimsmakers.  Insider claimants, or pressure 
groups, sometimes organize their efforts to undermine those of outsider claimants, or 
social movements.  When social movements challenge the existing social order, or some 
aspect of it, the collective actions of insider claimsmakers form countermovements that 
mobilize, typically through the use of counterframing or counterrhetorical strategies 
designed to block what a social movement is able to effectively communicate to its 
audience(s).  Social movements must respond to these discursive threats if they are to 
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succeed in their goals of winning public support, altering the meaning of some given 
thing, and/or changing public policy.  What is in need of further elaboration for this 
dissertation are the complexities of the social and discursive environments within which 
social movements operate, especially those that specifically pertain to the 9/11 Truth 
Movement.    
The (Multi)Institutional Logics and Discursive Field of the 9/11 Truth Movement 
The following subsections move through a discussion of different ways to 
approach the conceptual importance of social movements, how they are contextualized 
by multi-institutional politics, and how social movements operate within discursive 
fields.  Included in the discussion are new social movements (NSMs) because “NSM 
theory provides an important corrective to political process approaches by centering 
inquiry on the nature of domination in society and on the relationship between forms of 
domination and social movement challenges” (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008:81).  This 
discussion proceeds under the assumption that power is asymmetrically distributed 
throughout societies, and that those in power tend to physically and symbolically 
dominate subordinates via ideology, hegemony, and discourse (Stoddart 2007).  With 
regard to the preceding section, social movements, acting as outside claimsmakers, 
typically have less institutionally afforded legitimacy, and, moreover, the presence of a 
discursive field lends extra symbolic power to their insider opponents.  The final 
subsections give special attention to the nature of discursive fields, especially those 
central to the 911TM, namely anti-conspiracy discourse.  
(New) Social Movements & Political Processes 
The classic social movement agenda is rooted in the concepts of political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, collective action frames, and repertoires of 
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contention, and each contains its own independent as well as interacting structural and 
dynamic, causal and consequential mechanisms in terms of social movement origins, 
processes, and outcomes (McAdam et al. 2001).  For example, political processes 
approaches (McAdam 1982; see also McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996), which were for a 
period of time “the hegemonic paradigm among social movements analysts” (Goodwin 
& Jasper 1999:28), theorize the state as the target of, gatekeeper to, and/or repressive 
force against protests and other forms of dissenting collective action.  As an example, 
taking the state as a major explanatory factor of social movements, McAdam et al. (2001) 
propose that social movements should be explained in terms of the extent to which 
agents of the state, organizationally and individually, exercise control within the 
geographic boundaries of nation-states (i.e., state capacity) and the degree to which the 
polity is inclusive and representative of the citizenry (i.e., democracy).  The political 
processes approach to studying social movements has powerful explanatory capabilities, 
but recent correctives to its limited set of deficiencies offer more robust insights for the 
current project.   
Critiquing and extending the political process approach, Elizabeth Armstrong 
and Mary Bernstein, citing numerous other critiques that “revolve around the definition 
and identification of political opportunity, the state-centeredness that marginalizes some 
social movements, and ignoring or misunderstanding the relationship between culture, 
identity, and structure in movements” (2008:74), propose a multi-institutional politics 
approach that expands the conception of power beyond the state and into culture and 
institutional orders.  Power, it should be noted, is a central concept in the study of social 
movements, and it is thought to be enacted during interactions between social 
movements, their targets or audiences, and their opposition or antagonists (Benford & 
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Hunt 1992, 2003).  Alongside social institutions like the state and media, culture is a 
powerful force for social movements that is at once both a constraint and a resource for 
opportunities (Swidler [1995] 2003; Williams 2004).  We might think of culture as the 
collection of socially transmitted attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, and practices that guide 
and shape the cognition and behavior of social actors (DiMaggio 1997), or, in the context 
of multiple institutional orders, we might refer to these as “institutional logics,” which 
are “symbolically grounded, organizationally structured, politically defined and 
technically and materially constrained” unifying sets “of material practices and symbolic 
constructions…available to organizations and individuals to elaborate” (Friedland & 
Alford 1991:248-249).      
For the 911TM, the most salient example of these issues dates to when the former 
U.S. President, George W. Bush, along with his administration and a mostly compliant 
news press, defined in the hours, days, and weeks after the events of September 11, 2001, 
that they were acts of Jihadi terrorism by the al-Qaeda network.  This definition then 
served as provocation for the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Global War on Terror 
(Altheide 2006; Connor 2012; Entman 2004; Gershkoff & Kushner 2005; Krebs & Lobasz 
2007; Meyer 2009; Zarefsky 2004) and restrictions to U.S. civil liberties, such as through 
signing into law the so-called USA PATRIOT Act.  Social movements are largely defined 
by and operate within the cultural landscape of their social milieu (Polletta 2008), and so 
the 911TM has had a difficult struggle in their attempt to reframe “9/11” insofar as the 
dominant narrative produced by the Bush administration and mainstream news media 
took firm root in U.S. culture (Connor 2012; Denzin & Lincoln 2003; Krebs & Lobasz 
2007).  The reinforcement of the narrative of “9/11” among and between multiple 
74 
 
institutional orders does not necessarily affirm its validity or legitimacy, but it does 
suggest that challengers to the narrative will more easily find enemies than allies. 
Some treatments of “9/11” by sociologists and other academics include no 
references to alternative (i.e., “conspiratorial”) accounts of the events of September 11 
(Calhoun, Price & Timmer 2002; Denzin & Lincoln 2003), but rather they source 
knowledge of the events to the official account (Zelikow 2004).  One sociologist claiming 
to have produced “The Sociology of Conspiracy” [emphasis mine] (Sternheimer 2007, 
2010) cites only Zelikow’s (2004) 9/11 Commission Report as the source that shows why 
9/11 conspiracy theories are false, and another sociologist went so far as to use the label 
“anti-American” for a category of people who have interpretations of the events of 
September 11 that do not match the official interpretation (Robinson 2005)!  While some 
sociologists have paid critical attention to Zelikow’s (2004) final report on the terrorist 
attacks (e.g., see Hershberg & Moore 2002; Mednicoff 2005; Perrow 2005; Tierney 2005; 
Vaughan 2006), they do not mention any of the alternative critical appraisals of it that 
bring attention to the report’s factual omissions and distortions suggesting it is part of a 
fabrication or cover up of the actual circumstances surrounding the events of September 
11 (for examples of these assertions, see Ahmed 2005; Griffin 2005).  One analysis 
supporting this trend shows a near unanimous agreement in cultural studies literature 
that any deviation from or skepticism toward the official story of “9/11” is considered 
inherently or effectively conspiratorial (Truscello 2011).   The state’s and mainstream 
news media’s definition of “9/11,” then, is diffuse enough to have tilted sociological and 
academic investigations in its favor and, thus, away from the 911TM’s. 
In terms of what makes an “official story” just that, David Coady (2006a) simply 
enough positions official stories or authoritative accounts of historically important 
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events in opposition to conspiracy theories.  For the definition of the latter term, Coady 
“recommend[s] the following three-part definition:” 
A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of an historical event, in which 
conspiracy (i.e., agents acting secretly in concert) has a significant causal role.  
Furthermore, the conspiracy postulated by the proposed explanation must be a 
conspiracy to bring about the historical event which it purports to explain.  
Finally, the proposed explanation must conflict with an ‘official’ explanation of 
the same historical event.  (2006a:117) 
No mention of the legal status of the conspiracy is mentioned, but we might assume that 
it is implied; if not, then conspiracies are sometimes plainly considered to be secretive or 
covert acts planned or engaged in by the concerted actions of tightly or loosely 
networked individuals.  Regardless of the legal status, Coady (2006a) directs against 
treating government as the sole source of authority or legitimacy for the term “official.”  
Coady explains: 
Both the media and the academy are, in virtue of their power to influence 
opinion, sources of official stories as well.  It is not surprising, therefore, that 
conspiracy theories tend to be disparaged by representatives of these institutions.  
It is also not surprising that official stories are unreliable in societies in which the 
media and other sources of official information are directly controlled by the 
government.  We are surely warranted in thinking that the more diverse the 
sources of official stories, the more credence those stories deserve.  But the fact 
that the government does not directly control other sources of official stories in 
contemporary western societies does not mean that these institutions are fully 
independent of the government.  (2006a:126)    
Therefore, when the 911TM attempts to reframe the official story of “9/11,” it 
necessarily calls into question the legitimacy of the social institution of government 
because it eventually provided the dominant explanations of how and why the events of 
September 11 took place (NIST 2008; Zelikow 2004).  However, social institutions that 
sponsor the government’s explanation then become officiates of this narrative as well, 
and thus actors within these institutions have vested interests in protecting that 
narrative, less their credibility and legitimacy suffer scrutiny.    
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From the state-centric political processes approach, social movements have been 
defined as “rational attempts by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage 
to advance collective interests through non-institutionalized means” (McAdam 1982:20).  
McAdam et al. advance this by focusing on contentious politics, by which they mean 
“episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when 
(a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and 
(b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants” 
(2001:5).  The 911TM can be considered an excluded group for it is regularly at the 
receiving end of a most divisive “transpersonal strategy of exclusion” (Husting & Orr 
2007), which is the use of the conspiracy label.  State actors and agencies within the U.S. 
federal government are often included in the claim that “9/11 was an inside job,” and if 
they can successfully mobilize support to the extent that they achieve their efforts to set 
up an independent investigation with subpoena power (e.g., see NJ911Aware.org 2013), 
then the 911TM will likely affect the interests of many social actors across a variety of 
social institutions.  These features make the 911TM a ripe subject for an analysis under 
the political processes and contentious politics approaches, but there are other 
sociological factors to consider.   
 While I retain aspects from political processes definitions of social movements in 
my analysis, insofar as they fulfill the political aspect of Armstrong and Bernstein’s 
(2008) multi-institutional politics approach, some additional aspects of the 911TM make 
it problematic to primarily hold to the political processes framework.  For example, the 
911TM often claims that the mainstream, corporate media has been complicit in a cover 
up of certain events of September 11 (e.g., see Zwicker 2006), and their antagonists hail 
from diverse institutional orders, such as government, mass media, academia, and think 
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tanks.  Moreover, as I have shown above, the discipline of sociology at the least has 
overlooked texts produced by the 911TM’s intellectual organizers as a viable source of 
interpretative schema for understanding “9/11.”  Therefore it is useful to include with 
the political process approach a model of social movements that is attuned to the 
complexities of the distribution of power throughout society’s institutional orders, and, 
moreover, because culture is a powerful resource and constraining force for social 
movements, it should be considered in the analysis of them as well.  This is found in the 
multi-institutional politics approach (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008), especially as much 
as it relates to Benford and Hunt’s (2003) model of the interactions between claimants on 
the public problems marketplace that is constituted by multiple parts of civil society 
(Janoski 1998). 
In addition to studying the nature of social movements, with Armstrong and 
Bernstein’s multi-institutional politics approach to studying social movements, “the 
investigation of the goals and strategies of movements are opportunities for insight into 
the nature of domination in contemporary society” (2008:82).  Insofar as this dissertation 
is about the 911TM, I assert that it, like previous studies on NSMs (see Crossley 2002), 
highlights areas in society where domination and oppression occur.  The multi-
institutional politics approach is predicated on a specific definition of social movements 
(Armstrong & Bernstein 2008:84), which is David Snow’s definition of them as   
collective challenges to systems or structures of authority or, more concretely, as 
collectivities acting with some degree of organization (could be formal, hierarchical, 
networked, etc.) and continuity (more continuous than crowd or protest events 
but not institutionalized or routinized in the sense of being institutionally 
organizationally calendarized) primarily outside of institutional or organizational 
channels for the purpose of challenging extant systems of authority, or resisting change 
in such systems, in the organization, society, culture or world order of which they are a 
part.  [italicized in original] (2004b:11) 
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Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008) use of Snow’s (2004b) definition is important because 
Snow (2004b) asserts that social movements often target systems or structures of 
authority, which is a way of saying that social movements, especially those with radical 
grievances, target the logics of institutional orders.   
Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) propose that social movements utilize and target 
both the material and symbolic aspects of overlapping and nested social institutions, 
which are sometimes reinforcing (e.g., science and education, education and 
government, government and military) and sometimes contradictory (e.g., science and 
religion, religion and government, government and markets).  We see this in the 
911TM’s challenge to the meaning of “9/11” in their pursuit of the “Truth” of what 
actually happened on September 11, 2001.  The ubiquity of the narrative of “9/11” in 
American culture (Denzin & Lincoln 2003), and the effect the narrative has had on U.S. 
domestic and foreign policy (Altheide 2006; Entman 2004; Kellner 2003), solidifies it as a 
powerful constraining cultural force for its challengers, and similarly “9/11” serves as a 
powerful resource for those who defend its legitimacy.  The legitimacy of the 
institutional orders of the state, economy, military, and mass media (along with sectors 
of academia) are called into question when the 911TM challenges the validity of the 9/11 
Commission’s (Zelikow 2004) version of “9/11” as a complete and thorough narrative 
(e.g., see Griffin 2005) and NIST’s (2008) final report as a scientifically sound effort to 
explain the collapse of WTC 7 (e.g., see Griffin 2010a).   
Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) encourage social movement analysts to consider 
how power is distributed throughout institutions such as these.  Instead of viewing 
power as originating or being centered within the state, they view power as distributed 
throughout a society’s institutions and culture, for example, in the ways that 
79 
 
classificatory systems are constructed and used to define distinctions in bodies, 
behaviors, and beliefs.  This, as they note, is a central concern of Michel Foucault’s work, 
which postulates that social actors are the products of their society’s “regime of truth, its 
‘general politics of truth’:” 
that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true.  (1984:73) 
Symbols and material practices are anchored in social institutions, and so, for example, 
political activity does not only occur if and when the power of the state is utilized, 
contested, or threatened, for “political activity concerns both changes in classification 
and in allocation, that is, changes in rules and changes in the distribution of resources” 
(Armstrong & Bernstein 2008:84-5).  The 911TM not only challenges the narrative 
important to the state as an institution, but which myriad others have affirmed as a true.    
The 911TM’s public claimsmaking and framing activities threaten several logics 
of many institutional orders.  Through contesting the meaning of “9/11,” the 911TM 
calls into question the classification of “terrorists,” and in challenging who was actually 
responsible for the events of September 11 they threaten to alter perceptions of how 
resources have been justly distributed in response to the attacks.  Families and 
communities who have lost members to what they believe to have been a legitimate 
threat, corporations that have military contracts, and the people deriving their livelihood 
and status from the military and law enforcement orders engaged anti-terrorist efforts 
might suffer, respectively, symbolic and material damage to their worldviews and 
access to resources if the 911TM is successful in its endeavors.  State agents whose 
political platforms involve protecting their constituents against terrorist threats are 
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challenged by the 911TM’s activities, as is the legitimacy of intelligence and security 
agencies that serve the function of protecting U.S. interests in the Global War on Terror.  
The 911TM threaten to damage, disrupt, or destroy a narrative central to the legitimacy 
of the guiding logics of several institutional orders, and this is likely to bring out 
defenders of those institutions who, by virtue of this, become a collective countervailing 
force to the 911TM.  Alliances from insider actors and networks is one feature of the 
constraining aspects the multi-institutional order that social movements face when 
challenging core assumptions or logics of society’s central institutions (Armstrong & 
Bernstein 2008; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996; Snow 2004b).   
In this way, and within the multi-institutional politics perspective, social 
movements like the 911TM challenge systems of authority, not just personalities or 
charismatic authority figures, nor particular organizations or institutions, but rather they 
challenge institutional arrangements and theories of how those institutions should and 
do operate.  We can find insight into the expected effects when using a definition of 
social movements as anti-authoritarian mobilized collectivities, in which case Snow 
(2004b) has 
suggested that structures or systems of authority—be they institutionally, 
organizationally, or culturally based—function, in a kind of Foucauldian fashion, 
to coordinate patterns of behavior and orientation, typically among a fairly large 
number of people, such that the activities, orientations, identities and/or 
interpretations of one set of actors is subordinated to the directives, mandates, 
and perspectives and framings of another set of actors (superordinates) or 
privileged cultural texts, narratives, or codes.  The relevance of systems of 
authority to social movements, as argued, is that they typically are the targets of, 
and sometimes the inspirational sources for, the challenges mounted by social 
movements.  (p. 13) 
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Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) bring this out when they cite Dorothy Smith’s (1987, 
1990, 1999) concept of relations of rulingxviii and Michel Foucault’s conception of micro-
level “mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the State 
apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level” (1980:60).  As DiMaggio 
(1997) points out, social institutions provide socio-cultural contexts in which cognitive 
schemata crystalize meaning though social interactions, but social agents, individually 
or collectively, can alter those shared mental frameworks.  Those social actors at the 
helms of a society’s seats of power tend to work to maintain and change aspects of the 
social order that benefit their interests (Domhoff 1990; Mills [1956] 2000; Reed 2012; Zald 
& Lounsbury 2010), and this is accomplished through controlling or influencing 
ideological aspects of core social institutions responsible for disseminating information 
(Althusser [1971] 2006; Gramsci 1992; Hall 1985; Stoddart 2007).  This is how and why 
the power elite benefit from educational and media institutions that facilitate the mass 
cultural effect in society (Mills 2000), and this is why the 911TM’s claims affect so many 
institutional orders and social actors simultaneously.  
In the days and months after the events of September 11, political and media 
elites selected certain interpretations of the actors and motivations for those blamed for 
the events.  These authoritative accounts, legitimated by the institutional orders of the 
state and mainstream news media, reinforced the narrative while simultaneously 
                                                                 
xviii Relations of ruling involve “the social organization of the objectified knowledges…[of] the terms, 
themes, concepts of the subject and subjectivity, of feeling, emotion, goals, relations, and an object world 
assembled in textually mediated discourses” (Smith 1990:1).  Under patriarchy, these knowledges are 
constructed by men, under capitalism by capitalists, under White supremacy by Whites, and under 
imperialism by imperialists (e.g., see hooks 2010), and in each system the “ruling apparatuses are those 
institutions of administration, management, and professional authority, and of intellectual and cultural 
discourses, which organize, regulate, lead and direct, contemporary capitalist societies” (Smith 1990:2).  
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making dissent appear illegitimate.  The 911TM challenges the symbolic violence of 
“9/11” (that it, naturally, was an outside job), and in doing so the legitimacy of the 
logics of multiple institutional orders are called into question.  For example, if actors and 
agencies within the federal government harm instead of protect U.S. citizenry, and if 
actors and agencies of news media cloak instead of reveal those actions, then the guiding 
logics, and therefore the legitimacy, of those systems are contested.  Legitimacy is a 
product of social processes that must be continuously enacted to create, reinforce, and 
repair the sense of, belief in, or the conception of a phenomena as acceptable, rational, 
justified, true, and fair (Johnson et al. 2006).  In challenging the official narrative of 
“9/11,” then, the 911TM challenges the everyday relations to the ruling systems of 
authority that form the sometimes taken-for-granted and sometimes consciously upheld 
and defended backdrop for families, communities, educational systems, and other such 
institutional orders in which the received version of how and why the events of 
September 11 happened serve as un(con)tested assumptions (see Ahmed 2005; Altheide 
2006; Entman 2004; Kellner 2003; Zwicker 2006).  This brings about another need for a 
multi-institutional politics perspective when analyzing the 911TM as a social movement, 
particularly because it operates as an NSM. 
While NSMs do not represent a coherent paradigm or theoretical perspective 
within social movements literature (Pichardo 1997), their relevancy for this study is in 
how they challenge the logics of multiple institutional orders, or systems of authority 
(Snow 2004b).  The peace/anti-war and environmental movements, for example, 
challenge multiple institutions, industries, and organizations by, in part, problematizing 
the logics of the everyday, taken-for-granted social constructions (i.e. doxa) that arise as 
products of advanced capitalism, militarism, and alignments between common interests 
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(i.e. field-level logics) of the corporation and the state (Benford 1993; Gould, Pellow & 
Schnaiberg 2008; Habermas 1981; Hooks & Smith 2005; Thornton et al. 2012; Woehrle et 
al. 2008).  Challenges to the undergirding logics of society’s central institutional orders 
(Domhoff 2010; Mills 2000) brings about a “legitimation crisis” in which previously 
unquestioned assumptions (doxa) and privileged interpretations of the current social 
order or status quo (orthodoxy) come to be contested (unorthodoxy, heterodoxy) 
(Bourdieu 1977; Habermas 1975).  If and when elites with coincidences of interests across 
interlocking or reinforcing institutional orders are threatened by social movements, they 
are likely to form, encourage, join, or allow countermovements to oppose the perceived 
or real aggressions of the movement (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996).  The developing 
movement-countermovement interactions take place within a public problems 
marketplace where each of these collective actors competes for visibility in the mass 
media, attention of public audiences, and influence over policymakers (Benford & Hunt 
2003), and so the involvement of this variety of institutional orders and social actors is 
made all the more complex when we take into account the assumed or taken-for-granted 
nature of ruling systems of authority.  
Concerning the role of discursive fields for NSMs, Crossley’s (2003a) use of 
Habermasian theories of social movements provides an enlightening example for our 
purposes.  Crossley (2003a) posits that the ‘colonization of the lifeworld’xix by the logics of 
                                                                 
xix Crossley (2003a) states that what Habermas means by ‘the colonization of the lifeworld’ “is that the 
state now permeates ever more areas of our l ives, exercising a surveillance and regulatory role.  Integral 
to this is a process of ‘juridification’, whereby ever more areas of l ife are becoming subject to legal 
regulation, and legal regulation itself is ever more internally complex a nd differentiated.  This results in a 
loss of both freedom and meaning. The cultural narratives and symbolic forms that give existential 
meaning and ethical direction to our l ives are crushed by bureaucratic procedures, which offer no 
comparable vision or comfort and which simultaneously reduce our room to choose and manoeuvre [sic].  
This is compounded by the ‘cultural impoverishment’ caused by an increased specialization and 
differentiation of the knowledge and cultural base of society.  The basic social processes in which we are 
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global capitalism and the multinational corporation was the source of protests in the late 
1990’s against the World Trade Organization, World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, and other such international structures of global (economic) governance.  The 
protestors and activists in the many coalitions of the anti-corporate movement 
“abandon[ed] the ‘strategic rationality’ more usual for the consumer role, which focuses 
the individual only upon the best means for realizing their own selfish desires, and 
question[ed] the ethics of consumption as it is ordinarily practiced” (298).  Continuing, 
Crossley (2003a) raises an important insight about the nature of NSMs in a multi-
institutional context:  “[NSMs] raise previously doxic assumptions concerning 
consumption to the level of discourse, contesting and questioning these assumptions” 
(294).  When NSMs, or social movements generally, challenge the unspoken, 
unquestioned, taken-for-granted assumptions (doxa) about the legitimacy of 
interlocking and powerful institutional orders, they threaten the interests of social actors 
from multiple institutional orders who then have reason to form alliances against the 
challenging collectivity.  NSMs threaten systems of authority because the seek to 
influence how people understand the roles in contemporary society, which necessarily 
means that individuals are encouraged to (re)consider their relations with ruling 
systems of authority and truth regimes.  
The concepts of orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and doxa are important for this 
discussion because the 911TM’s claims are often doxic to the dominant discourse about 
the narrative of “9/11 and the events of September 11 (e.g., see Altheide 2006; 
                                                                 
involved and which impinge upon our l ives have become so complex and specialized that it is no longer 
possible for us to comprehend them fully or to weave them into a coherent narrative.  Our conscious 
grasp upon the social world is thus both incomplete and fragmented” (294). 
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Birkenstein, Froula & Randell 2010; Calhoun, et al. 2002; Denzin & Lincoln 2003; Entman 
2004; Hershberg & Moore 2002; Mednicoff 2005; Perrow 2005; Robinson 2005, 2008; 
Tierney 2005; Vaughan 2006), but, moreover, what is also doxic is the truth-value of the 
official explanations for “9/11” and the events of September 11.  The 911TM’s 
countermovement antagonists treat its challenging claims as heterodoxy, specifically via 
the conspiracy label (e.g., Aaronovitch 2010; Banas & Miller 2013; Berlet 2009; Byford 
2011; Kay 2011; Popular Mechanics 2011; Shermer 2011), and these social actors treat the 
orthodox claims about the events of September 11 (e.g., see NIST 2008; Zelikow 2004) as 
essentially uncontestable and, therefore, they often go untested and recede into doxic 
territory.  What is almost universally accepted as true in the dominant discourse about 
“9/11” is that the 911TM’s claims have no bearing on it, or, if they are considered 
worthy of attention, their claims are considered or portrayed as heterodoxic.  They are 
heterodoxic, or completely counter to orthodoxy, by virtue of the discursive practices of 
the 911TM, their countermovement antagonists, bystanders, and those who pay no 
attention to the movement at all.  The parties involved in producing discourse about 
“9/11” do not have equal say in its narrative, nor do they have equal footing in society, 
particular in relation to its multiple institutional orders.   
The Multi-Institutional Politics Approach & Institutional Logics 
The multi-institutional politics approach (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008) combines 
theories of NSMs, “that is, the various movements which emerged in western societies 
in the wake of the 1960s, including environmentalism, the peace movement, second-
wave feminism, animal rights, anti-psychiatry, etc.” (Crossley 2002:11), with Pierre 
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Bourdieu’s (1977) concepts of fieldsxx and habitusxxi (for discussions of these concepts see 
Crossley 2003b; Sallaz & Zavisca 2007), which Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) hold akin 
to Friedland and Alford’s (1991) nascent work on institutional logicsxxii.  Treating 
Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of field and Friedland and Alford’s (1991) use of social 
institutions “as roughly interchangeable” (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008:82), the multi-
institutional politics approach includes social structuralxxiii aspects of society as 
analytically central, including the institutional orders of the family, religion, education, 
media, science, the state, economy, and military.  Along with these structural aspects, 
habitus and institutional logics (i.e., cultural content) are considered to provide and 
constrain opportunities for agency or action during social interactions within and across 
                                                                 
xx “The concept of fields entails an economic metaphor, and this is enhanced by Bourdieu’s conception of 
‘cultural’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘social’, as well as economic forms of capital.  A field consists of relations hips 
between different ‘positions’, with various types of ‘resources’, economic, symbolic, etc., flowing between 
them” (Crossley 2003b:59).   
xxi “The habitus, to borrow a metaphor Bourdieu himself uses, contains the ‘genetic information’ which 
both allows and disposes successive generations to reproduce the world they inherit from their parents’ 
generation” (Crossley 2003b:43). 
xxii “Institutional logics” is defined further below within this chapter, but I will  note that Armstrong and 
Bernstein (2008) are not the only ones to draw a connection between the concepts of habitus, fields, and 
institutional logics.  For example, Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) point out that “[w]hile not part 
of Friedland and Alford’s (1991) chapter, it is noteworthy that impor tant precursors to the institutional 
logics perspective had been developing with the work on logics and practice (Bourdieu 1977)…,” and if we 
can accept that “‘practice’, for Bourdieu, is the combined effect of habitus, capital (including the 
embodied forms of cultural capital…) and field” (Crossley 2003b:44), then we can see the proposed 
connection. 
xxiii “Social structure” has been used synonymously with “social organization,” with both referring to 
“social relations of various kinds, their internal processes , their behavioral and institutional issue, and 
their connectivity and interdependence as emergent systems extended across time and space” 
(Prendergast & Knottnerus 1994:1).  As Prendergast and Knottnerus (1994) discuss, social structure is a 
complex concept and theoretical approach to sociology, and its definition and use changes from one 
school of thought to the next.  For example, “[i]n anti -reductionist sociology, the concept structure refers 
to temporarily and/or spatially extensive social conditions that to a greater or lesser extent influence 
actors’ forms of thought, decision and actions, and which, depending on the circumstances, may facil itate 
or constrain actors’ capacities to achieve their objectives” (Sibeon 1999:323).  We can see the similariti es 
and differences in definitions, but the essential point is that social structures are composed of various 
sizes of social relationships (e.g., from small, face-to-face groups up to “world systems”), they are 




those institutional orders.  Due to the nature of the 911TM’s claims, their adversaries 
arise from media (Kay 2011; Taibbi 2008), academia (Banas & Miller 2013; Sunstein & 
Vermeule 2009; Wood & Douglas 2013), trade press (Chertoff 2004; Molé 2006; Popular 
Mechanics 2006, 2011; Shermer 2011), and think tanks (Berlet 2009; Tobin 2007).  When 
the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists engage in counter-claimsmaking (Best 2008) 
and counterframing (Benford & Hunt 2003) activities, they have at their disposal the 
logics and legitimacy of those institutional orders as well as the discursive function of 
the conspiracy label (Husting & Orr 2007) across those orders, which exists as a field-
level logic (Thornton et al. 2012) in the discursive field (Snow 2004a).    
Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) attempt to provide a corrective to the narrow, 
slight, or marginal deficiencies of the political process (McAdam 1982) and contentious 
politics (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001) approaches by proffering social movement 
scholars “theoretical tools with which to investigate the shifting nature of domination 
(both material and cultural) in both governmental and nongovernmental institutions 
and collective efforts that arise in response to different types of domination” (Armstrong 
& Bernstein 2008:82).  One way they do this is by bringing culture back in to the analysis 
of social movements “as a powerful, constraining force” (2008:82).  Armstrong and 
Bernstein (2008) confer that social institutions are material (practice) and non-material 
(symbolic) compositions established by social actors, and that social movements seek 
changes in the distribution of both aspects within and between social institutions.  Like 
other social movement scholars (Benford & Hunt 1992; Snow 2004b), Armstrong and 
Bernstein (2008) see social movement grievances as challenges to how power is 
distributed and operates within any one or between any given set of institutional orders, 
whether in material (hard power) or non-material forms (soft power), and that these 
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challenges often bring about a revision to or new definition of what a social institution is 
(how it is arranged) and/or does (how it operates).   
Social movements can target a variety of institutional orders (e.g., the state, the 
corporation, the military, mass media, education, religion, the family, etc.).  Each 
institutional order is guided by cultural content (i.e. institutional logics) consisting of the 
norms, beliefs, values, ways of using language, and the meanings attached to socially 
significant practices that might align or conflict with the logics of reinforcing or 
competing institutional orders (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton et al. 2012).   Social 
institutions sometimes operate in concert, such as when the power elite use their 
respective seats of power in the institutional ordersxxiv of the military, the economy, and 
the government to cooperate in achieving whatever goals align in their “coincidence of 
interests” (Mills 2000:213, 224, 276, 288).  Currently, a power elite operates, when it 
needs to, largely outside of the public view due to the interrelationship between these 
                                                                 
xxiv Mills ([1956] 2000) first uses the term, “institutional orders” at the end of the following lengthy 
passage:   
There is no longer, on the one hand, an economy, and, on the other hand, a political order 
conta ining a  military establishment unimportant to politics and to money-making.  There is a  
pol itical economy linked, in a  thousand ways, with military institutions and decisions. On each side 
of the world-split running through central Europe and around the Asiatic rimlands, there is an 
ever-increasing interlocking of economic, military, and political s tructures.  If there is government 
intervention in the corporate economy, so is there corporate intervention in the governmental 
process.  In the structural sense, this triangle of power is the source of the interlocking directorate 
that i s most important for the historical structure of the present.  
The fact of the interlocking i s clearly revealed at each of the points of crisis of modern 
capitalist society—slump, war, and boom.  In each, men of decision are led to an awareness of the 
interdependence of the major institutional orders.  (p. 7-8)  
More recent usage of this terminology includes a precise definition:  Each institutional order is 
“defined as a different domain of institutions built around a cornerstone institution that 
represents the cultural symbols and material practices that govern a commonly recognized area 
of l ife” (Thornton et al. 2012:53-4).  Therefore, for example, the military order contains the Army, 
Air Force, Marines, Navy, and National Guard, and each of these institutions contain within an 
overarching military-style form of symbolic norms (e.g., salutes, the use of “Sir” and “Ma’am” to 
symbolically indicate status, taking an oath based on the U.S. Constitution, etc.) and material 
expressions of these norms (e.g., wearing service uniforms and the use of service ribbons to 
indicate status and merit); each sub-institution carries out specific forms of these symbolic and 
material  practices (e.g., generals and admirals carry a similar rank, uniforms differ in style, etc.).   
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three institutional orders and those of the mainstream mass media and various policy 
making groups and think tanks (Akhavan-Majid & Wolf 1991; Domhoff 1990, 2010; 
Perrucci & Wysong 2008; Reed 2012; Zald & Lounsbury 2010).  From the institutional 
logics perspective, Thornton et al. (2012) refer to connections such as these as an 
interinstitutional system, and they argue that how power operates, and whether it is 
considered legitimate or illegitimate, depends both upon the cognitive and interactional 
domains of micro-level phenomena, which is consistent with DiMaggio’s (1997) 
assessment, as well as with which logics of both institutional orders (meso-level) and 
institutional fields (macro-level) originate and contextualize enactments of power. 
Whereas under the institutional logics perspective we treat “an institutional logic 
as the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, 
including assumptions, values and beliefs, by which individuals and organizations 
provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their 
lives and experiences” (Thornton et al. 2012:2), the institutional logics perspective (ILP) 
aids researchers interested in questions of how individual and organizational 
actors are influenced by their situation in multiple social locations in an 
interinstitutional system, for example the institutional orders of the family, 
religion, state, market, professions, and corporation.  Conceptualized as a 
theoretical model, each institutional order of the interinstitutional system 
distinguishes unique organizing principles, practices, and symbols that influence 
individual and organizational behavior.  Institutional logics represent frames of 
reference that condition actors’ choices for sense-making, the vocabulary they 
use to motivate action, and their sense of self and identity.  The principles, 
practices, and symbols of each institutional order differentially shape how 
reasoning takes place and how rationality is perceived and experienced.  (p. 2)   
The ILP identifies institutional orders that would constitute the public, media, and 
policymaker claimant domains of Benford and Hunt’s (2003) model of interactional 
dynamics on the public problems marketplace (Figure 5).  Moreover, the ILP “can point 
the way to productive conceptualization of how cultural resources are used for 
90 
 
mobilization, framing, and institutional change” (Thornton et al. 2012:175), but within 
this perspective Thornton et al. note that “theoretical integration is needed that examines 
cross-level effects among activists, their fields, and societal-level logics” (2012:176). 
As one component of this theoretical integration, social movements act as 
“cultural entrepreneurs” (Thornton et al. 2012:107), which are key agents in the 
initialization or initiation of social change.  The interinstitutional system is not a static 
composite of social spheres, it is rather a dynamic system always in flux due to the 
constant and ongoing (inter)actions of individuals, groups, and organizations operating 
within and between social institutions.  Cultural entrepreneurs, such as social 
movements, engage in theorization, framing, and narrative formation, by which they 
attempt to explain, make comprehensible, and/or render phenomena meaningful across 
institutional orders in new or different ways.  Benford and Hunt’s (2003) theoretical 
contribution lies in identifying the targets of cultural entrepreneurs, the complexity of 
interactions within and between claimants and targets (i.e., institutional orders), and the 
rhetorical strategies social movements and their antagonists are likely to use when 
attempting to achieve or oppose social change.  One additional component in need of 
theoretical integration is the existence of discursive fields that shape movement 
ideologies and framing practices (Snow 2004a), and this is akin to field-level logics 
discussed under the ILP. 
 When seeking to bring about or oppose social change, movements and 
countermovements can rely upon institutional arrangements and logics to inform their 
rhetorical practices.  “Social movements might use one institution as a base from which 
to challenge others,” note Armstrong and Bernstein (2008:87), but the multi-institutional 
perspective “also suggests that when institutions reinforce each other, change will be 
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difficult.”  Institutional logics are sometimes contradictory, which open opportunities 
for back-and-forth challenges from movements and countermovements, with each 
relying on the legitimacy and cognitive and social sensemaking schema (frames) of their 
respective institutional orders.  To give themselves more legitimacy, social actors rely 
upon the logics of multiple institutional orders when possible, especially those that 
match their audience’s or constituencies interpretative schema, and when they do seize 
upon theories, frames, or narratives from different social institutions, the facilitating 
medium is the institutional field.  Thus, institutional actors can rely on the logics of 
institutional (discursive) fields that transcend any given institution’s logics (Thornton et 
al. 2012).   
Empirical examples of these issues can be found in the cases of the ‘scientific 
certainty argumentation methods’ employed by some actors in the political arena to 
undermine or prevent scientifically informed environmental regulations (Freudenberg, 
Gramling & Davidson 2008).  Think tank researchers and politicians dispute the 
legitimacy of climate scientists’ work (McCright 2000, 2003, 2010), and yet another 
example is found in some religion-based movements’ opposition to solely teaching 
Darwinian evolution in public schools (or at all) in favor of including creationism or 
Intelligent Design in science curriculums (Forrest & Gross 2004; Scott 2004).  Still many 
more examples can be found in the contestations over the meaning of issues related to 
ecology, education, health, science, terrorism, and war (Holloway 2008; Mooney 2005; 
Oreskes & Conway 2010).  This is to say, movements and countermovements are 
(sometimes) able to tap into dominant, societal-level cultural values, beliefs, attitudes, 
and norms (field-level logics) to reinforce their position and/or undermine their 
opponents’ (Polletta 2008; Snow 2004).  Social movements seeking change in society 
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often threatens a given (set of) institutional order(s), countermovements arise to protect 
those orders (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996), and, even when movement actors rely upon 
the logics of science (empiricism and rationalism) and professions (expertise and 
credentialing), straying too far into the domain of heterodoxic claimsmaking can serve 
as a basis for countermovements to delegitimize their claims. 
Dangerous Machinery in the Discursive Field of the 911TM 
Social movements’ claimsmaking (Best 1990, 2008; Muleahy 1995) and framing 
(Benford & Hunt 2003; Benford & Snow 1988; Snow 2004a) practices “[are] dialogic and 
founded in the social process of mediated action or speech communication” (Steinberg 
1998), and thus social movements engage in meaning construction in a discursive field 
consisting of historically contextualized symbolic and material, cultural and structural 
opportunities and constraints (Snow 2004a; Williams 2004; Shriver et al. 2013; Steinberg 
1999).  Within the discursive field of the 911TM, elite and organizational deviance in the 
form of actually existing conspiracies provide discursive opportunities (Jones 2010, 
2012), and the existence and use of the conspiracy label is a constraining mechanism 
(deHaven-Smith 2010, 2013).  While some of its members use their expertise and 
professional stock of knowledge to construct arguments as to why the events of 
September 11 do not, in fact, match the dominant narrative of “9/11,” countermovement 
antagonists use the conspiracy label to “ridicule questions about documented 
forewarnings of 9/11 (such as the President’s Daily Brief on August 6, 2001, titled ‘Bin 
Laden Determined to Strike in US’)” (Husting & Orr 2007:134), let alone allegations that 
“9/11 was an inside job.”  This is what we should expect to see when social movements 
pose radical challenges (Ferree 2004) to systems of authority that threaten elite interests 
(Shriver et al. 2013).  
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Knowledge, and the control there of, is a central source of power for individuals, 
organizations, and social institutions, allowing those who construct what is known and 
knowable to influence the beliefs and behaviors of those susceptible to that will 
(Foucault 1980).  Institutional actors throughout U.S. history have employed strategies to 
vilify target populations they deem threatening to their interests, and these same 
powerful social forces tend to amplify qualities in themselves and others they deem 
beneficial to their interests (Roscigno 2011).  Concepts such as ideology, hegemony, and 
discourse have been used to explain why subordinates submit to their own domination 
and oppression, and these same concepts provide explanatory power as to how and why 
superordinates go about formulating the symbolic content for interpretative schema that 
shapes knowledge and cognitions within (their) subordinates (Stoddart 2007).  It is 
useful to discuss these concepts because they provide a backdrop to how discursive 
fields functions as a constraining force and powerful resource to the 911TM and its 
countermovement antagonists, respectively.  The discussion in the following subsections 
moves from a brief unravelling of hegemony, ideology, and discourse to an elaboration 
of the conspiracy label and the discursive field in general. 
Hegemony, Ideology, and Discourse 
Hegemony is interstitial and dispersed, a web of interconnected assumptions 
and physical realities that are normal and commonsense, but hegemony is not the 
natural byproduct of aggregate symbolic interactions and emergent norms.  Whereas the 
state and its agents can use coercive force to achieve some desired end, “the institutions 
of ‘civil society,’ such as the Church, schools, the mass media, or the family, are largely 
responsible for producing and disseminating hegemonic power” (Stoddart 2007:201, see 
also Gramsci 1992).  While the prior definition suggests that hegemony is produced in 
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the daily routines and interactions within society, the inclusion of power dynamics 
provides that “[h]egemony is the assertion of a ruling ideology through cultural power 
mechanisms in order to dominate and subordinate other groups or classes of people” 
(Beach 2005).  Actually, there are multiple ideologies always-already present when new 
members of society are socialized in the dominant culture (Johnston [1996] 2002).  Each 
ideology becomes hegemonic to the extent that they are voluntarily adopted and abided 
by and that they reinforce or support hierarchies with asymmetrical allocations of 
resources (Stoddart 2007).  Thus, there are multiple hegemonies in operation within 
societies (Grewal & Kaplan 1994; Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis 2000).   
Like hegemony, ideology is defined in various ways.  One scholar has it that 
“[a]n ideology is a more or less consistent set of beliefs about the nature of the society in 
which individuals live, and about the proper role of the state in establishing or 
maintaining that society” (Johnston 2002:13).  Defined in this way, statism is a dominant 
ideology that “involves an enhanced importance of the state apparatus in securing the 
conditions for the valorization of capital at the expense of exchange relations and/or 
bourgeois political domination and at the expense of (always indirect) democratic forms 
of political representations” (Jessop 2007:234).  This definition of statism is 
contextualized by another ideology, Marxism, which uses class as its primary analytic 
framework, much like feminism uses patriarchy as its primary framework to analyze 
society.  I have moved my social movements analysis away from state-centric models, 
but statism as an ideological social force suggests that, discursively speaking, the state 
will be defended when it comes under threat or when it is outright attacked.  While 
these examples highlight the web-like, nebulous nature of ideologies, social realty is also 
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a contextual factor in what ideologies will be dominant and how they will be 
contextualized.   
Johnston (2002) provides an example of how the ideology of nationalism, or the 
set of beliefs that position the nation-state as a sovereign, self-determining entity at the 
primacy of the social world, is contextualized by authoritarian regimes.  Johnston 
stresses that “there is nothing necessarily authoritarian about nationalism”  (2002:205).  
“Nonetheless,” he continues, 
nationalism provides a powerful vehicle for authoritarian rulers to employ in 
justifying their grip on power and in the attempt to secure legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public.  It may be useful to think of nationalism in liberal democracies as a 
(usually) subordinate element within the broader ideologies of conservatism, 
liberalism, and socialism.  By contrast, in authoritarian regimes, nationalism can 
become the dominant element in the ideology of the state.  To put it another way, 
in the context of liberal democracies, nationalism is less an ideology than a 
disposition which may be present or absent within ideologies.  In authoritarian 
systems (and certain other special contexts) nationalism often becomes the 
ideology.  [italicized in original] (p. 205) 
Ideologies and hegemony encapsulate the mind, leading adherents to use certain 
analytic schema over others.  For example, statism leads people to assume the state is 
natural and ascendant, nationalism leads people defend their geographic homeland and 
attack others’, racism leads people to discriminate between individuals based upon 
physical characteristics that take on symbolic meaning developed within classificatory 
systems, and Marxism leads to analyses of capitalist class power and domination with 
the assumption that labor is the essence or nature of the human being.   
To analyze the origins, functions, and consequences of an ideology is to position 
oneself as not susceptible to or influenced by it.  A Foucauldian critique challenges how 
it is that ideologies come to influence thought and behavior of others, but not one’s 
self—a natural question from this critique is how it is that “9/11 conspiracy theorists” 
operate ideologically, but people who subscribe to the Bush administration’s narrative of 
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“9/11” are not thinking ideologically (deHaven-Smith 2010; Manwell 2010)?  In order 
for power to work via ideologies and, at last, to be hegemonic, it must work its way 
throughout society in discourse, and thus producing and controlling discourse are 
simultaneous mechanisms of power.  Carrying this discussion further, Stoddart notes 
that “[t]he regulation of discourse deals with who is allowed to speak on a given topic, 
as well as which forms of knowledge are subjugated in the production of truth” 
(2007:205).  For Foucault (1980), power operates when knowledge and truths are created 
to define certain people, behaviors, and beliefs as subordinate and superordinate, but 
power is also present in the ability to resist truth regimes and the discourses they 
generate and sustain.  These concepts are present in the development and deployment of 
anti-conspiracy discourse and the conspiracy label. 
Labels are ways for one group or category of people to designate another as 
socially deviant based upon the presumptions from the labeling group about what is 
acceptable, normal, or moral.  This is to say, labels function as normative descriptions, 
prescriptions, and proscriptions for classifying and categorizing humans as different 
from normal or socially acceptable people, and these are important components of 
exclusionary practices of Othering, marginalization, stigmatization, and social 
distancing (Canales 2000; Hall 1999; Krumer-Nevo & Benjamin 2010; Taket et al. 2009).  
Social agents create rules that others are to abide by, and rule enforcers identify rule 
breakers, label, and sanction them (Becker 1963).  Therefore, deviance is not something 
inherent in the beliefs or behaviors of individuals, groups, and categories of people, but 
is a product of societal reactions (Grattet 2011).  Insofar as social control agents employ 
labels that, in effect, stigmatize and discredit their targets, “the labeling process involves 
the translation of abstract social control ideologies to local situations, which, in turn, is a 
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process that is contingent upon local practical knowledge and traditions, competing 
discourses and models available within the environment, and organizational and 
environmental factors and constraints” (Grattet 2011:197).  Social control ideologies is an 
important phrase due to how ideology relates to hegemony and discourse, for these 
factor into the types of discursive social control to which insider collective claimsmakers 
have access. 
The hegemonic discourse of the conspiracy label plays off of the ideologies of 
nationalism, statism, and professionalism, the latter of which can be thought of as a 
hegemonic belief system and set of practices that reinforces distinctions between 
credentialed experts and laypersons (Evetts 2003).  Since governments, considered 
essential and paternal under the ideology of statism, are often at the center of claims 
regarded as conspiracy theory, and because governments are often confused or 
conflated with nation-states and the inhabiting citizenry via the ideology of nationalism, 
claims of conspiracy can be rhetorically dismissed as misinterpretations of enactments of 
power and misplacement of faith in an institutional pillar of society.  When producing 
official narratives, which tend to become dominant, governments should be considered 
powerful actors alongside other institutions, such as media and academia, and this 
becomes especially important when attempting to consider the truth-value of any given 
claim labeled as a “conspiracy theory” (Coady 2006a).    
Proffering claims labeled as “conspiracy theories” positions one, no matter the 
educational or professional status, as intellectually incompetent, and this line of 
reasoning has its social origins in a popular news press publication by a scholarly 
professional (Bratich 2008; Fenster 2008).  Since around the time that the distinguished 
American historian, Richard Hofstadter (1964), penned his article for Harper’s Magazine, 
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“The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” the use of the conspiracy label has steadily 
grown in mainstream news and scholarly publications to a point where it appears 
almost weekly (Husting & Orr 2007).  “Indeed,” notes one analyst of conspiracy 
discourse, “the term ‘paranoid style’ is still regularly deployed by political 
commentators of all stripes to frame, for instance, the 9/11 Truth Movement, the Tea 
Party Movement, and…Occupy” (Aistrope 2013:116).  Anti-conspiracy discourse and the 
conspiracy label are hegemonic, yet dependent upon given ideologies (e.g., statism, 
nationalism, racism, professionalism, etc.), and they are constructed and employed 
through discourses.  Before moving to the topic of discourse and discursive fields, we 
will examine anti-conspiracy discourse and the conspiracy label in further detail. 
Anti-conspiracy Discourse & The Conspiracy Label 
Husting & Orr’s (2007) content analysis of how the terms “conspiracy theory” 
and “conspiracy theorist” were employed in The New York Times and various academic 
publications is a key source for sociological understanding of how this particular label 
operates.  In their analysis, Husting and Orr focus on one particular function of the 
conspiracy label, its tendency to shift “the focus of discourse to reframe another’s claims 
as unwarranted or unworthy of full consideration” (2007:129).  Elaborating, this team 
notes that the conspiracy “label functions symbolically, protecting certain decisions and 
people from question in arenas of political, cultural, and scholarly knowledge 
construction” (2007:130).  Supporting this, Jones’ (2010) report on her ethnography with 
the 911TM positions its members’ statements about possible elite conspiracies against 
elite’s statements about using conspiracy as a possible geopolitical strategy.  The final 
analysis is that “knowledge does not have to be proved untrue for it to be labelled 
‘conspiracy theory’.  Instead,” Jones notes, “this demarcation appears contingent on the 
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logic of an insider/outsider binary” (2010:360), where insiders (i.e., elites and their 
supporters) can speak of conspiracy legitimately where outsiders (i.e., “conspiracy 
theorists”) cannot.  In the end, rhetorical devices, like the conspiracy label, used in 
strategies of exclusion “deflect attention from the claim at hand and shift discourse to 
the nature of the claimant” (Husting & Orr 2007:130). 
Taking issue with the fact that “conspiracy theory” is not a term that is popularly 
used to theorize about conspiracies engaged in by elites, deHaven-Smith notes that, 
“[c]onsidered as a label, the phrase conspiracy theory does a poor job of characterizing 
speculations about political intrigue, yet the label remains popular because it functions 
normatively to protect political elites from mass doubts about their motives and tactics” 
[italicized in original] (2010:797).  “Basically,” states deHaven-Smith in a later work on 
the subject, “the term ‘conspiracy theory’ is applied pejoratively to allegations of official 
wrongdoing that have not been substantiated by public officials themselves” (2013:9).  
deHaven-Smith’s work on the subject is revealing of the nature of the conspiracy label, 
including how it “preempts the normal reasoning of people when they witness a longer-
than-usual series of chance events” (2013:190), leading people to compartmentalize 
political crimes as isolated events and view the political class in terms of deeply divided 
factions and atomized political actors as opposed to a network of political actors who 
align, at the least, along a “coincidence of interests” (Mills 2000:213, 224, 276, 288).   
In order to suspect political crimes, or crimes involving political actors or 
payoffs, people would have to deviate from the norms established and enforced through 
the use of the conspiracy label.  “As shown by our speech habits and observation 
tendencies about assassinations, disputed elections, and terrorist attacks,” deHaven-
Smith notes, “we are averse to talking about such events as connected in any way” 
100 
 
(2013:19).  As a cultural phenomenon, aversion to thinking about political crimes in 
terms of conspiracy necessitates socialization into the socially constructed confabulation 
of the conspiracy label.  Taking off from this, deHaven-Smith provides a passage with 
key insights into the discursive origins and functions of the conspiracy label: 
Americans know that voicing suspicions about political elites will make them 
objects of hostility and derision.  The verbal slaps vary, but they are difficult to 
counter because they usually abuse reason.  For example, in using the 
conspiracy-theory label as a putdown, conspiracy deniers imply that official 
accounts of troubling events are something altogether much more solid than 
conspiratorial suspicions—as if official accounts are in some sense without 
speculation or presuppositions.  In fact, however, conspiracy deniers and 
debunkers are relying on an unstated theory of their own—a very questionable 
theory.  In the post-WWII era, official investigations have attributed 
assassinations, election fiascos, defense failures, and other suspicious events to 
such unpredictable, idiosyncratic forces as lone gunmen, antiquated voting 
equipment, bureaucratic bumbling, innocent mistakes, and, in the case of 9/11 
(to quote the 9/11 Commission, p. 339), a “failure of imagination.”  In effect, 
official accounts of suspicious events have answered conspiracy theories with 
coincidence theories.  [italicized in original] (2013:19-20) 
The same cultural climate that allows elites to theorize about using conspiracies while 
treating elite explanations of troubling events (i.e. political crimes) as authoritative 
positions claims that those things exist and are problematic for society as illegitimate 
(deHaven-Smith 2013; Jones 2010).   
 Husting and Orr provide a key passage that demonstrates the paradoxical or 
illogical nature of refuting claims about conspiracies by employing the conspiracy label 
solely because one has made claims about conspiracies.  “Because conspiracies do 
happen,” they argue 
this process is a noteworthy preemption of the scholarly and investigative 
process. “Conspiracy” is a category of law. Indictments for criminal conspiracy 
are brought and convictions made. Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, and the 
Enron scandal all led to indictments and convictions on charges of criminal 
conspiracy. Even so, these events continue to be associated with the phrase 
conspiracy theory, which gets 135,000 Google hits when combined with 
Watergate 79,300 combined with Iran-Contra, and 134,000 with Enron. Although 
one can demonstrate the existence of some conspiracies and disprove the 
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existence of others, in any given case the decision should turn on systematic 
study of evidence.  (2007:131) 
Even anti-conspiracists, citing the same examples as Watergate and Iran-Contra, agree 
that conspiracies occur, but they take issue with unwarranted, demonstrably false, 
and/or dangerous conspiracy theories (e.g., see Berlet 2009; Byford 2011; Clarke 2002; 
Keeley 2006; Sunstein & Vermeule 2009).  Due to the fact that (elite initiated) 
conspiracies do occur, claims identified as “conspiracy theories” cannot be treated a 
priori as unwarranted (Coady 2006a, 2006b); however, the truth-value of the claims 
identified as “conspiracy theories” suffer from the social context that powerful actors, 
institutions, and frames bring to perceptions or interpretations of those claims 
(Pelkmans & Machold 2011). 
Pelkmans and Machold (2011) bring to light the fact that the elite theories of the 
conspiracy that developed the day of September 11, 2001, survived while alternative 
accounts were stigmatized.  “The reasons for these different trajectories,” they argue, 
“can be found in the political clout that the different theories could attract, and in the 
ways in which the theories resonated with popular ideas about the national and 
international political landscape” (2011:74).  Pelkmans and Machold (2011) depict this in 
a figure reproduced here in Figure 6, and they explain it as follows: 
The trajectory of a theory depends on its location in a given field of power, as 
well as on the strength of its claim to truth.  The various ways in which theories 
of conspiracy are perceived as situated along two axes, the truth-axis and the 
power-axis can be displayed through a heuristic diagram (see Figure [6]). 
 In the top-half of the diagram we see how theories of conspiracy that are 
designed by the relatively powerful will be labeled along the truth-axis.  If the 
claim to truth is strong—for example due to an ability to muster convincing 
evidence—these theories will be labeled “facts.”  If the evidence is debatable this 
will at most turn the theories into “contested facts.”  (p. 74) 
Foucault’s (1980) truth regimes orient whether a claim will be perceived or interpreted 
as factually based or merely “conspiracy theory,” for when a claim moves too far from 
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Figure 6.  Theories of Conspiracy in Relation to Truth and Power 
 
those put forward and circulated by powerful actors they fall outside the commonly 
accepted boundaries of acceptable discourse.   
In terms or troubling events or political crimes, if an explanatory claim that does 
not align with those of powerful social forces is put forward by laypersons, 
professionals, or experts, no matter whether the evidence is scientifically informed or 
illogical and non-empirical, it will likely be considered “conspiracy theory.”  “A good 
example of this,” remark Pelkmans and Machold (2011:75),  
are the efforts of the 9/11 Truth movement [sic].  Its authors have produced 
numerous volumes on the faults in the official account, developing a range of 
potential explanations including knowledge of, but minimal control over, the 
events of 9/11 (Griffin 2004), to theories that posit full-blown complicity in the 
events (Meyssan 2002).  However, these theories continue to be easily dismissed 
as conspiracy theories.  (p. 75) 
These texts are routinely dismissed as “conspiracy theories,” even though the claims 
within are not given rigorous attention by their critiques (e.g., see Kay 2011; Popular 
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Mechanics 2011).  How and why Pelkmans and Machold’s (2011) heuristic diagram 
functions can be elucidated with Entman’s (2004) cascading activation and cultural 
congruence models. 
 Entman’s (2004) cascading activation model, reproduced here in Figure 7, depicts 
how the Bush administration’s framing of the events of September 11 was adopted by  




other political elites and policymakers, and then mainstream news media journalists and 
entire news organizations carried on these frames in their news reports and editorials.  
The bold arrows cascade down the model, and “each level in the metaphorical cascade 
also makes its own contribution to the mix and flow (of ideas)” (Entman 2004:10).  
Entman explains in further detail how this model depicts the development of the official 
frame of the events of September 11, frames that would eventually develop into a 
coherent, official narrative (Zelikow 2004): 
All parties to this [cascading activation] process operate under uncertainty and 
pressure, with mixed motives and varying levels of competence and 
understanding.  All are “cognitive misers” who work in accordance with 
established mental maps and habits.  They are “satisficers” who rarely undertake 
a comprehensive review of all relevant facts and options before responding.  Few 
political leaders or journalists have the time to do that, and even fewer members 
of the public have the inclination.  The implication of these cognitive limitations 
is that what passes between levels of the cascade is not comprehensive 
understanding but highlights packaged into selective, framed communications.  
As we go down the levels, the flow of information becomes less and less 
thorough, and increasingly limited to the selected highlights, processed through 
schemas, and then passed on in ever-cruder form.  The farther an idea travels 
between levels on the cascade, the fainter the traces of the “real” situation are—
whether the actual perceptions, goals, and calculations of the president way at 
the top, or the true mix of public sentiments moving from the bottom back up to 
policymakers.  (p. 12) 
The dashed lines moving back up the model indicate, with the metaphor of a cascading 
waterfall in mind, that much extra work is need to pump a new or alternative frame up 
the model, and this model is an important heuristic to keep in mind in terms of the 
social environment within which the 911TM operates.   
This model is important to keep in mind for two reasons.  First, it supports 
constructionist assumptions that the narrative of “9/11” was not a natural product of 
objective news reporting, which means that we can expect aspects of the narrative to be 
incomplete or false due to opportunistic motivations by vested interests.  Secondly, 
social movements attempting to sway public opinion would be, in effect, combatting the 
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gravity of the news’ and administration’s frames, and, insofar as movements’ ultimate 
goals are to change public policy (Benford & Hunt 2003; Best 2008), the dynamics of how 
difficult it is for the public to change public policy indicate that social movement’s 
likelihood of success is low, especially if we assume the U.S. is an oligarchy and not a 
democracy (Gilens & Page 2014).  This is a pillar in my assumption that the 911TM has a 
low probability of success in reframing “9/11,” but it is one among two others, which is 
the institutional legitimation of their antagonists and their access to symbolic power 
afforded by anti-conspiracy discourse that is inaccessible to the 911TM.    
Since the Bush administration, elites, and news organizations began promoting 
the theory that Usama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were responsible for the events of 
September 11 soon (within hours) after they occurred, these claims formed a powerful 
framing mechanism that shaped cultural assumptions about what happened and what 
the appropriate response should have been.  Entman further explains that due to the 
presence in popular culture of many of the factors involved in the official framing of the 
events, which include terrorist hijackers, skyscrapers, firefighters, mayors, etc., “[i]t 
required almost no cognitive effort to make the connections promoted by the 
administration’s frame of the event.  Previous information had repeatedly activated 
most of the mental pathways connecting similar or identical concepts in the past” 
(2004:15).   
In his cultural congruence diagram, reproduced here in Figure 8, Entman (2004) 
depicts how information presented in news cycles and discussed in the public that is 
congruent with the official frames becomes habitually recognized as fact.  Information 
that is ambiguous or not recognized as officially verified is contested, much in the way 
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Figure 8.  Cultural Congruence 
 
Pelkmans and Machold (2011) explain how claims that have little to no convincing 
evidence, but which adhere closely to powerful definitions, are considered factually 
mistaken but not “conspiracy theory.”  Finally, Entman (2004) explains how information 
that is incongruent with the dominant definition of the situation surrounding September 
11 is altogether blocked from open public discussion and consideration by news 
organizations as legitimate because it is too unfamiliar, complex, and apparently 
irrelevant.  News media have profit interests motivating them to align with elite 
definitions, especially when those definitions resonate with commonly held cultural 
assumptions or resonant frames.   
“Responses to incongruent stimuli,” as Entman puts it, “rather than spreading 
along ‘logical’ paths, cause a kind of mental short circuit, a detour that steers thinking 
down psychologically comforting pathways” (2004:14).  This “mental short circuit” can 
be explained as cognitive dissonance, “a psychological phenomenon occurring when 
new ideas or information conflict with previously formed ideologies, accepted beliefs, 
and corresponding behaviors” (Manwell 2010:854).  For many people, new information 
that contradicts previously established beliefs and behaviors is often rejected without 
serious contemplation, just as new information that supports or reinforces previously 
established beliefs and behaviors is accepted without due consideration.  Due to the 
short circuiting nature of the dominant frames of “9/11” and cognitive dissonance, 
“[w]hen people are confronted with evidence contradicting the U.S. official account of 
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9/11, it is unlikely that immediate, prolonged discussion and debate regarding evidence 
supporting alternative accounts will change people’s minds” (Manwell 2010:858).   
The 911TM actively works to engage the public in dialogue and debates about 
9/11 Truth in attempts to reframe the narrative of “9/11” and supplant the dominant 
theory of the events of September 11, but therein lies the power of the conspiracy label.  
As deHaven-Smith put the matter,  
the broad-brush ‘conspiracy theory’ disparages inquiry and questioning that 
challenge official accounts of troubling political events in which public officials 
themselves may have had a hand.  Deployed in public discourse to discredit and 
silence those who express suspicions of elite criminality, the label functions, 
rhetorically, to shield political elites from public interrogation.  (p. 798)  
With regard to the variety of interpretations of the events of September 11, insider 
statuses within contemporary U.S. society arise as a product of how closely one 
positions him or herself to Zelikow’s (2004) 9/11 Commission Report.  If “9/11” recedes 
from its doxic position as an uncontested historical fact, one need only resort to the 
conspiracy label when they proffer the orthodoxy of the official story.  Satisfactorily and 
summarily dismissing “conspiracy theorists” as such leaves one to pursue whatever 
activities were interrupted by the seemingly unwarranted discursive incursion.    
Aligning with the conclusions and logic of The 9/11 Commission Report is 
unproblematic and orthodox, and only somewhat threatening to one’s status is taking 
up unorthodox positions by treating the 9/11 Commission and/or its conclusions as 
problematic, errant, or misleading.  In Pelkmans and Machold’s (2011) model (Figure 6), 
this leads one into the territory of contested facts and mistakes, and in Entman’s (2004) 
model (Figure 8), this leads one into the territory of ambiguity but not incongruity.  This 
can be shown when the 9/11 Commission’s own chairs, Thomas Kean and Lee 
Hamilton, noted that they “were set up to fail” (2007:14) due to the emotional gravity of 
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the events, the complexity of the U.S. government’s response to the events, and the 
political context of investigating the U.S. government, military, intelligence agencies, the 
FAA, etc.  Kean and Hamilton (2007) ultimately conclude that while the final report by 
the 9/11 Commission was flawed, the organization had put forth diligent effort under 
the circumstances that revealed enough information to conclude that Al Qaida was 
ultimately responsible for the surprise attack.  It is unorthodox to suggest that the final 
report was flawed, but this position escapes perceptions or interpretations of heterodoxy 
if and when one accepts the ultimate conclusion that “9/11 was an outside job.” 
Somewhat further down the line in the hierarchy of credibility is the theory that 
“9/11” was the result of blowback from U.S. foreign policy (Johnson 2004; Kellner 2001).  
Entman (2004) treats this position as past the tipping point of ambiguity and ultimately 
incongruent with dominant cultural beliefs.  This is in line, for example, with how in the 
2008 Republican primary, then-Presidential candidate, Rudolf Giuliani, publicly 
chastised his fellow candidate, Ron Paul, for making the “extraordinary statement…that 
we invited the attack [of September 11] because we were attacking Iraq,” as Giuliani 
framed it (iRonPaul.com 2007: 2:45-3:05).  However, this represents only one of the two 
dominant political parties in the United States, and one of the staunchest ideological 
supporters/defenders of the Republican Party, Anne Coulter (2011), claims that the left, 
progressives, and/or the Democratic Party are conspiracy theorists for supporting such 
conclusions.  Lastly, because Entman (2004) completely ignores alternative accounts of 
explaining “9/11” that go beyond blowback theories to suggest that agents within the 
U.S. government were complicit in carrying out and covering up the actual events of 
September 11, we have a further sign that blowback theories constitute unorthodox 
statuses relative to the heterodoxic status of 9/11 Truth.  That fact that alternative 
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accounts of September 11, such as those put out by the 911TM, are missing from 
Entman’s (2004) analysis, is also another sign of the need to broaden social scientific 
investigations into what is typically considered taboo intellectual territory. 
Taking off from Husting and Orr’s (2007) and Pelkmans and Machold’s (2011) 
analyses, one critical review of cultural studies texts (see Birchall 2006; Bratich 2008; 
Dean 2009; Fenster 2008) that directly address the 911TM shows that these rule creators 
and enforcers (Becker 1963) “[classify] 9/11 skepticism in one of two ways:”  
by assuming the label “conspiracy theory” applies to all 9/11 skepticism, they 
condemn even demonstrable falsehoods to what Orr and Husting call the “freak 
show” of postmodern American culture; and by focusing on how the theories are 
able to circulate, rather than whether the theories possess any epistemological 
legitimacy, they avoid questions regarding the very definition of conspiracy 
theory.”  (Truscello 2011:33) 
The reference to Husting and Orr’s (2007) use of “freak show” comes from the following 
paragraph in their article, which is premised on their agreement with cultural studies 
analysts who argue that the cultural and socio-political climates in contemporary U.S. 
society serve as incubators for delusional paranoia (i.e., “conspiracy theories”): 
Instead of questioning the coherence of “conspiracy theorizing” as a category, or 
pointing to the reframing power of the phrase, these analyses come dangerously 
close to reifying it.  Lumping together alien abductees, the X-Files, and concerns 
about corporate or political corruption erases distinction between varying 
concerns of conspiracy, treating them all as part of the “freak show” of American 
culture in the postmodern moment.  Scholarly analysis must engage the 
micropolitics of the term.  While this work on conspiracy has shown us the 
importance of cultural contexts for understanding many different kinds of 
phenomena, it must also attend more systematically to the micropolitics of the 
term:  its ability to reflexively tarnish identities of widely disparate claimants and 
to place limits on what can be uttered in the public sphere.  [italicized in original] 
(p. 143-144) 
The micropolitics of the conspiracy label plays out in the discourse produced by its use 
in practice and its reification in academia, media, and public discourse, and thus the 
conspiracy label defines a hegemonic discourse that leads to taken-for-granted 
assumptions about what can be thought in private and talked about in public.   
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The conspiracy label operates as a mechanism of “boundary maintenance by 
constructing the stigmatized other and her/his conspiracy theory.  The category 
conspiracy theory polices the borders of legitimate versus risible statements, and 
intellectually competent actors versus paranoiacs” [italicized in original] (Husting & Orr 
2007:141).  As another sociologist has stated the matter, “[c]onspiracy theory as a 
convenient rhetorical rebuttal has been culturally constructed as quick refutation of 
otherwise distasteful, never mind factual ideas” (Asadi 2010:74).  Moreover, “the 
conspiracy theory label is simultaneously a tool for those in control, and an obstacle for 
those challenging the political status quo” (Pelkmans & Machold 2011:77).  As a 
principle for regulating speech acts about troubling events involving political elites, the 
conspiracy label “equates intellectual nonconformity with irrationality and seeks to 
enforce conformity in the name of reason, civility, and democracy” (deHaven-Smith 
2013:40).  Anti-conspiracy discourse, as referred to by one analyst not cited in the 
previously discussed research (see Asadi 2010; Husting & Orr 2007; Pelkmans & 
Machold 2011; Truscello 2011), is “notable for its intolerance of dissenting 
interpretations, and its self-assignment in the constant policing and disciplining of 
‘conspiratorial’ thinking and paranoid ideas” (Goshorn 2000:9).   
Under a dramaturgical analysis, anti-conspiracists position themselves before 
their audiences as protagonists defending against the irrational aggressions of 
antagonistic paranoiacs.  If we adopt this point of view, “we do not adopt the point of 
view of the participants in the drama (conspiracy theorists, targets of conspirators, and 
the public—dupes, the general public, and the true believers).  Rather,” continue Wexler 
and Havers (2002:255), 
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we take the view of the rational analyst as an objective voice whose directorial 
assumptions put meaning, motive, and purpose into the plot. 
 From the rational analyst’s perspective, the plot is simple.  The trigger 
for action and thus the origin of the story rests in the inability of some people to 
live in a world where problems stem from a complex etiology.  (p. 155) 
Acting as rational analysts, anti-conspiracists propose to their audiences to have an 
authoritative and objective analysis of the social world.  Conspiracies might occur, but 
journalists eventually uncover these plots; there are kernels of truth in conspiracy 
theories, but conspiracy theorists are more often wrong, and potentially dangerous.  As 
part of the anti-conspiracy discourse (Bayat 2006; Goshorn 2000), this point of view 
forms a threat to communicative action because it closes the marketplace of rational 
discourse to the exclusion of certain claims and claimants (Habermas 1984).  “Variants of 
the label conspiracy theorist become dangerous,” argue Husting and Orr [italicized in 
original] (2007:147). 
The mechanism allows those who use it to sidestep sound scholarly and 
journalistic practice, avoiding the examination of evidence, often in favor of one 
of the most important errors in logic and rhetoric—the ad hominem attack.  
While contest, claim, and counterclaim are vital to public discourse, we must 
recognize that “democracy is a fragile and delicate thing” (Denzin 2004) [sic] and 
mechanisms that “define the limits of the sayable must continually be 
challenged. (p. 147).   
As the main component of the 911TM’s discursive field, anti-conspiracy discourse has 
several characteristics that limit the 911TM’s ability to engage in unobstructed 
communicative action, and it has broader implications for the discursive landscape of 
society in general. 
 Predating the events of September 11, thus indicating that this analysis has 
predictive validity, Goshorn’s (2000) analysis of cultural studies texts (see Dean 1998; 
Fenster 1999; Marcus 1999; Melley 2000) revealed the existence of an anti-conspiracy 
discourse prepared for the existence of the 911TM.  First, Goshorn posits the following: 
112 
 
There is a debilitating critical problem in accepting the reified terminology that 
would construct a discourse of "paranoid thinking and conspiracy theory" as it 
has long been employed by commercial media in both news coverage and 
fictional forms, by official government spokespersons, and by the few academic 
scholars who have addressed the area until recently. Only when one realizes 
how far we have been led along the "paranoia and conspiracy" trail can we see 
how this represents a sort of discursive capture, or the clever taking in hostage of 
larger, potentially more disturbing discourses by a smaller, more aggressive but 
more comforting set of assumptions. The latter, or anti-conspiracy discourse, 
performatively discredits and dismisses the former while simultaneously 
calming immediate anxieties and displacing latent fears introduced by alleged 
conspiracy narratives. Psychological explanations here serve purposes of 
psychological containment.  [italicized in original] (2000:8) 
 
Dating back to Richard Hofstadter’s (1964) article in Harper’s Magazine, “The Paranoid 
Style in American Politics,” along with Tom Bethell’s (1975) editorial in The Washington 
Monthly, “The Quote Circuit,” a plethora of articles from psychologists has arisen to 
define and measure beliefs in “conspiracy theories” (Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999; 
Brotherton 2013; Brotherton & French 2014; Brotherton, French & Pickering 2013; 
Darwin, Neave & Holmes 2011; Douglas & Sutton 2011; Goertzel 1994; Swami, 
Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham 2010; Van Prooijen & Jostmann 2013; Wood, Douglas & 
Sutton 2012) and to uncover the social psychological origins and consequences of them 
(Douglas & Sutton 2008, 2011; Jolley 2013; Jolley & Douglas 2014; Swami 2012; Wood & 
Douglas 2013).  While Bethell’s (1975) article generated a research program that inspired 
scientists and pundits to reify the existence of a psychological process thought to lead to 
“conspiracy theorizing” (Ebel-Lam et al. 2010; Hugh 2007; Leman & Cinnerella 2007; 
McCauley & Jacques 1979), Hofstadter’s (1964) article generated thousands of citations 
that continue to regenerate his thesis; for example, of the 1,251 citations of Hofstadter’s 
(1964) article currently (as of June 12, 2014) listed on Google Scholar, the most recent is 
Jolley and Douglas’s (2014) article, which suggests that conspiracy theories are 
politically and ecologically detrimental. 
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 Goshorn’s analysis of anti-conspiracy discourse is instructive in yet another way: 
Anti-conspiracy discourse, which credits itself with a superior reason untroubled 
by any paranoia about contemporary events, can be considered as a form of 
reactionary foundationalism, defensively covering its own implication within a 
threatened or imploding consensus culture – or that which stands behind the 
shield of responsible thinking in order to fight off the criticisms of the 
"irresponsible" others. In the few cases where academic critics have managed to 
comment on the resurgence of conspiracy theory, it is most typically viewed as a 
vulgar method employed in the popular understanding of complex problems for 
those whose analytical skills are "politically impoverished," suffering from "poor" 
sources of information, while the academic's own perceptions and often less -
informed sources remain unexamined.  [italicized in original] (2000:11) 
Current research agrees with Goshorn’s (2000) assessment (see Aistrope 2013; Asadi 
2010; deHaven-Smith 2013; Husting & Orr 2007; Jones 2010; Pelkmans & Machold 2011; 
Truscello 2011; Wexler & Havers 2002), and it has been suggested that anti-conspiracy 
discourse is not only restrictive for the 911TM but detrimental to society.  I am not in this 
dissertation concerned with any other claimants than the 911TM, its members, and its 
countermovement antagonists, and I am not interested in claims other than to the 
empirical realities of September 11 and to the use of the conspiracy label.  However, 
many anti-conspiracists who target the 911TM claim that it is inherently or in effect an 
anti-Semitic movement (see Aaronovitch 2010; Berlet 2009; Byford 2011; Kay 2011; 
Shermer 2011; see also Phillips & Huff 2010), and due to these types of practices in 
operation even before the 911TM existed, “there remains an active leftist fear or latent 
paranoia of being associated with anti-Semitic analyses and paranoid interpretations of 
internal subversion common to many extreme-right groups” (Goshorn 2000:17). 
Discourse and Discursive Fields in the Context of Multi-Institutional Politics 
The discursive work of the conspiracy label is divisive and derisive, and its 
continual employment since mid-1960 has led to a communicative landscape, or 
discursive field, that hinders rational discourse and serious investigation into 
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catastrophic events like those of September 11 (deHaven-Smith 2010, 2013).  The concept 
of “discursive fields” has two main components.  Referring to written or spoken 
communication based upon reasoning or argument (as opposed to intuition or 
revelation), the discursive aspect entails the claims that are made about the existence or 
non-existence, legitimacy or illegitimacy, reliability or unreliability, and the general or 
specific meaning of some person, group, category, place, thing, idea, event, occurrence, 
process, action, or state of affairs.  The field component of the term refers to the cultural 
terrain, socio-cultural environment, and/or socio-historical context within and out of 
which discourse takes place.  “Field,” in this case, “is a mesolevel [sic] concept denoting 
the local social world in which actors are embedded and toward which they orient their 
actions” (Sallaz & Zavisca 2007:24).  “Such fields,” states Snow  
emerge or evolve in the course of discussion of and debate about contested issues 
and events, and encompass not only cultural materials (e.g., beliefs, values, 
ideologies, myths and narratives, primary frameworks) of potential relevance, 
but also various sets of actors whose interests are aligned, albeit differentially, 
with the contested issues or events, and who thus have a stake in what is done or 
not done about those issues and events.  These various sets of actors include, in 
addition to the social movement in question, one or more countermovements, the 
targets of action or change, the media, and the larger public, which includes 
clusters of individual who may side with the protagonists or antagonists as well 
as those who are indifferent and thus constitute bystanders.  (2004a:402) 
Upon this field, the drama of the collective claimsmaking by antagonists and 
protagonists plays in front of multiple audiences with varying levels of interest (Benford 
& Hunt 1992, 2003). 
An important point in the concept of fields is that they are at once dynamic yet 
structural, fluctuating within parameters (Bourdieu 1977).  When applied to discourse, 
this means that language and communication are static and dynamic, shifting with 
social contexts and the goals and interests of social actors (van Dijk 2009).   Based on his 
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discussion of the discursive turn in framing issues for social movement scholarship, 
Steinberg summarizes his point that he has 
offered a model of discursive repertoires that partially supplants the current 
theory of framing.  Based in dialogism and sociocultural psychology, this model 
portrays the production of meaning as a dynamic and often conflict-riven 
process tied to particular socio-historical contexts and patterns of interaction.  It 
depicts the ideological processes of mobilization and action as dynamic 
discursive processes in which collective actors vie to control the meanings within 
repertoires of discourse.  The instability within discourse itself and the 
essentially contested character of its meanings both create opportunities for 
contesting hegemony.  (1998:862)  
The “current theory of framing” in the study of social movements that Steinberg (1998) 
refers to is rooted in Snow et al.’ (1986) classic article on frame alignment processes and 
micromobilization, which was one of the earliest studies to elaborate on the concept of 
framing in the context of social movements research (Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 
2000).  Discursive fields are thought to form the backdrop or context within which 
frames are constructed, articulated, contested, accepted, and/or rejected (Snow 2004a).  
Therefore, when social movements and countermovements package their claims into 
meaningful schema, this framing is contextualized, constrained, and provided 
opportunity within and as a growing part of a discursive field. 
In his later work, Steinberg (1999) empirically demonstrates that collective actors 
can be constrained or aided by the symbolic or cultural structures, i.e. the discursive 
fields, within which they are obliged to operate.  Taking off from Steinberg’s work, 
Snow brings to our attention “that framing processes and contests figure prominently 
within discursive fields related to social movements and the collective actions with 
which they are associated” (2004a:402) because the symbols, beliefs, values, ideologies, 
myths, and narrative that compose the non-material aspects of these fields shape what 
can be said and meaningfully interpreted.  Snow (2004a) relates discursive fields to the 
116 
 
kindred embedding concept of discursive opportunity structures (Koopmans & Olzak 
2004), which are the cultural, social, and political contexts that allow a given frame to 
resonate in a given socio-cultural context (Ferree 2003).  Conversely, threatened political 
elites mobilize, drawing upon their capital (financial, political, social, cultural, and 
symbolic) to form discursive obstructions for social movements that inhibit their ability 
to effectively raise public support (Shriver et al. 2013).  In the case of the 911TM, “9/11” 
has already been typified by political and media elites (Altheide 2006; Connor 2012; 
Entman 2004; Krebs & Lobasz 2007; Meyer 2009) to the extent that it typically induces 
those who uphold the official narrative to rebuff those who do not as un- or anti-
Americans (Robinson 2005, 2008) or as “conspiracy theorists” or “conspiracists” (Berlet 
2009; Kay 2011; Sunstein & Vermeule 2009; Taibbi 2008).   
Discursive fields, or the “terrain(s) in which meaning contests occur” (Snow 
2004a:402; Spillman 1995:140-1; Steinberg 1999:748), relate to what Thornton et al. (2012) 
call field-level logics.  Institutional fields are those face-to-face or mediated social 
interactions in which symbols and practices are carried out across institutional orders, 
which is to say that the logics of one order carry over into or are contested by another.  
For example, institutional fields are active when news outlets reports for federal 
agencies, U.S. Departments, and/or the Pentagon in order to maintain market share and 
professional legitimacy (e.g., see Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston 2008).  However, this 
example “does not limit the field concept to only the institutional orders of the state, the 
professions, and market competition, or to a particular level of analysis” (Thornton 
2012:62).  Field-level logics transcend institutional logics in that the former contain 
dispersed, societal-level theories, frames, narratives, and practices, or what Thornton et 
al. call “vocabularies of practice” (2012:149).  These “coalesce into a common language 
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for sensemaking, decision making, and mobilization around categories of practice” 
(2012:149), which provide the common ground upon which social actors can 
communicate about present, material and more abstract phenomena.  For our purposes, 
this means that regardless of the evidence put forward or the credentials or expertise of 
the speaker, the conspiracy label operates across institutional contexts to explain deviant 
speech acts and their interlocutors without resolve to rational debate and analysis of 
empirical claims.      
 “Communication and joint attention to field-level practices [are] at the heart of 
[Thornton et al.’s (2012)] model of field-level institutional logics,” and thus I treat 
Snow’s (2004a) definition of discursive field as interchangeable with this level of the ILP.  
Institutional fields are those symbolic and social terrains in society where human and 
organizational actors and agents take one another into account in practices that 
materialize the symbolic or ideational components of institutional orders (Thornton et 
al. 2012).  Institutional logics form when symbolic representations are transferred to 
meaningful practices in social contexts, and field-level vocabularies of practice, or 
“systems of cultural categories” (Thornton et al. 2012:168), emerge “as social groups 
establish shared narratives to both frame and make sense of organizing practices.”  “One 
or, more typically, multiple institutional logics develop at the level of institutional 
fields” (Thornton et al. 2012:148), and field-level vocabularies of practicexxv, such as the 
conspiracy label, transcend the logics of any given institutional order by providing the 
                                                                 
xxv Thornton et al. (2012) “define vocabularies of practice as systems of labeled categories used by 
members of a social collective to make sense of and construc t organizing practices.  For example, ‘share 
price,’ ‘institutional investors,’ ‘S.E.C.,’ ‘auditing,’ and ‘accountability’ are examples of the labeled 
categories of the vocabulary of corporate governance in the United States” (159).  
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discursive content of the theories, frames, and narratives that form and are used in the 
emergence of institutional fields.   
Thornton et al. refer to the presumably shared knowledge, beliefs, and 
suppositions as the “common ground” between social actors, which “makes it possible 
for a speaker or writer to coordinate what is meant and what the audience understands” 
(2012:159).  While they recognize the complexities of communications processes, they do 
not cite any literature pertaining to discursive fields or even to discourse14.  Instead, they 
build their own theoretical agenda, including how they treat theories, frames, and 
narratives, which they use with specific reference to field-level logics.  These are 
important to discuss because they constitute the framework of the content of what social 
movements and countermovements dispute.  While Thornton et al. (2012) recognize the 
complexity of contextualized and cross-level emergence of meaningful practices of 
communication, at no point do they cite or refer to it as dialogic.  “Rather than assuming 
communication as the sending and receiving of messages whose meanings are evidence 
and unproblematic,” argues Steinberg (1999), the conception of discourse under a 
dialogic view “offers a model of discourse as a dynamic, conflict-ridden cultural terrain” 
(748).  The ILP is dynamic, and includes the logics of theories, frames, and narratives, 
but including the concepts of discourse, discursive fields, and dialogism will explicitly 
tie these components into Thornton et al.’s (2012) explanatory model of society, and, 
again, Thornton et al.’s (2012) ILP informs Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008) 
institutional politics approach and Benford and Hunt’s (2003) marketplace of public 
problems.       
The most abstract of the symbolic sense-making schema are theories, which 
“provide general guiding principles and explanations for why and how institutional 
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structure and practices should operate” (Thornton et al. 2012:152).  Theories, such as the 
theories of government, democracy, the economy, capitalism, the military, war, and 
conspiracy, provide general assumptions (usually rooted in ideologies) and specific 
formulations about how societal components should be arranged and what these 
components should do or look like.  Theories are distinguished from institutional logics 
because theories need not be isomorphic to actually existing institutional orders, they 
can be ideal typical, such as theories of “free markets” and “democracy.”  An important 
point about theories is that as they diffuse widely throughout society, “they become self-
fulfilling, increasing the adoption of practices consistent with the theory” (Thornton et 
al. 2012).  Thus, the generation of the conspiracy label in news articles that theorized the 
existence of a “paranoid style” (Hofstadter 1964) and that conspiracy explanations “are 
popular because people have an irrational need to explain big and important events 
with proportionately big and important causes” (McCauley & Jacques 1979:637; see also 
Bethall 1975) have led to the reification (Berger & Luckmann 1966) of a theory that 
explains beliefs in conspiracies antagonistically instead of sympathetically. 
Theories can be used in different ways, depending on their intended purpose.  
Whereas scientists, economists, historians, politicians, and laypersons (i.e. non-experts, 
non-professionals) use theories to explain how society and its constituents operate, 
cultural entrepreneurs, or those who attempt to change or control society (see Becker 
1963), engage in theorization: 
Theorization is engaged in by cultural entrepreneurs’ use of stories and 
rhetorical strategies to expose or ameliorate contradictions and to manipulate 
moral and pragmatic legitimacy through cultural symbols.  The goal of 
theorization is to obtain resources and mobilize support, justify possible 
solutions and new courses of action, and translate interests to often-diverse 
constituents.  (Thornton et al. 2012:110) 
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The theorization of “conspiracy theories” by anti-conspiracists nearly always positions 
them as implausible, unfounded, unverified, unproven, unwarranted, and untrue 
(Goshorn 2000; Husting & Orr 2007; Truscello 2011).  This is problematic, in the first 
place, because the labeling of a belief as “conspiracy theory” or a person as a 
“conspiracy theorist” is a product of ant-conspiracy discourse that has the inherent 
drawback of being ideological (i.e., unscientific) and irrational (i.e. based upon the ad 
hominem).  Moreover, the push by anti-conspiracists to dismiss certain beliefs because 
they have been or can be labeled as “conspiracy theories” poses the risk of committing a 
Type-II error, which is retaining the assumption that an event was not the result of a 
conspiracy when it actually was (for discussions on this, see Coady 2006a, 2006b; Bayat 
2006; Buenting & Taylor 2011; Pelkmans & Machold 2011).     
As sense-making schema within institutional orders and fields, theories purport 
to explain a given arrangement of social reality, however, theories exist in tandem with 
other vocabularies of practice, narratives and frames.  “Narratives give meaning to 
specific actors, events, and practices, whereas frames are general symbolic constructions, 
applicable across a wide variety of practices and social actors” [italicized in original] 
(155).  In this dissertation, I have referred to the “narrative of ‘9/11’” with some 
reflection, for there were specific events on September 11, 2001, that actually occurred in 
objective, capital-R reality—to note, I reject strict constructivist and strong relativist 
positions, but I do not claim that I or any single individual possesses complete 
knowledge of the events of September 11 (see Bhaskar 2011).  There are competing 
theories for how and why the events of September 11 occurred, and the events are now 
referred to as “9/11,” which is a word or term used to refer to an entire narrative of the 
events of September 11, the surrounding circumstances, and to the consequences.  This 
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narrative developed, in a general sociological sense, like all other narratives, “in the 
process of social interaction as a result of processes of cognition, communication and 
negotiation” (Thornton et al. 2012:155).  Narratives take their form from actors with 
interests rooted in the logics of one or more given institutional orders (e.g., profit, 
power, prestige, etc.).  As actors will generally rely upon institutional logics and 
vocabularies of practice to formulate and/or iterate a narrative, social movements will 
attempt to frame a narrative in a given way so as to achieve movement goals (Snow & 
Benford 1988), and these practices are accomplished through the construction and 
articulation of coherent theories that explain how social things do and/or should 
operate.    
For social movements, we might think of these field-level logics of the discursive 
field as “repertoires of contention,” in political processes language (McAdam et al. 
2001:137), or they can be conceived of as “scripts” and “interpretations,” in 
dramaturgical language (Benford & Hunt 1992:38, 47).  These social stocks of knowledge 
guide movements in how to communicate between members, to audiences, and with 
antagonists when they protest, recruit new members, confront their opposition, and seek 
or oppose social change in other ways.  Since field-level logics also provide cultural 
material for the opposition to social movements, culture at this interinstitutional level is 
both enabling and constraining.  Social movements attempt to pull members of the 
public into their discursive fields through the use of framing techniques, with the goals 
of reframing a narrative and, in the end, replacing an extant theory, but 
countermovements attempt to counteract these efforts.  Whereas social movement’s and 
their members tend to be perceived as social outsiders, countermovements tend to 
represent insider-claimsmakers who can rely upon the legitimacy of institutional orders 
122 
 
under attack by social movements, making their counter-claimsmaking and 
counterframing efforts all that more effective (Benford & Hunt 2003; Thornton et al. 
2012).  The discursive field of the 911TM, though, contains the conspiracy label and anti-
conspiracy discourse generally, which tilts the field in the favor of the movement’s 
countermovement antagonists. 
Synthesis 
Benford and Hunt’s (2003) model of interactional dynamics on the public 
problems market place between and among claimants (see Figure 5) does not account for 
the roles that multi-institutional politics (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008) and field level 
logics (Thornton et al. 2012), or discursive fields (Snow 2004a), play in shaping, 
constraining, and opening opportunities for counterframing and reframing strategies 
employed by countermovements and social movements.  Presented in Figure 9 is the left 
hand section of Benford and Hunt’s (2003) model depicting interactions between and 
among insider (countermovements) and outsider (social movements) collective 
claimsmakers.  Both claimant domains have been placed within a circle to indicate the 
presence of a discursive field.  This is not meant to imply that there is only one 
discursive field, nor that discursive fields only apply to movement-countermovement 
dynamics within the larger model of public problems.  It is plausible and likely that each 
possible unit of analysis (i.e. from one to all claimant domains and all combinations of 
their interactions, including constituents of each domain) from Figure 5 has one or more 
discursive fields that shape, constrain, and open opportunities for discourse for those 
claimants.  For example, there are discourses within claimant domains and at least one 
produced between claimants.  However, when taking into account the cultural myths, 
values, beliefs, knowledge, norms, and other practices that these claimants can utilize in 
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Figure 9.  Movement-Countermovement Dynamics within a Discursive Field  
 
their interactions, we expand our notion of discourse (talk and texts) produced between 
and among claimants to the level of a discursive field (the total collection of talk and 
texts in context of broader socio-cultural and socio-historical factors).   
For this sociological pilot study with the 911TM, and with the initial proposition 
of the analytic utility of discursive fields within a multi-institutional public problems 
marketplace, as it might more broadly be stated, I have simplified the analysis in this 
dissertation.  This simplification is designed to highlight the existence of the discursive 
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field as a part of movement-countermovement dynamics so we can see what its nature is 
likely to look like for social movements generally.  The unit of analysis for this 
dissertation is the discursive field itself, and thus our focus is on discourse among both 
claimant domains, not between them.  Discourse is the product of competition through 
communication between two or more parties over the meaning of some given thing.  
The goal is to gain hegemonic dominance through framing claims in ways that are 
ideologically coherent and resonant with audiences.  Claims can range from orthodox, to 
unorthodox, to heterodox, depending not on the truth-value of the claim, but its 
ideological value, along with the credibility of the claimant, in the perception or 
interpretations of audiences.  Gaining hegemonic control over a narrative or discourse 
would likely transfer a previously heterodox or unorthodox claim up the hierarchy of 
credibility, thus establishing it in a position of dominance and as a likely target for 
discursive assault.   
Insiders, having formed into a countermovement, use and defend orthodox, and 
sometimes unorthodox, claims in attempts to defend the status quo and extant ruling 
systems of authority.  Outsiders, coalesced into social movements, often seek some type 
of social change that works against the status quo and/or the interests of ruling 
authorities, and this is often the case in NSM challenges to relations of ruling (Smith 
1990), truth regimes (Foucault 1980), and field-level logics of the interinstitutional 
system (Thornton et al. 2012).  As collective claimsmakers, each of these claimants form 
discourses around how best to achieve their goals, and as competing claimants in the 
public problems marketplace, each set of actors employs rhetorical and counterrhetorical 
strategies to the degree necessary to achieve those objectives (Ibarra & Kitsuse 2003).  In 
doing so, the actors draw upon culturally resonant scripts or frames that produce and 
125 
 
are contextualized by the emergent discursive field (Benford & Snow 2000; Steinberg 
1998).  While not existing sui generis, discursive fields are a social reality that can be 
parsed into their component parts, dynamics, and trajectories.   
The shaded area of Figure 9 indicates the dynamic nature of discursive fields, 
which are “inherently partly disorderly or fuzzy, since the actual structuring of meaning 
is done in use” [sic] (Steinberg 1998:856).  Like Pelkmans and Machold’s (2011) model of 
theories of conspiracy (Figure 6) and Entman’s (2004) diagram of cultural congruence 
(Figure 8), the shaded area indicates that a tipping point exists in terms of the perceived 
or interpreted credibility of a claim.  However, claims are issued, rebutted, reformulated 
and reissued, etc. etc. etc., both in real time interactions and asynchronously across texts, 
and the perceived or interpreted truth-value of a claim depends on one’s standpoint in 
relation to ruling systems of authority; as Pelkmans and Machold (2011) discuss, 
conspiracy theories are measured in proximity to power, not truth.  Unlike Pelkmans 
and Machold (2011), and Entman (2004), I posit not distinct cutoff point or clear 
demarcation of where or when a claim will transfer from orthodoxy, to unorthodoxy, to 
heterodoxy.  Similar to how Best’s (1990, 2008) and Benford and Hunt’s (2003) models of 
claimsmaking do not represent a process, but rather designate stakeholders and 
relationships, the gradient in Figure 9 represents the dynamic and dialogic nature of 
anti-conspiracy discourse (Goshorn 2000; Snow 2004a; Steinberg 1998; Truscello 2011).   
Social movements seek social change, sometimes threatening multiple 
institutional orders in the process.  When actors representing multiple institutions come 
to defend threatened interests of their respective positions against a given social 
movement, their aggregated actions form into a countermovement opposition.  When 
such a diverse array of institutions are represented, a social movement will likely receive 
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counterclaims and counterframes rooted in the politics of multiple social institutions 
(Armstrong & Bernstein 2008; Thornton et al. 2012).  Regardless of the logics that inform 
counterclaims or counterframes, countermovements can draw symbolic power from 
dominant cultural resources, such as, in the case of the 911TM, the conspiracy label.  In 
this regard, the discursive field within which the 911TM operates is poised against their 
efforts, especially due to the gravity of the dominance of the commonly accepted 
narrative of “9/11” (Altheide 2006; Entman 2004).  Anti-conspiracy discourse colors as 
“conspiracy theory” what members of the 911TM have to say to their audiences, 
whether issued by a scientifically informed, and credentialed professional or uttered by 
a street activist with imperceptible amounts of expertise.   Due to the “discursive 
capture, or the clever taking in hostage of larger, potentially more disturbing discourses 
by a smaller, more aggressive but more comforting set of assumptions” (Goshorn 
2000:8), that anti-conspiracy discourse performs, what the 911TM says is heterodoxic; 
but such is the nature of how “conspiracy theory” operates in relation to truth and 
power in contemporary U.S. society (Pelkmans & Machold 2011).   
Before proceeding to the next chapter, it should be mentioned that doxa, or the 
implicitly accepted, unconsciously defended, unstated assumptions, and/or what are 
sometimes plainly “unknown unknowns,” does not necessarily refer to unreferenced or 
uncited information.  Problem denial and ignoring are tactics movements and 
countermovements use to frame, counterframe, and reframe claims (Benford & Hunt 
2003); if something goes unmentioned, it is not necessarily a sign that hegemony, 
ideology, or the powers of discourse are or have, in effect, positioned some piece of 
information as doxic.  For example, defending the orthodoxy of the official story of 
“9/11” does not entail citing Zelikow’s (2004) 9/11 Commission Report because of the 
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widely shared assumption of its authoritativeness.  Not citing this report in defense of 
the orthodox narrative of “9/11” positions it as doxic, but when it comes into conscious 
discourse, and when it is used to defend the dominant narrative, it enters the discursive 
field becomes as part of the orthodoxy.  Doxic cultural ideations can be drawn upon for 
orthodox, unorthodox, or heterodoxic claims; it is the discursive buffer between the 
meso-level of discursive fields and the more macro-levels of the logics dispersed among 
the interinstitutional system.  Thus, is a vital nature of discursive fields highlighted, i.e., 






METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
Data for this project were gathered from three sources, face-to-face interviews 
with street activists in two sessions, an extended online participant observation, and 
texts in the formats of books, news articles, journal articles, and video archives.  Face-to-
face interviews were collected on September 11, 2011 and 2013, in from members of the 
911TM gathered for street rallies in Manhattan, NY.  Interviews and field notes were 
recorded with a voice recorder, and interviews were transcribed and analyzed for 
themes.  The online participant observation took place with “The 9/11 Truth 
Movement” Facebook group over a year starting in 2012.  I made posts open to the 
entire group, I commented on certain posts, and I observed certain posts and comments 
that I “liked.”  Texts from countermovement antagonists were collected incrementally 
throughout this project’s development as they were mentioned by participants, 
observed in online discussions, and discovered during literature reviews for this 
dissertation.  Like data from interviews and the online participant observation, I reduced 
the population of texts to exemplars that highlight anti-conspiracy discourse within the 
discursive field of the 911TM.  Methodologically, studying the 911TM and its discursive 
field brings about certain methodological concerns that are worth meditating over 
before moving into a nuanced discussions of data gathering and analysis. 
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Methodological Considerations  
Methodologically, this project combines grounded theory methods with critical 
ethnography and critical discourse analysis.  In terms of grounded theory, I posed an 
open-ended question for each activist in 2011 at the outset of our interviews, I asked 
clarifying and probing questions, and then I used responses from participants to 
generate questions for subsequent participants.  My participant observation with the 
911TM Facebook group in 2012 was partially built on my 2011 interviews, and, while 
data produced from it contributed to questions for my 2013 interviews, it also stands 
alone as one third of my data collection efforts with the 911TM.  In 2013, I opened 
interviews with the same type of open-ended question format as in 2011, but I was much 
more purposive in my endeavors to produce data about key issues I had discovered 
during my engagements with the movement since 2011.  Finally, in order to include 
countermovement antagonists in this study, I collected texts from social actors who have 
explicitly targeted or attempted to refute or debunk claims from the 911TM.  I use these 
texts to show the counter-claimsmaking and counterframing activities that position the 
911TM as an incredible site of polemic interlocution. 
I have used grounded theory data collection methods to allow the members of 
the 911TM to “speak for themselves as agents of social change” (Denzin & Lincoln 
2011:249), but as compared to attempting to build a novel theory that explains the 
911TM from the ground up, my study gravitates toward critical ethnographic research 
methods in three ways.  First, I have framed my research in the theoretical lenses of 
social movements and social problems literature (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008; Benford 
& Hunt 2003; Best 2008), which precludes the analytic neutrality of formal grounded 
theory (Corbin & Strauss 2008).  Secondly, my focus is on the entire cultural group of the 
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911TM and their interactions with the public and their antagonists, which positions the 
study in more of an ethnographic approach than a grounded theory approach that 
would be focused on the specific beliefs and behaviors of a theoretically selected sample.  
Lastly, as a member of the 911TM, I have taken an advocacy position, which means that 
analytic neutrality in my choice of questions to ask, topics to focus on, and the way I 
portray the data was and is not adhered to.  What is presented is an insider’s 
sociological perspective on the 911TM in terms of discursive obstacles placed in its way.   
Grounded theory methods date to Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss’s ([1967] 
2012) book, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, and have since taken off into a variety of 
approaches ranging from formal, objectivist methods (Corbin & Strauss 2008) to the 
constructivist approach that “not only theorizes the interpretive work that research 
participants do, but also acknowledges that the resulting theory is an interpretation” 
(Charmaz 2006:130).  While I am not here formulating a theory of the 911TM from the 
ground up, for this study we should keep in mind that both the 911TM and their 
antagonists present their own interpretations of the narrative of “9/11” and 
explanations of the events of September 11, but that my own (re)presentation and 
analysis of these facts are interpretations from just one standpoint.  My goal for this 
study, as is the goal generally for grounded theory methods, has been to provide an 
explanation of the 911TM that is rooted in their own words and texts, in which case I 
avoided entering the field with prefabricated, structured interview questions based on 
theoretically-informed categories.  Rather, I wanted data to emerge from the movement 
in its own terms (Glaser 1978).       
Of the different approaches to and strategies within grounded theory (Kelle 
2007), my own approach to gathering data falls most closely to Glaser’s (1978), which, 
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like the basic questions that inform the sociological perspective (Berger 1963) and the 
sociological imagination (Mills [1959] 2000), is essentially guided by the broad question 
of what is going on with the phenomena at hand?  The way I approached this in real 
time with movement members was to pose an open-ended question, “What brings you 
to ground zero today?”  I then pursued clarification questions with participants, and I 
used prior interviews to inform subsequent ones.  This comes close to what Dick (2007) 
describes as the convergent interviewing process in grounded theory studies, which is a 
dialectic technique that probes the agreements and disagreements between interviewees, 
and then it moves toward an emergent theory of action through comparing responses.  
The types of memo writing, coding, and constant comparison techniques that inform 
most grounded theory methods (Holton 2007; Kelle 2007) were not used in 2011 or 2013 
because interviews were collected in quick succession, making note writing impractical, 
and my purposive as opposed to theoretical sampling techniques (Morse 2007) also 
brought me closer to ethnographic research than a true grounded theory process.   
My intensive, unstructured interviewing strategies have brought me close to 
some of the most active members of the 911TM, allowing me to dig deep into finding 
out, for example, what motivates some people within the movement to travel across the 
entire continental United States in order to spend one day in protest at the September 11 
memorial services at “ground zero.”  My overall strategy has also led me to uncover 
what drives some of the movement’s members to engage in the daily routine of posting, 
discussing, and debating issues in the “9/11 Truth Movement” Facebook group, and in 
both situations I have recorded the thoughts, beliefs, stories, narratives, and theories of 
members of the 911TM as they exist in their natural state.  All along, I have treated 
members of the 911TM as indigenous knowledge workers (Birchall 2006; Denzin 2007; 
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Jones 2010), and so my motivations to help them further build self-determination and 
empowerment in the face of powerful countervailing forces detracted from my ability to 
build a theory that can be read as value-neutral, objective, and analytically disinterested 
in the outcome, but that has not been my goal.  As much as I wanted movement 
members to provide data for which I had no previous theoretical category in mind, I did 
choose certain questions over others because my intention with the movement had been 
one of critical inquiry, which does not attempt “to produce a more ‘valid’ categorization 
but to avoid objectifying and misrepresenting research subjects”  (Gibson 2007:450).   
 In tandem with performing grounded theory methodologies to collect my data, I 
have treated this project as an exercise in critical ethnography (Madison 2012).  It has 
been noted that grounded theory and ethnography are useful to use in tandem when the 
practicalities of an investigation call for the strengths each offers researchers in the field 
(Timmermans & Tavory 2007).  In the sites of my data collection with the 911TM, both in 
Manhattan and on Facebook, my participants were (and still are) part of groups who 
interact on a regular basis, sharing language, attitudes, values, and beliefs unique to the 
subculture of 9/11 Truth.  Ethnographic research involves immersing one’s self in the 
day-to-day lives of participants in order to uncover and elucidate the meaningful 
behaviors of a (sub)cultural unit, which includes their use of language, their social 
interactions, their construction and uses of artifacts, as well as their engagement in daily 
routines and rituals (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994; Williams 2011).  In the early part of 
the 20th century, Robert Park (1925), for instance, encouraged his students and other 
sociologists to remove themselves from their offices and to go out and explore real-time 
social interactions as part of their data gathering techniques, which I did, but now in the 
21st century researchers can do just that without having to remove ourselves from our 
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desks and computers (Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce & Taylor 2012).  Following movement 
members around Manhattan, like following thread posts on Facebook, allowed me 
access to the lived reality of movement members, and, as a movement member myself, I 
was often able to satisfy my needs as both a researcher by observing what was going on 
with my participants along with my desires as a movement member to affiliate with 
others engaged in attempts to disrupt the hegemony of the narrative of “9/11.”  
As compared to formulating categories from my data by continuously going 
back to the field and sampling for theoretical purposes, as is the prescription for a 
grounded theory study (Charmaz 2006; Corbin & Struass 2008), I began to concern 
myself with how and why the 911TM operates within a social environment largely 
hostile or unsympathetic to its beliefs and behaviors.  Naturalistic inquiries (Denzin 
1971), such as this one, involve engaging with participants in social settings where 
behaviors are authentically performed (as compared to behaviors that occur in a 
controlled, laboratory setting), and while I can say that this occurred in both 2011 and 
2013 in Manhattan, my participant observation with the 911TM Facebook group is 
squarely within the camp of ethnographic research.  My participant observation moves 
this study beyond the scope of grounded theory methodologies because it was during 
this time that I began to impose issues and concerns that I had as a researcher and as a 
member of the movement.  For the most part, as I began to invest myself more heavily in 
the movement and treat it as a primary source of my scholarly work, I began to find 
myriad countervailing sources that, upon my own and other movement members’ 
scrutiny, socially construct the movement and many of its beliefs in a way that 
delegitimizes otherwise credible claims from movement members, such that the 
exclusion of the collapse of WTC 7 from The 9/11 Commission Report (Zelikow 2004) is a 
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clear indication that members of the U.S. government and major news media engaged in 
a cover up of the events of September 11. 
As compared to realist ethnography, which is typically written in the third 
person in attempts to portray participants in an uninterested voice without the 
researcher’s standpoint taken into account (Van Maanen 1988), my approach is that of 
critical ethnography.   “Critical ethnography begins with an ethical responsibility to 
address processes of unfairness or injustice within a particular lived domain…” 
[italicized in original] (Madison 2012:5), and in this case I treat members of the 911TM as 
the recipients of undue labeling and stigmatization through the use of the conspiracy 
label by the movement’s countermovement antagonists.  Critical ethnography diverges 
from realist and positivist-oriented programs in that the researcher acknowledges his or 
her position or orientation toward the subject matter with the intention to take a stance 
on a social issue, and (s)he also engages in emancipatory practices, which entail certain 
kinds of rigor that are sometimes unnecessary in positivistic qualitative research.  For 
example, Patti Lather (1986) develops the concept of catalytic validity, which is the effort 
of the researcher to develop self-understanding and self-determination in participants 
that can help move them to better work against injustices.  Many of my posts in the 
911TM Facebook group were made with the intention to inform as well as elicit 
responses; while many of my posts were made in regard to my need to clarify issues 
movement members brought to light in the field in Manhattan, at other times my goal 
was to alert the movement to the workings of their countermovement antagonists and to 
gain insight into movement members’ knowledge and interpretations of their 
opponents.  These efforts, though, were largely based upon what movement members 
had already told me, and so I rarely, if ever, exposed the 911TM to new information.   
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In such a light, I have gathered interviews with and observations of movement 
members that allow us to understand how it operates as compared to how its opposition 
claims it operates, and it is through this type of intention on my part that I have 
deployed qualitative methods for critical social purposes (Cannella & Lincoln 2009).  In 
line with this, Madison describes how critical ethnographers seek change for the groups 
for which they advocate:      
The conditions for existence within a particular context are not as they could be 
for specific subjects; as a result, the researcher feels an ethical obligation to make 
a contribution toward changing those conditions toward greater freedom and 
equity.  The critical ethnographer also takes us beneath surface appearances, 
disrupts the status quo, and unsettles both neutrality and obscure operations of 
power and control.  Therefore, the critical ethnographer resists domestication 
and moves from “what is” to “what could be.”  [italicized in original] (2012:5)    
Therefore, the critical components of this project are designed to counter certain 
narratives constructed by the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists about the 
movement.  In describing the circumstances and procedures of my data collection 
below, I provide the necessary methodological insight into the origins of statements that 
I position against discourse of the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists, and in 
revealing my alignment with the 911TM I expect caution from readers skeptical of we 
who challenge the received narrative of “9/11” and contest the official explanation of 
the events of September 11. 
 In order to ascertain the arguments of the 911TM’s countermovement 
antagonists, I have engaged in a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of texts they have 
produced (Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 2003).  Sociological discourse analysis is often 
concerned with how organizational and institutional structures facilitate, delimit, and 
produce styles and content of discourse, as well as how discourse is produced by and 
produces selves and social interactions (Grimshaw 2003; Heller 2004).  CDA bridges the 
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gaps between the use of language in verbal and written interactions at the micro-level of 
social reality with the power imbalances and inequalities inherent within macro-levels 
where, for example, media outlets and scholarly communities produce texts about 
subjects.  It is the job of CDA to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions that allow 
various forms of oppression (e.g., sexism, racism, classism, etc.) to go unnoticed, 
unchallenged, or unfettered within various social institutions (e.g., media, politics, 
military, science, corporations, etc.) (Linde 2003; van Dijk 2003).  Especially when 
applied to the social institution of media, which is inclusive of audiovisual and print 
news, books, magazines, journals, Internet blogs, and entire websites, CDA is used to 
uncover how language is used to frame an issue, person, or category of people, and the 
data can be in the form of texts that include, for example, an entire book or news channel 
down to how a particular fragment of discourse takes form (Cotter 2003). 
One major issue that should be addressed before concluding is the influence of 
my position with regard to how my data have been selected.  Interviews and participant 
observations are considered “researcher-instigated data.”  Whereas the existence of 
these data depends on the efforts of a researcher to elicit participation from human 
subjects, “naturally occurring data” are collected unobtrusively and “constitute 
specimens of the topic of research” (Peräkylä 2005:869-70).  Often times, researchers are 
interested in the content of interviews, such as the arguments made about a particular 
issue or how meaning is constructed, but naturally occurring data are the very empirical 
phenomena in which a researcher is interested.  Researcher-instigated and naturally 
occurring forms of data exist on a continuum, with the polls separated by the degree to 
which the researcher influences what data are produced and collected.  Data collected 
through interviews with the 911TM in Manhattan and participation with their online 
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forum on Facebook would not exist without my questions and efforts, which entails 
certain methodological considerations as to how my situatedness and standpoint affect 
the data I have gathered (Kincheloe & McLaren 2005; Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis 2002).  
Naturally occurring data, such as the texts of the 911TM’s countermovement 
antagonists, exist as cultural artifacts in their own right and only needed to be identified 
as a category and collected for analysis, which introduces different methodological 
issues than are present in researcher-instigated data (Lynch 2002; Speer 2002). 
 Data that are “contrived” (Speer 2002), “researcher-instigated” (Peräkylä 2005), 
or “naturally organized” (Lynch 2002) are a consequence of a researcher’s efforts to 
collect, organize, interpret, and report information collected from and/or about other 
human beings, social interactions, social artifacts, and social situations.  Thus, for these 
types of data, there is always a component of the researcher’s point of view present at 
some point in the research process.  Data presented in this project reflect my position as 
a white, heterosexual, middle class, U.S. American male (among other statuses, 
including my age, political affiliations, religious affiliation, etc.), as well as those of a 
sociologist and member of the 911TM.  My initial venture to collect interviews in 2011 
was inspired by a sense of professional and personal curiosity about what (other) 
members of the 911TM would say about their lived practices.  As I continued asking 
questions to and receiving answers from movement members, in concert with reading 
texts from their/our countermovement antagonists, I found it necessary to take an 
explicit position with relation to the movement, to the narrative of “9/11,” and the 
official explanation of the events of September 11.  Therefore, this project provides 
insight into the interworking of a radical social movement, an analysis of its interactions 
with its most active opponents, and a report from a movement member who has 
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employed critical sociological methods to explain the state of a new social movement 
that challenges a narrative central to the operation of power and domination at the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
 What should be considered methodologically weakest of my methods is the 
identification and selection of texts to analyze from the 911TM’s countermovement.  
Intellectual organizers within the 911TM are aware of the collective efforts of its 
countervailing social forces (e.g., see deHaven-Smith 2013), and so 9/11 Deniers is not a 
contrived category of data and neither are their texts.  When attempting to provide a 
coherent representation of the discursive field of the 911TM, I had not personnel or 
professional interests in representing either it or its countermovement in neutral terms.  
This logic can be read to bleed over into my selection and presentation of texts.  I made 
no attempts to systematically collect or analyze these texts, but rather I selectively pulled 
quotes and passages that highlight the existence and operation of the 911TM’s discursive 
field from exemplars of its countermovement.  I discuss this issue in further detail 
below, but it is worthwhile to explicitly state that this study is not a systematic analysis 
of the content of the 911TM’s claims and frames nor is it for the counterclaims and 
counterframes of its countermovement.  This study simply shows that discursive fields 
are important factors to consider when analyzing movement-countermovement 
dynamics. 
 Ethnographic, grounded theory, and discourse analysis methods diverge and 
coverage in how analysts decontextualize, or code and interpret, and recontextualize 
data in efforts to interpret and represent data from samples as descriptive and 
explanatory of some given phenomenon (Alldred 1998; Starks & Trinidad 2007).  These 
methods have been employed in a way that triangulates on data necessary to answer the 
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research questions of how the conspiracy label functions within the discursive field of 
the 911TM.  In further detail below, I discuss the procedures for each of the three data 
collection techniques or methods I employed, as well as further methodological issues 
for each approach that concern this study. 
Face-to-Face with the 9/11 Truth Movement 
 On September 11, 2011 and 2013, in Manhattan, NY, I audio recorded face-to-face 
interviews with 911TM activists.  On both occasions I used snowball and convenience 
techniques to recruit participants from their street rallies, which are public 
demonstrations that involve advocacy or protest without the use of violence (e.g., 
terrorism would not count) or noncooperation (e.g., strikes and boycotts would not 
count) (McPhail & Wohlstein’s 1984).  From 10 a.m. until about 4 p.m. on September 11, 
2011, I collected 20 interviews with members of the 911TM at or around the intersection 
of Fulton St. and Broadway, across from St. Paul’s Chapel, in Manhattan , which is 
approximately two blocks away from the WTC complex. After the rally, movement 
members at this site began to disperse and decide where to move to next (I was among 
them while they deliberated), and I offered to share a cab ride with one member to their 
next location.  I collected this person’s interview on our way to Times Square, and I 
collected one more interview in this new site before traveling with this person to the 
Unitarian Church of All Souls on Lexington and East 80 th St, which is on the Upper-East 
Side.  After the premiere screening of 9/11:  Explosive Evidence, Experts Speak Out by 
AE911Truth (see ae911truth 2012) at the Unitarian Church, I traveled by subway with 
my Times Square interviewee to an after party they became aware of that was occurring 
at a tea shop called The Yippie Cafe on 9 Bleeker in Greenwich Village.  I collected seven 
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more interviews at this site until about 2 a.m., and this concluded my interviews for 
2011.   
 In 2011, my sampling of 911TM activists began while en route to “ground zero,” 
or the location of where memorial services were enacted to pay homage to the impact of 
airliners and the deaths of thousands of people at the WTC complex precisely ten years 
prior.  Police-enforced roadblocks had formed a perimeter several blocks away from 
ground zero, and, while walking toward where I suspected there to be people engaged 
in memorial service and rallying activities, I found a lone member of the 911TM wearing 
a movement-related t-shirt reading “9/11 Truth Now.”  This person, carrying a sign on a 
wooden handle about eight feet tall with the words, “Investigate 9/11.  Honor the fallen 
by relentless pursuit of the truth,” was my first interview from the 911TM.  While 
interviewing this person we were joined by a bystander who invited themselves to join 
our conversation, indicating that they had flown in from Singapore to join the 911TM in 
its activities for the day.  I asked if either person knew of any gatherings of the 
movement, and it was suggested that I follow the first person toward the WTC complex, 
which is where I located a gathering of approximately 75 activists.   
This rally was located in front of the Chase bank at the corner of Fulton St. and 
Broadway across from St. Paul’s Chapel, where 9/11 memorial services were taking 
place.  Barricades lined the sidewalks, helmeted police officers were directing 
pedestrians and traffic, and upon my entrance to this location I noted several activists 
holding a red banner with yellow lettering reading, “The Bush Regime Engineered  
9/11.”  Another large poster held by activists read, “Revolt!  Against the U.S. Gov. 
Traitors” (see Figure 10).  Several smaller signs referencing the Remember Building 7 
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campaign and AE911Truth’s analysis of WTC 7 were on display by various individuals.  
Figure 10.  9/11 Truth Movement Signs of Protest at “Ground Zero,” September 11, 2011.  
 
On my way to cross the street, I could hear one person shouting, “This is not about 9/11!  
This is about today, about the lies alive today!”   
After being approved by a police officer to cross to the activists’ side of the street, 
I began collecting interviews at this site by identifying people wearing and/or holding 
911TM-related artifacts.  Several interviews took place in this fashion, with me 
approaching a person wearing a t-shirt and/or holding a sign related to the movement, 
but I eventually interviewed people not clearly indicated as part of the rally but whose 
presence was longer stayed then the continuous stream of pedestrians.  Most of these 
bystanders were not part of the movement, but they indicated they were curious about 
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the movement’s activities before or upon their arrival at the scene.  Although my 
sampling techniques cannot be said to be representative of the 911TM as a whole, I did 
interview a significant portion of those in attendance at the rallies and after party, which 
amounted to 31 total in 2011, and I attempted to vary my selections based on movement 
signifiers (types of artifacts) as well as by race, gender, and age. 
Two years passed, during which time I engaged in an online participant 
observation with the 911TM, and on September 11, 2013, I traveled back to Manhattan to 
interview movement members gathered for “a rally at ReThink911’s towering Times 
Square billboard at 5:20pm—exactly 12 years to the minute since Building 7 fell” 
(ReThink911 2013b).  The ReThink911 rally was held within barricades on West 47 th St., a 
side street just off Times Square and 7 th Avenue.  This street conference included several 
celebrity speakers from within the movement who spoke to between 100 and 150 people.  
Starting at about 4:45 p.m., I collected 10 interviews until the rally ended at about 7 p.m.  
I used data from my 2011 interviews and online participant observations to inform my 
non-standardized interview questions in 2013.  I was also interested in the significance 
of the ReThink911 campaign and if movement members believed it was a sign of success 
for 9/11 Truth and/or the 911TM, and so questions for several participants were 
directed at those affairs.  I was in the middle of an interview while the event ended, and 
my interviewee asked a passerby to take a photo of the two of us.  This impromptu 
photographer was holding a sign reading, “RememberBuilding7.org,” and so I 
requested and was obliged with an interview.  Our exchange took place while I followed 
this person to a small crowd of 911TM members engaged in street activism in the middle 
of Times Square just a few dozen yards away.   
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About 20 911TM activists had skipped the ReThink911 after party/ies, having instead 
continued to practice one of the movement’s main goals, which is to get people to 
“investigate 9/11,” a slogan that appears on several 911TM artifacts.   These activists’ 
efforts included a large display of about a dozen poster boards placed on the ground 
near a busy walkway (see Figure 11).  I did not take the time to document in detail the  




text-based information, but the pictures on the poster boards included photographs of 
the WTC complex, WTC 7, and images of the miniscule red/gray chips found in the dust 
of all three collapsed WTC buildings, which is claimed to be indicative of the use of 
nanothermite purportedly used to demolish the skyscrapers (Harrit et al. 2009).  Several 
of the activists engaged passing pedestrians in conversations, all of which seemed 
amicable except for two incidences I noticed that involved raised voices, shouting, and 
body gestures that indicated aggravation and/or exacerbation on the part of the public 
(e.g., pacing, pointing, waving and flailing arms, etc.).  I collected nine more interviews 
with movement members at this second site until we dispersed together at about 11 p.m.  
In all, I audio recorded 20 face-to-face interviews from my two sites in 2013. 
Recruiting participants for interviews was a fairly straight forward process.  On 
both occasions members of the movement used conventional tactics from the repertoires 
of contention typically employed by social movements (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 
1994; Taylor & Van Dyke 2004; Tilly 2004).  These included synchronized chanting of 
slogans (e.g., “9/11 was an inside job!”), carrying signs and banners with slogans (e.g., 
“Investigate 9/11”) and pictures (e.g., of the Twin Towers and WTC 7), wearing t-shirts 
with slogans and pictures (e.g., a hand gestured peace sign in the form of a silhouette of 
WTC 1, 2 & 7 with the tag line “9/11 Truth for Peace”), distributing literature in the 
form of pamphlets and DVD’s, engaging the passerby in demonstration-related verbal 
interactions, hosting speakers on platforms with amplified audio, and marches with 
many of the same techniques.  By virtue of these types of public displays, it was clear to 
me who was engaged in 911TM-related activism, and this is how I identified potential 
participants that I knew to be part of the 911TM.  In both 2011 and 2013, two movement 
members offered to help me with recruiting participants after our interviews, which 
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indicated that while I had tried to remain detached from insider politics with movement 
members, I had in some way given off the impression that my interviews were 
worthwhile enough for them to volunteer these services.  Four people from 2011 and 
two from 2013 were recruited via other movement members.   
 While most of my interviewees in 2011 were white and male U.S. Americans, 
which seemed to be the demographic majority in attendance, I interviewed one person 
from Singapore, another from Vietnam, two from Great Britain, one from France, one 
African American, four females, and people ranging from 18 years of age up to their late 
60’s to early 70’s.  Domestically, movement members were typically from the NYC area, 
but California, Texas, Oklahoma (not including myself), Illinois, and Pennsylvania were 
represented in the sample as well.  In 2013, I interviewed four females and two 
Hispanics, but other demographic information was not noted, which adds to the 
selection biases inherent in such sampling techniques (Walgrave & Verhulst 2011).  
Based upon comments offered after presentations I have given on the topic of the 
911TM, a key deficiency of this study is that I have not been interested in the 
demographics of the movement, nor have I documented with intention the political 
affiliations and ideologies of movement members.   
Whereas the movement itself can be viewed as a politically left-oriented 
mobilization against the “Bush Regime,” as was clearly indicated in at least one of the 
protest signs in 2011, and whereas it has been treated as a primarily Democratic (Taibbi 
2008) or progressive-liberal (Coulter 2011) phenomena, it should be noted that these 
analyses represent the 911TM’s antagonists, and it remains an empirical question as to 
the movement’s demographic composition.  Jones (2012), for instance, notes a strong 
libertarian stream within the 911TM, but recognizes that the movement is not easily 
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defined by conventional political labels.  Assessments by some of the its 
countermovement antagonists propose that the 911TM’s members’ political affiliations 
and ideologies range from traditional Republican-Democratic (Berlet 2009) to less 
traditional forms, such as radical feminism and Marxism (Kay 2011), but, again, these 
remain empirical questions to be answered with systematic research methods. 
If participants offered their party affiliation or political ideology during 
interviews, it was recorded, but only as part of the emerging data that movement 
members offered during interviews.  Many members, for example, indicated that they 
had been “Bush supporters” before they discovered 9/11 Truth, and other people 
indicated that they knew they had been lied to about the Iraq war by the Bush 
administration and that is what led them to investigate the origins of the War on Terror.  
Movement members did not seem to be interested in discussing conventional politics, 
though, and so I did not pursue that line of questioning in detail.  If a particular topic or 
issue seemed to be important to a movement member, I would trace a line of questions 
out for the particular topic or issue, and if and when a particular line of questions 
seemed to elicit repetition in or no responses, I would ask a participant about statements 
made in prior interviews or to clarify a statement made previously in their own 
interview.  Thus, conventional, Republican-Democratic, progressive-conservative 
politics were not discussed at any great length during my 2011 or 2013 interviews.   
All interviews in 2011 began with a phrase equivalent to “What brings you to 
ground zero today?”  Small variations of this, such as, “The only question I have is…,” 
and, “I just have one question today, and that is…,” were added to my basic research 
question, but after answering the initial question most participants were willing to 
entertain further questions.  In 2011, the questions I asked were based upon what people 
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were saying to me, the signs they were carrying or information they were speaking 
about, or information that I had gathered in prior interviews.  Even though I had gained 
information about such things as WTC 7 prior to my interviews, I probed such issues 
and information with movement members in order to record multiple interpretations of 
it.  These questions were typically posed with a statement such as “…and what is WTC  
7,” “what is the significance of WTC 7,”or “could you tell me more about WTC 7?”  
While I continued these types of grounded interviewing methods in 2013, I was 
primarily interested in the ReThink911 campaign, if members believed the movement to 
be effective or successful, and about information and issues I had learned while engaged 
in my online participant observation of the “9/11 Truth Movement” Facebook group.   
On both occasions, several movement members stated that they enjoyed my 
interview questions, and, in conjunction with the fact that some movement members 
offered to help me recruit more participants after their own interviews, I believe that I 
“present[ed] a caring and concerned attitude, expressed within a well-planned and 
encouraging format” (Holstein & Gubrium 2003b:10).  Insofar as my interview questions 
were “well-planned,” I had actually intended in 2011 to formulate a grounded approach 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967) in which my initial question would be open-ended to the extent 
that it would allow the participant free range within which to explain their motivations 
for their activities on that day.  As compared, for example, to opening my interviews 
with questions about why they joined the movement or who they believed was truly 
responsible for the events of September 11, or leading them to that question or directing 
them toward some other prefabricated topic, my opening question was at once specific 
to their behaviors that day and it could also be perceived as a general question about 
their beliefs because.  This opening question inspired a general set of responses about 
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members’ involvement with the movement and beliefs about the events of September 11 
with no clear pattern emerging other than that encouraging fellow citizens to 
“investigate 9/11” and bringing out the “Truth” of what happened on September 11 
were driving factors in participation.   
Interviews from 2011 ranged from 33 seconds to 32 minutes, with interviews 
increasing in length as the day progressed.  The shortest interview I gathered, which 
was the eighth interview I collected from the 911TM, proceeded as follows: 
I: The one question I have is what brings you to ground zero today? 
 
P1: Nine eleven truth! 
 
I: Nine eleven truth? 
 
P1: That’s it, man. 
 
I: And what is… 
 
P1: Too many unanswered questions; I don’t believe the official story! 
 
I: Is there anything else that you feel is important to add, that people might 
want to know about? 
 
P1: Yeah, how do three towers fall straight down in one day?  You can 
convince me one tower can.  You might be able to convince me that two 
towers can, but you’ll never convince me of three:  It’s a mathematical 
impossibility.  They fell straight down through the path of most resistance.   
 
I: Is there anything else? 
P1:  [shakes head, walks away] 
In the last two lines you will notice that I concluded this interview with an open-ended 
question about whether or not the participant had anything else they would like to add.  
I concluded all interviews with this technique to, as much as possible, gather data that 
was based upon what my participants, individually and collectively, had to offer as 
compared to what I intended, encouraged, or influenced them to say.  In several 
instances this technique extended the interview for several minutes.  As I gathered more 
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data, I had more questions from previous interviews, but my own sense is that 
interviews increased in length latter in the day because movement members were 
stimulated from the day’s events.   
Interviews from 2013 were on average much longer than in 2011.  The shortest 
was 43 seconds, but the longest was one hour twelve minutes.  Many of the interviews 
lasted around 20 minutes, and two were about 45 minutes in length.  I attribute this to 
the fact that I had spent time analyzing my first set of interviews in addition to engaging 
in an online participant observation with the 911TM, and so I had several questions that, 
although I had not specifically formulated them beforehand, I believed I would be able 
to work into my line of questions.  I was also much more prepared to confront certain 
topics, such as the theory/ies that no airliners were actually hijacked and/or crashed 
into the Twin Towers, Pentagon, and/or the Shanksville, PA field (i.e. the so-called “no 
planner theory/ies), and the theory/ies that “Jews,” “Israelis,” the “Mossad,” 
“Zionists,” and/or “neoconservatives” were behind the attacks—these theories vary 
depending on their source, and they are not accepted in part or totally by all members of 
the 911TM.  In this way, my 2013 interviews were less grounded than the first set, 
although I did continue to employ the open-ended opening and closing question 
techniques with each participant.  On several occasions I was prepared to ask pointed 
questions about content discussed on the “9/11 Truth Movement” Facebook group.  
 “The aim of the interviewer,” Holstein and Gubrium say, “is to derive, as 
objectively as possible, the respondent’s own opinions of the subject matter in question, 
information that the respondent will readily offer and elaborate when the circumstances 
are conducive to his or her doing so and the proper methods are applied” [italicized in 
original] (2003b:10).  In terms of objectivity, several of my participants asked about my 
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own beliefs of what happened on September 11, and this indicates that I had asked 
questions in a way that often led respondents to express their own subjectivity without 
me leading them to a given conclusion or response.  If participants felt the need to ask 
about my beliefs, then this is a good indication that I did not let on during my interview 
what my beliefs were.  Grounded interview questions should be designed to “explore 
and examine research participants’ concerns and then further develop questions around 
those concerns” (Charmaz 2003:312), and this was accomplished by posing open-ended 
opening and closing questions as well as using my participants’ responses to inform 
questions for subsequent participants.   
As part of a group with a collective identity and shared experiences, it can be 
expected that individuals would likely have similar stories about their awakening to 
9/11 Truth and about their interactions with others in attempting to get them to 
investigate 9/11.  As one example, when one member noted that their beliefs and 
activities related to the 911TM caused them physical, psychological, and social distress, I 
began asking other participants if they experienced something similar.  Drawn from the 
end of an interview, here is how this exchange typically proceeded: 
I: One person I interviewed earlier mentioned that when they were going 
through their awakening, or when they first learned [the truth about 
9/11] that they actually felt physically ill; they couldn’t eat, they couldn’t 
sleep.  Did you feel any physical differences or changes? 
 
P2: Honestly, I would say yes.  I felt a lot of anxiety, and I’m not a very 
anxious person, I’m usually a very even-tempered type of guy, and I 
remember when this stuff was first presented to me to the point where I 
couldn’t deny it anymore, I got very anxious .  I mean, I felt afraid.  I felt 
like pacing, and calling people and like, “Do you know this stuff!  Do 
you know this stuff!”  I mean just, you know, I couldn’t believe it!  You 
know?  So, yes, I would say that I definitely experienced some physical 
anxiety as a result of learning the truth about nine eleven.   
 
I: At this point I can’t think of any more questions directly, unless you 




P2: No, sir. 
The interview techniques I employed in 2011 and 2013 resulted in many lengthy 
interviews that provided much rich and detailed information about the 911TM and its 
members.  As Jones (2010, 2012) points out of the movement, though, the 911TM has a 
strong online presence in addition to its offline activities, and members’ online behaviors 
were explored with my participant observation of the “9/11 Truth Movement” Facebook 
group. 
Observing and Participating with the 9/11 Truth Movement Facebook Group 
 While face-to-face interviews allow researchers to respond in real time to 
participants’ statements and body language, gathering data online has many benefits.  
The need to share the same physical time and space with participants is eliminated with 
online research, which reduces many costs to researchers and opens the potential variety 
of participants to nearly anybody across the planet with an Internet connection (Mann & 
Stewart 2004).  Email, SMS texting, chat rooms, message boards, and social networking 
sites comprise much of the online world where qualitative researchers can pursue data, 
and these data can be gathered through secondary and primary content analysis, 
discourse analysis, interviewing, focus groups, and, as I have engaged in, participant 
observation (Boellstorff et al. 2012).  Extending to more than a year, I engaged in a 
participant observation with the “9/11 Truth Movement” Facebook group where I 
observed ongoing interactions, posed questions, and responded to group members.  
Several opportunities and challenges came about during this phase of my research, 




Whereas face-to-face interviews involve standardized and non-standardized 
interview formats, such as structured, semi-structured, and unstructured questions that 
one or more interviewers ask directly to one or more interviewees, “participant 
observation is a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, 
interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit 
and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture” (DeWalt & DeWalt 2011:1).  In 
the context of online participant observations, the researcher “plays with” (Boellstorff et 
al. 2012:69) virtual communities in ways that are more difficult or impossible in the 
offline world.  For example, whereas I could only travel to Manhattan twice due to 
budgetary and time constraints, I could easily and regularly connect with members of 
the 911TM online.  While in Manhattan, I could not participate in the rallies as I was 
busy collecting as much data as possible before needing to fly home to attend to my 
courses on each of the following two days.  When online, though, unless I indicated that 
the reason I was participating was for research purposes, which I did from time to time 
in accordance with IRB standards, I appeared as just another active member in the 
group.   
Where there are benefits to online as compared to offline research there are also 
costs.  In the case of this study, I was sometimes apprehensive about what types of 
content I was willing to share in the online, public Facebook forum, and this poses 
certain methodological constraints that field notes and audio recordings do not.  What is 
posted on Facebook will potentially remain in the open public record indefinitely, and 
so I had to consider what potential employers, colleagues, and other social agents might 
find if they researched me for future employment, collaborations, and other aspects of 
my professional life.  This affected what types of questions I was willing to ask, the ways 
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that I posed certain questions, and which posts by members I would comment on and 
how I would comment.  Social, political, and economic constraints are obstacles for 
certain sociological studies, and the 911TM is a case in point. 
Insofar as participant observations involve two interrelated components, 
researches can note the flows and patterns of interactions, the presence or absence of 
dominant and sub-cultural behaviors, and ask clarifying and explanatory questions if 
and when they need further insight from participants.  “The analysis of existing online 
community conversations and other Internet discourse combines options that are both 
naturalistic and unobtrusive” (Kozinets 2010:56), and, whereas the unobtrusive 
methods, such as content and discourse analyses, require sampling techniques that 
account for many factors, including sampling times of the day when users are more or 
less active and capturing message posts that are both representative and unique,  
participating in online forums with active users, such as Facebook groups, often 
involves a snowball type of sampling method (Baltar & Brunet 2012; Bhuta 2012).  Some 
posts that I made received no responses while others were the catalyst for nearly one 
hundred comments, and so during my participant observation it was difficult to know 
the types of posts and comments other users would reply to or “like.”  I varied times of 
day, content, and styles of posts in order to produce responses from my participants.     
I have had a Facebook account since 2006, and I considered myself at the time to 
be a regular user, checking my account multiple times a day to interact with Facebook 
friends and groups.  Typically, people join Facebook in order to connect and network 
with friends, family, and acquaintances, and users consume and share (i.e. post) to the 
Facebook wall entertaining and informative text-based messages, images, and links to 
websites and webpages (Cheung, Cheu & Lee 2011).  An individual’s Facebook wall is a 
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collective forum that displays posts from those individuals, groups, and pages with 
whom they are networked, and by joining Facebook groups and pages users can 
network and interact with people who share common interests.  For the possible types of 
responses users can make to posts, or to comments within posts, a “like” on Facebook is 
a quick and convenient way to show approval or acknowledgement of another person’s 
post or comment, and/or one might reply to a post or another comment with a short 
acronym (e.g., “lol,” or laughing out loud), an emoticon (e.g., , , etc.), a link to a 
website or webpage, or they can range from phrases or sentences and up to lengthy 
paragraphs that include any and all of the above response ranges.  Facebook groups 
harbor between 2 members and millions, and the “9/11 Truth Movement” group 
currently (as of July 14th, 2014) has 38,761 members.   
As I have been interested in “9/11,” the events of September 11, and the 911TM 
since about the spring of 2008, and because I had already traveled across the country to 
interview 911TM members face-to-face, I decided to join the 911TM Facebook group late 
in 2011.  Initially, I had joined to satisfy my personal and professional curiosities about 
the movement and its member’s beliefs, but I was also interested to find others willing to 
discuss alternative accounts of the events of September 11.  Eventually, after about five 
months of interacting with people in the group, I requested and received IRB approval 
to study it as part of my research with the 911TM.  In attempting to uncover and 
understand how members of the 911TM interpret “9/11” and how they describe the 
events of September 11, I began to think of how the activities of the 911TM Facebook 
group were part of the social movement’s contemporary repertoires of contention, much 
like protests, rallies, petitions, and street activism are in the offline world.  My 
participation fed into this, and I began to take my role as a participant researcher more 
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seriously.  If the Facebook forum served as an actual outlet for real or authentic activism 
of the 911TM, then my participation in group discussions would mean that I too was 
engaging in cyberactivism (Carty & Onyett 2006), which meant for me that I might as 
well take further steps toward authenticating my dual positions as researcher and 
member of the 911TM.    
At about the same time that I began considering applying for IRB approval for 
my online participant observation, in April of 2012, I also applied for membership to 
Scholars for 9/11 Truth & Justice (see STJ911 n.d.).  Upon acceptance to STJ911, I 
considered myself a full-fledged member of the 911TM, which poses certain questions 
about my ability to be objective in my research about a movement of which I am a part.  
Sociology is a discipline with a diverse internal division of labor (Burawoy 2007), and I 
have taken it as my task to bring to sociologists and other professionals in the academy 
and broader public awareness about a social movement that calls attention to a growing 
fissure in contemporary society.  Sociologists often advocate, implicitly if not explicitly, 
for values (e.g., social justice and economic equality) and the political rights and social 
welfare of disadvantaged categories of people, and this can raise “the suspicion that we 
are biased in favor of the subordinate parties in an apolitical arrangement when we tell 
the story from their point of view” (Becker 1967:241).  As stated above, this project is 
designed to facilitate discussion about the 911TM and its claims, and my participation 
with them had been intended to raise issues within the group that would eventually 
allow me to work toward their empowerment. 
In parsing out how it is that sociological analyses can be considered credible in 
light of the fact that “[w]e can never avoid taking sides” (Becker 1967:245), Becker refers 
to a “hierarchy of credibility” implicit in societies, institutions, and organizations that 
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have ranked positions.   This is to say that in nearly all social situations a pecking order 
of believability works as a background assumption that tacitly informs laypersons and 
professionals alike from whom and of what types of information are more trustworthy 
and reliable than others.  Of importance here is Becker’s reasoning of how this hierarchy 
affects the creditability of sociological analyses of subordinate groups when these 
groups are often considered less dependable in knowledge construction than 
superordinate groups, especially experts in the professions: 
The hierarchy of credibility is a feature of society whose existence we cannot 
deny, even if we disagree with its injunction to believe the man [sic] at the top.  
When we acquire sufficient sympathy with subordinates to see things from their 
perspective, we know that we are flying in the face of what “everyone knows.”  
The knowledge gives us pause and causes us to share, however briefly, the doubt 
of our colleagues.  (1967:243) 
When “taking sides,” we are urged to acknowledge our position, and we should make 
known that our reflexivity does not gives us jurisdiction over the beliefs and behaviors 
of those who we have not studied.  In the case of this dissertation, I have studied the 
911TM from within, as one of its members and as a professional sociologist.  My online 
participant observation arose from my dual roles as researcher and movement member, 
therefore, my interactions as a member of the 911TM can discredit my participation as a 
sociologist. 
 As a partisan on the matter of 9/11 Truth, I can only ask, like those within the 
movement (e.g., see Griffin 2007b), that my readers investigate the claims of the 911TM, 
particularly those related to WTC 7, or I ask that you retain any judgment and 
evaluation of the 911TM’s and its countermovement antagonists’ claims.  I will present in 
the following chapter claims and counterclaims of the 911TM and its countermovement 
antagonists, and my intent is to show that it is later group who relies upon rhetorical 
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fallacies and half-truths when attempting to repair damage done by the 911TM to the 
official narrative of “9/11.”  As a partisan, then, I expect my claims, as much as they are 
claims from within the movement and by a sociologist, to be scrutinized and held in 
suspicion of bias, but we should all be aware that biases can be a result of reliance upon 
the hierarchy of credibility as much as they are upon the implicit or explicit 
considerations of the researcher. 
Responding to Becker’s (1967) article, “Whose Side are We On,” Alvin Gouldner 
(1968) takes issue with Becker’s willingness to take a certain “standpoint, a kind of 
underdog position” [italicized in original] (104).  Gouldner (1968) urges sociologists to 
continue to study and defend, when necessary, the underdog position, but because it 
can be continuously questioned as to whether one researcher’s underdog is another’s 
“overdog,” we are called to clarify upon what grounds we have made our commitments.  
“The essential point about the underdog,” Gouldner states (1968:105), “is that he [or her] 
suffers, and that his [or her] suffering is naked and visible;” however, one constant issue 
raised by the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists is that they are harmful to society 
because, if they are not primarily composed of anti-Semitic bigots, their movement 
invites and nurtures such bigotry (Berlet 2009; Kay 2011).  There are, it should be noted, 
those within the movement who have been labeled as anti-Semitic (e.g., see Anti-
Defamation League 2011; Bollyn 2012; Ry Dawson 2013), and the 911TM Facebook 
group has recognized this to the extent that they have allotted Friday’s as the only day 
of the week that such issues as “Jews,” “Zionists,” “Israel,” and the “Mossad” can be 
discussed.  They call it “Zio Fridays,” and I first learned about it when I unwittingly 
broke this rule, among others.      
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Early on in my endeavors at my online participant observation with the 911TM, I 
made a few preliminary posts, for instance, asking “What does ‘inside job’ mean to 
you?” and another regarding then recent claims about “9/11 debunking” (see 
RedHerring 2012), but I had little success in eliciting responses (these two posts had no 
likes or replies).  Some of my posts were the catalyst for dozens of comments, but most 
resolved to zero to very few replies or likes.  One post in particular highlights many of 
the issues I have discussed above, and it is here reproduced in full just as it is displayed 
on the Facebook group wall: 
Richard G Ellefritz  9/11 Truth Movement 
December 19, 2012 · 
 
I didn't see this in the Top 9/11 Docs file, what do you all think? Seems pretty 
legit to me: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_fp5kaVYhk 
 
9/11 Conspiracy Solved: Names, Connections, & Details Exposed! 
Was 9/11 really an Inside Job? After reviewing this documentary, and checking 
the evidence, I think the answer will be clear to you. http://www.alienscientis...  
youtube.com 
Like · 2 Comment· 5 Share · 0 
    Ken Doc and [one other] like this. 
 
Richard G Ellefritz:  He uses the terms "hijackers" and "flight 93," and I know 
there some who don't believe there were actually hijackers or that flight 93 
crashed into the Pentagon, so that could be a matter of contention. 
    December 19, 2012 at 6:14pm · Like 
 
Richard G Ellefritz:  One other thing I thought might bother (some) people in this 
forum is the lack of attention to Israel, yes/no? 
    December 19, 2012 at 9:49pm · Like 
 
Ken Doc:  First off Rich..... that doc is great just way above most peoples heads. 
    Secondly, we here have something called ZFD (Zio Fridays) that we devote 
time to exposing the Israeli involvement to 911 each and every Friday.  
Guess you must take Fridays off, lol 
    December 19, 2012 at 10:15pm · Like 
 
Ken Doc:  Oh yea, it's "Flight 77" that people have a hard time believing hit the 
Pentagon. 




Richard G Ellefritz:  Yeah, I thought to myself afterwords that I typed in the 
wrong flight number, but I left it just to be honest. As far as ZFD, I’ll await a 
response to my second comment above tomorrow, then. 
    December 20, 2012 at 1:07pm · Like       
Before discussing how this exchange exemplifies some of the complications of doing an 
online participant observation with the 911TM, I will point out that Ken Doc has given 
me explicit permission to use his name in full.  In fact, after I initially announced my 
intention to study the group, Doc replied directly after with the statement, “Do it up 
Rich. I do this publicly for a reason. Lol.”  Doc is one of the key administrators and most 
active members of the 911TM Facebook group, and, as an example of the admiration he 
often receives from group members, one member stated in reply to one of my posts that 
“ken doc is a fine representative for most of us” [sic]. 
  My initial post above was in regard to a video on YouTube titled, “9/11 
Conspiracy Solved: Names, Connections, & Details Exposed!” AlienScientist (2012), aka 
Jeremy Rys, constructed the film based upon the works of intellectual organizers within 
the movement, which he cites in the description of his YouTube video.  These figures 
include such works as Michael Ruppert’s (2004) Crossing the Rubicon, Mark Gaffney’s 
(2012) Black 9/11, various articles by Kevin Ryan (e.g., Ryan 2009; Ryan et al. 2009)15, and 
James Corbett’s (2010) blog post, “A Guide to 9/11 Whistleblowers.”  Like Black 9/11 and 
Kevin Ryan’s book, Another Nineteen, in which Jeremy Rys is given “a debt of gratitude” 
(2013:5), “9/11 Conspiracy Solved” provides an extensive account of names, networks, 
historical trajectories, geopolitical and economic means and motives of individuals and 
organizations believed to be responsible for the events of September 11.  Therefore, a 
methodological consideration we need to take into account is how the hierarchy of 
credibility plays into the reader’s assumption about the truth-value of these accounts if 
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(s)he is not familiar with them.  Statements I make that seem to or actually uphold 
claims made by the 911TM are based upon the type of insider knowledge that I used 
when engaging in my participant observation and interviews.  My position as an insider 
provided me with a type of access that other sociologists, academics, and professionals 
would not have if and when they study the movement from outsider statuses relative to 
the 911TM.  This makes my study both unique in its ability to report about the 
movement from within as well as biased, especially as could be judged by 
countermovement antagonists. 
 As the practice of reflexivity is considered a common and expected component of 
qualitative research (Finlay 2002), I expect that revealing my insider status with the 
movement will be taken as a sign of trustworthiness as opposed to a detriment to my 
credibility.  Making known my status is intended to convey mutual recognition of how 
my situatedness as both participant and observer affects the types of data I have 
collected and report in this dissertation.  Like the voices of the “boy racers” studied by 
Karen Lumsden, who picked up on the works of Becker (1967) and Gouldner (1968), the 
911TM are “socially situated as the ‘underdogs’ in terms of the silencing of their voices 
and the privileging of the voices of the ‘outside’ groups in public discourse(s)…” 
(2012:7).  Also like the “boy racers” of Lumsden’s study, members of the 911TM are 
“largely aware of their marginal position within society and their labeling by ‘outside’ 
groups” (2012:12).  Unlike Lumsden’s (2012) initial assumptions about “boy racers,” I 
entered the field with the assumption that the 911TM was not problematic or disruptive 
to society.  However, like her reflexive outcomes, my own values and beliefs have been 
impacted and shaped by the interactions I have had with the 911TM as a movement 
insider and as a sociologist studying the group. 
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 If we look back to the example of my participant observation with the 911TM 
Facebook group given above, I will point out some issues that I experienced that affected 
my sense of self as participant and observer of the group.  First, my intent with this post 
was to entice a discussion about the completeness or incompleteness of AlienScientist’s 
(2012) YouTube video with, for example, his use of the term “hijackers.”  Prior to this 
post, I had posted a question asking anybody in the group to “provide any good, 
detailed work on the hijackers,” and the one person to reply queried, “The ‘hijackers’? 
You mean the patsies who were set up to look like hijackers?”  Along with this, I was 
aware of Dean T. Hartwell’s (2011) book, Planes Without Passengers:  The Faked Hijacking 
of 9/11, and therefore I believed that interrogating a densely packed YouTube video 
claiming to have solved the 9/11 conspiracy could best be served by asking about the 
use of language pertaining to key issues of concern to (some) members of the 911TM.  
You will notice that Doc cited the reason that it was not on his list of “Top 10 9/11 Docs” 
(see Doc 2012) is that it is “just way above most peoples heads” [sic], therefore it is 
reasonable to infer that this movement organizer for the 911TM Facebook group 
recognizes the importance of framing with respect to reducing the complexity of 
information in order to frame 9/11 Truth in a coherent and resonant way for the public 
(Benford 2000). 
Part of the problem with writing about the content discussed by the 911TM is 
that there is so much information about the narrative of “9/11” and the events of 
September 11 that the 911TM have discussed and debated.  It can become very difficult 
to not confuse a name, date, time, or rationale, and this can be seen where Doc corrected 
my reference to Flight 93, which allegedly was crashed into a field in Shanksville, PA, as 
opposed to Flight 77, which allegedly hit the Pentagon.  My request to my readers is to 
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suspend judgment about the truth-value of claims about “9/11” and the events of 
September 11 due to the facts that Zelikow’s (2004) official report is incomplete (Ahmed 
2005; Griffin 2006)—if not for the mere fact that it did not reference WTC 7—and that the 
reports in MSM often include omissions, distortions, and fabrications as well (Zwicker 
2006).  Much of the information presented by the 911TM that is discussed in the 
following chapter has been tailored for an audience not thoroughly steeped in its 
discourse, which introduces certain methodological concerns in relation to how well I 
have represented the breadth and depth of their concerns.      
 With this said, we can look to my second comment in my post, one in which I 
inquire as to whether AlienScientist (2012) should have referenced or interrogated 
possible Israeli connections to the events of September 11.  Like my inquiry into the 
hijackers, I brought up Israel because it is a matter that I have found to be important to 
the 911TM.  In a post prior to the one concerning “9/11 Conspiracy Solved,” I had 
inquired about Noam Chomsky’s ‘discussion of 9/11 conspiracy theorists’ (see 
RPShedrow 2011), in which he dismisses alternative accounts of September 11 as not 
scientifically supported and irrelevant in any case.  I had posed the following question: 
“If you were watching this with Prof. Chomsky, or if you were going to write him about 
it, what would you say to him? There are about a dozen issues he brings up, one being 
the idea of left-gatekeepers, so take your pick,” and two respondents brought up Israel.  
Whereas, for example, Jeremy Rys, who has given explicit permission to use his name in 
full, replied by saying that he “would tell Chomsky that his ignorance of 9/11 and 
failure to do any honest research into the attacks is the largest mistake of his intellectual 
career,” another member replied with the statement that “When people understand who 
did 911 - Chomsky's done. This clown also leads his followers to believe it's the US who 
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is waving Israeli's tail. The tribe always lead and control dissent” [sic].  One member 
replied directly to this person, with the statement, “@[member] > the plotters don't 
define themselves by nationality > Israel to them is expendable > thus homeland 
security in America > the pernicious and well crafted victim narrative used to shield 
their operations” [sic].  These responses deserve some consideration for content, but, 
more importantly, for methodological considerations of doing an online participant 
observation with the 911TM. 
 First, I will note that many of the members’ responses were “on topic,” as the 
group often encourages its members to be, because they answered my question 
pertaining to what they would say to Chomsky.  Of the 19 accrued comments, most 
respondents answered my question directly or indirectly, but some members went “off 
topic” in that they seemed much more interested in criticizing Chomsky and his position 
on “9/11” than discussing what they would say to him.  We can see this in terms of the 
member who seemed to want Chomsky to deal directly with alleged Israeli involvement 
in the events, and another member’s criticism of that comment.  One methodological 
issue that I have with this exchange, among many other comments and posts within the 
group, is that I do not have an adequate understanding of the role that certain members 
of the 911TM claim “Zionists,” “Israel,” the “Mossad,” and/or “the Jews” (depending on 
who you ask) allegedly had in the events of September 11 to be able to accurately judge 
whether or not they are truly on topic or not.  Nor am I familiar enough with online 
vernacular to the extent that I believe I can adequately decode the use of the “>” 
signifier in the reply to the comment of interest.   
When dealing with claims made about a major and well-known historical event, 
especially one of such significance to contemporary U.S. history, we should be cautious 
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to not immediately accept or dismiss a claim as true or false due to how its content is 
consonant or dissonant with one or more dominant interpretations.  As deHaven-Smith 
(2013) goes to lengths to point out, the conspiracy concept is employed to achieve 
consensus at the expense of rationality and empirical validity.  To be dismissive of a 
claim because it does not fit squarely within our background assumptions would put us 
in the position of having already decided what is real and what is not amidst the various 
claimsmaking activities of our groups of interest, and this is anathema to how social 
constructionists typically approach the study of claimsmaking (Ibarra & Kitsuse 2003).  
The content of claims is considered by some social constructionists to be a relevant factor 
in social constructionist analyses of social problems (Best 2003, 2008).  To decide which 
claims are true and which are false a priori is to ontologically gerrymander a preferred or 
assumed reality (Woolgar & Pawluch 1985), and therefore we would be positioning one 
group higher or lower than another within the hierarchy of credibility (Becker 1967). 
 The fact that the 911TM Facebook group has designated Fridays as “Zio Fridays” 
is an indicator of both the importance of “Israeli,” “Mossad,” and/or “Zionist” 
components of their counter-narrative of “9/11,” but it is also an indicator that they do 
not want this component to override other factors in explaining what they believe 
happened on September 11.  This much was revealed to me in a one-on-one phone 
interview with Ken Doc.  The fact that I have consciously chosen not to address the 
911TM’s beliefs and claims about these issues in the current project is due to the fact that 
I am unfamiliar with their histories, trajectories, key actors, and other factors of which I 
am aware that I am ignorant.  My methodological concern here is that one audience, the 
911TM, could read my account as incomplete, and possibly even interpret it as an 
intentional cover-up of the complicity of these groups of people.  While this could 
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potentially make future expeditions to gather data from the movement problematic if 
and when this report becomes known within the movement, other audiences, such as 
the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists, might read any mention of these groups 
without a direct defense of their innocence as an implication of my anti-Semitism, which 
makes pursuing any and all avenues of discourse within the movement problematic.   
 Laura Jones (2010, 2012) work with the 911TM shows that this concern is not 
unique to me.  As part of her fieldwork with the movement, which comprises the only 
known peer reviewed, qualitative study of this group, Jones reports that within 10 
minutes of beginning an interview with a member of the movement, Sofia ‘Smallstorm,’ 
who had written, narrated, and produced the Internet-based documentary, 9/11 
Mysteries (see Citizens for 9/11 Truth 2010), “the interview veered into ‘conspiracy 
theorist’ stereotypes of right-wing anti-Semitism and one-world government as Sofia 
had told [Jones] of her belief that Israel were ultimately behind the demolition of the 
twin towers on 9/11” [sic] (2010:365).  Continuing, Jones reports that “[she] had 
considered prematurely ending [their] encounter, however, as the interview progressed, 
Sofia began to talk more personally about her own involvement in the 9/11 Truth 
campaign and how she saw the making of the film 9/11 Mysteries as an absolute 
imperative and calling in her life…” (2010:365).  While it is difficult to know whether I 
completely share Jones’ (2010) sentiments that guided her to consider ending the 
interview prematurely, I share Jones’ disposition. 
 In her own words, here is how Jones reflects upon her interview with Sofia: 
During the interview with Sofia I had felt uncomfortable at times but also 
something else, disappointment perhaps?  I think, with hindsight, I had wanted 
members of the 9/11 Truth movement to avoid these kinds of negative 
stereotypes and instead to represent something ‘different’, and more positive, in 
their engagement with conspiracy theory.  This would have allowed me to write 
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about them as ‘progressive activists’ focused on challenging the unpopular Bush 
administration through a re-imagined form of conspiratorial critique.  But, of 
course, people are complex and contradictory and do not easily conform to 
‘researchers’ expectations of their potential ‘subjects’.  (2010:365)     
To some degree, I share these thoughts and feelings.  Early on in my own research into 
“9/11” and the events of September 11, I was much more concerned with the collapse of 
WTC 7 and other empirical anomalies (e.g., the lack of video footage and pictures of 
flights 77 and 93) than I was with the potential or probable actors other than Al Qaeda 
Jihadists, but nor was I as interested in the 911TM as a social movement and how it 
operates in the public problems marketplace as I am currently.  From various 
claimsmakers at the beginning of my research, I was made utterly aware that the Bush 
administration, PNAC, and neoconservatives were blamed as the true perpetrators, but I 
was only vaguely aware that some members of the 911TM also or ultimately conclude(d) 
that “Jews,” “Israelis,” the “Mossad,” and/or “Zionists” were, depending on who you 
talk to, culpable, responsible, complicit, or willing beneficiaries.  It was not until my 
online participant observation with the 911TM that I began to become more sensitive to 
this particular topic. 
 In my 2011 interviews, none of my interviewees discussed these types of things, 
and so I had no reason to ask questions that Jones (2010) and countermovement 
antagonists (Berlet 2009; Kay 2011) view as the stereotypical right-wing anti-Semitism of 
conspiracy theorists.  However, after spending some time on the 911TM Facebook 
group, I became painfully aware that, in fact, these issues are of importance to some 
members of the group.  To this extent I will note that early on in my participant 
observation I was unaware of “Zio Fridays,” thus I was sanctioned by Ken Doc, a group 
administrator, for breaking this rule.  I did not continuously attempt to draw out this 
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(these?) issue(s) within the Facebook group.  First, as stated above, I am largely 
unfamiliar with the academic discipline of Jewish Studies (e.g., see Faculty of the 
Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf 2014), and therefore I would only be able to ask 
questions based upon the stereotypes of conspiracy theorists as portrayed by their 
antagonists (Berlet 2009; Kay 2011) or, as is more suitable to the grounded approach I 
have taken, I would only be able to ask clarification and explanatory questions to 
movement members, which I did attempt on a few occasions because of the importance 
of the issue(s) to the group. 
   My first post in the 911TM Facebook group, on February 1, 2012, consisted of an 
internal poll asking, “Do you consider yourself a member of the 9/11 Truth 
Movement?”  As a component of the basic questions about the 911TM, I was curious to 
know if people joined the group because they were already in the movement, if they 
were in the group but not in the offline movement, and other related questions, but only 
fourteen people of the more than 36,000 members at the time affirmed their status in the 
movement and no discussion took place, which is what I was aiming for in all of my 
posts.  For my second post, on February 17, 2012, I asked the group about an issue that I 
was, and still am, concerned with in terms of methodological implications for studying 
the 911TM.  In a commentary for the National Post, titled “University of Lethbridge Pays 
Student $7,714 to Pursue 9/11 Conspiracy Theories,” Jonathan Kay (2010) complained 
that the Canadian government and a Canadian professor had crossed acceptable 
boundaries of what should be considered permissible to study in the university setting.  
Kay (2010) states that Anthony Hall, a professor of globalization studies at the 
University of Lethbridge, who “seems to be using his post at Lethbridge as a training 
ground for 9/11 Trutherdom,” is free to believe what he likes “as long as he keeps it out 
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of the classroom.”  Kay (2010) included a hyperlink to “out of the classroom,” which 
takes readers to Hall’s page on RateMyProfessors.com, a website where students (and 
anyone else) can post feedback about their professors.  This is a form of academic 
censorship that complicates the scientific study of social reality in that it poses a chilling 
effect for researchers interested in engaging in critical studies involving marginalized 
groups because certain lines of inquiry, bodies of evidence, and sets of interpretative 
rationale can and will be viewed as inappropriate or unacceptable with certain academic 
and broader audiences (Gendzier 2010; McClennen 2010; Williams 2010).   
As somebody pursuing both the same profession and “Trutherdom” with which 
journalists like Jonathan Kay (2010, 2011) have taken issue, I bring these issues to light 
because discussing the 911TM and some of their relatively more radical claims seems to 
pose a risk to my professional livelihood.  Aware of this during my online participant 
observation, I asked 911TM Facebook group members the following questions about 
Kay’s (2010) article:  “What are your thoughts on this article? What does it mean when 
academics are attacked for thinking and questioning freely? Is this just a matter of free 
speech vs. free press? How do you think this might affect new academics who want to 
study the issues of 9/11 under a different paradigm than the dominant one?”  I received 
two responses from one of the group’s members.  One was a link to a debate between 
Kay and intellectual organizers in the movement (eddieleaks.org 2011; see also Paikin 
2011), and the other was the statement that the National Post is the “mossad times of 
Canada” [sic].  While I had to spend some time reviewing the link to Steve Paikin’s 
(2011) roundtable debate between Jonathan Kay and Richard Gage, Paul Zarembka, and 
Barry Zwicker, all intellectual organizers within the 911TM, which I later posted a 
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question about on March 26, 2013, I did not respond to the statement about the “mossad 
times of Canada.” 
The methodological implication here is that ethnographic work often involves 
learning about a subculture, and the researcher’s cultural biases, including our 
ignorance of the idioms and vernacular used by a subculture, can preclude our ability to 
pick up on what are initially meaningless statements or phrases.  When unfamiliar with 
such things, ethnographers should ask clarifying questions that help us understand 
issues and interpretations from the point of view of our participants, but in the case here 
I became afraid of associating myself online with statements that could potentially end 
with me being labeled “anti-Semitic.”  This leads to a methodologically serious reason I 
did not respond:  I did not then attempt to uncover more data from this 911TM 
Facebook group member due to social forces (e.g., Berlet 2009; Kay 2011) who actively 
attempt to stigmatize members of the 911TM, and “conspiracists” generally, as either 
anti-Semitic or accepting and/or enabling of anti-Semitism. 
Highly aware that unless I or another party deleted my posts, I was then and still 
am ambivalent as to how the information I have posted online with the 911TM Facebook 
group will affect my career.  Due to how anti-conspiracists like Chip Berlet (2009) and 
Jonathan Kay (2010, 2011) have ridiculed and stigmatized progressive university 
professors as anti-Semitics even though those professors do not hold such beliefs 
themselves, and who sometimes even produce literature combatting such prejudices, an 
informal boundary has been constructed for people who attempt to study the 911TM 
(for this critique see Phillips & Huff 2010).  As a social scientist, I expect to be able to 
study any group and any information from that group, and as this has been a grounded, 
qualitative research project, I have ultimately tried to allow the 911TM to speak for itself.   
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However, I self-censored in some cases due to the fear of reprisal from sources external 
and internal to my profession.  In some cases, I did not ask follow up questions where I 
desired further clarification, and in other cases, such as when asking if the 911TM 
believed that “Israel,” as a topic, should have been included in AlienScientist’s (2012) 
YouTube video, I posed the question in such a way that I believed it to be of geopolitical 
relevance as opposed to one based upon religion and ethnicity.  Therefore, data from my 
online participant observation are necessarily incomplete due to my standpoint (i.e. as a 
professional desiring a career devoid of undeserved negative attention), my situatedness 
(i.e. as a sociologist with very limited knowledge about certain topics), and to what my 
personal and professional interests with the 911TM originated as and developed into. 
It is problematic, methodologically speaking, that certain lines of question are off 
limits for some researchers (Kelly 2011), or that some researchers feel the need to cut 
their interviews short due to perceived “right-winged anti-Semitism” of their 
participants (Jones 2010:365).  The question becomes one of how well our data can 
represent the 911TM, or any group that has a radical analysis of society, if there are some 
questions that are likely to be sanctioned or, if they are pursued, that they must be 
treated as a highly sensitive subject matter as opposed to data that is to be allowed to 
emerge and then theoretically explained (i.e., deciding what a statement is or means 
before it is analyzed and placed in its theoretical context prejudices what can and will be 
known about our social world). 
 In all, I made 36 posts within the 911TM Facebook group, and I commented on 
39 posts by other members.  I was interested in why people joined the movement, the 
online group, how they interpret “9/11,” how they explain the events of September 11, 
and how they understand their position within the movement and its relation to 
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countervailing forces.  Very often I did not receive expected responses to the questions 
and information that I posted, but my experiences with the 911TM Facebook groups was 
ultimately fruitful because I was able to better understand the variety of positions and 
interpretations that members of the movement have and use in their everyday 
interactions online.  These experiences informed questions that I was able to ask my 
participants in 2013, and I was able to get other members’ interpretations of another set 
of social actors who are necessary to include for a study such as this, which are the 
911TM’s countermovement antagonists. 
Digging into the Discourse of the 9/11 Truth Movement’s Countermovement 
Antagonists 
 I have so far discussed data collection procedures and methodological issues 
concerning my face-to-face interviews and participant observation with the 911TM.  By 
including in this project discourse from texts produced by the 911TM’s 
countermovement antagonists, this project expands to include a critical discourse 
analysis (van Dijk 2003) in the form of what Michelle Fine and Lois Weis (2008) term a 
compositional study.  A compositional study gives implicit or, more often, explicit 
recognition to the socially fractured state of society, split along intersecting lines of race, 
class, gender, age, ability, and ethnicity.  Compositional studies takes these factors into 
account while providing the historical roots of the formation of those categories.  In-
group coherence and solidarity can be the product of hegemonic discourse, and so 
compositional “methods enables us to search explicitly for variety, dissent within, 
outliers who stand (by ‘choice’ or otherwise) at the dejected or radical margins, those 
who deny category membership, and those who challenge the existence of categories at 
all” (Fine & Weis 2008:90).  For compositional studies, data from in-groups can be 
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collected in several ways, from ethnographic work to nationally representative surveys, 
but data collection methods must also be used to gather data about the social forces that 
define or position those in-groups as seemingly coherent, naturally formed categories. 
 The compositional aspect of this study takes form in the use of interviews and 
participant observations with the 911TM positioned against oppositional discourse 
found within texts produced by their adversaries.  Discourse analysis is a multi-
disciplinary strategy of making visible and explicit the often taken-for-granted 
communication that takes place in talk and texts.  Data are derived from a variety of 
sources, including researcher instigated interviews and focus groups to naturally 
occurring texts in the forms of recorded conversations, letters, emails, articles in 
magazines and journals, books, Internet blogs, and so on.  The talk and texts are 
analyzed with many techniques, ranging from positivistic, theory driven coding 
strategies to constructivist and grounded methods that work with data to accumulate a 
general representation of the interlocutors and the symbolic world they construct 
through communicative interaction (Heller 2003; Phillips & Hardy 2002; Potter 2004).  
With its concern for explaining social problems, the ideological aspects of language, and 
how language is used to construct and maintain relations of power and dominance, 
CDA treats texts, or sounds, sights, sentences, and gestures produced in written and 
recorded forms, as pathways to understanding the nature of oppressive hierarchies 
(Titscher, Meyer, Wodak & Vetter 2000). 
 The method of collecting texts from the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists 
was generated during my ethnography with the 911TM.  During my research, 
movement members’ references to antagonists and my own discovery of countervailing 
forces through literature reviews produced several names and texts that I have 
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integrated into this study.  In one of my earliest, and most heavily commented (68 in 
total), posts that I made to the 911TM Facebook group, I had asked the group why it is 
that public intellectuals like Christopher Hitchens and Bill Maher, who are generally 
critical of central institutions, “buy into the official story of the events of 9/11, even 
when they're critical other aspects of the official story (i.e. that it was totally unexpected, 
that the War on Terror was necessary, etc.)?”  Of the many responses, several group 
members named other people they believe to be critical social analysts in many aspects, 
except when it comes to the narrative of “9/11” and the events of September 11.  The list 
produced by 911TM Facebook group members is as follows:  Randi Rhodes, Norman 
Goldman, Thom Hartmann, Julian Assange, Greg Palast, Glenn Greenwald, Matt Taibbi, 
Bill Moyers, and John Stuart.  These journalists, independent investigators, and 
comedians were described by the members as “left gate keepers,” ‘disinformation 
agents,’ ‘misinformation agents,’ “trolls,” and “limited hangouts,” and one member 
commented, “Here's a good takedown of the aforementioned gatekeepers,” with a link 
to David Ray Griffin’s (2010b) article, “Left-Leaning Despisers of the 9/11 Truth 
Movement: Do You Really Believe in Miracles?”   
It is safe to say that members of the 911TM are aware that they have many 
opponents, but, unlike some of them, I will maintain a general label for the 911TM’s 
opposition as countermovement antagonists so as not to impute motives and intentions 
not stated in their texts.  During my graduate studies and research with the 911TM, I 
had been developing an interest in the discursive opportunities and obstructions of the 
911TM (see asdimd 2012), and so I took special notice of when members pointed out 
opponents to the movement.  One such instance was when a member referred to 
Griffin’s (2010b) article, which is “An Open Letter to Terry Allen, Noam Chomsky, 
174 
 
Alexander Cockburn, David Corn, Chris Hayes, George Monbiot, Matthew Rothschild, 
and Matt Taibbi,” all of whom, like the list in the above paragraph, have in some way 
directed antagonism toward the 911TM.  Griffin is known to directly confront 
opposition to the movement, such as in his debates with Matt Taibbi (see Taibbi & 
Griffin 2008a, 2008b, 2008c) and his direct responses to Popular Mechanics (Griffin 2007a) 
and Cass Sunstein (Griffin 2011b).  Other movement members keyed me into debates 
between intellectual organizers within the movement and who I would come to 
recognize as key antagonists within the 911TM’s countermovement. 
As discussed above, one member referenced a discussion between intellectual 
organizers of the 911TM and their opposition on Steve Paikin’s (2011) show, The Agenda 
with Steve Paikin, which included Jonathan Kay, on the one hand, and Barrie Zwicker, 
Paul Zarembka, and Richard Gage, on the other.  Jonathan Kay (2010, 2011, 2014), who 
has written vehemently against the 911TM, was also the center of discussion on the 
911TM Facebook group when he debated (see Kay & Tarpley 2014) one-on-one with 
Webster Griffin Tarpley (2007).  Again the topic of the 911TM Facebook group, Jonathan 
Kay was backed by an ally, Ted Rall, in his debate (see Truthloader 2013) with 
AlienScientist (2012) and Neils Harrit (Harrit et al. 2009).  Responding to a post I made 
about Michael Shermer’s efforts to undermine the 911TM (see Skeptic Magazine 2013), 
one respondent pointed out that he had previously debated (see 911research.wtc7.net 
20087) Kevin Ryan (2007, 2009), and others in this same post made known that others in 
the 911TM (see Hoffman 2005b; Talboo 2010) had responded to Shermer’s (2005) essay in 
Scientific American and his 2009 article on Trueslant.com.   
It is clear that the 911TM is not only aware of their opposition, but that they 
regularly interact with them in discursive arenas ranging from face-to-face debates to 
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textual rebuttals and rejoinders.  Along with my theoretical rationale (Benford & Hunt 
2003; Best 2008; Snow 2004a), this provides the impetus for my inclusion of texts 
produced by key countermovement antagonists of the 911TM.  These include entire 
books directed at the 911TM by Jonathan Kay (2011) and Popular Mechanics (2011), as 
well as books by David Aaronovitch (2010) and Jovan Byford (2011) that give a 
significant amount of attention to the 911TM and its claims among other groups and 
issues.  I have also included peer reviewed journal articles (Swami et al. 2010; Wood & 
Douglas 2013), as well as materials in other formats, such as Carol Morello’s (2004) news 
article and James Meigs’ (2006) essay (see Table 1).  These exemplars are pulled from a 
larger list of those anti-conspiracists who have produced texts that directly or indirectly 
challenge the 911TM’s legitimacy, but cited here is only a small example of that larger 
corpus (Bale 2007; Banas & Miller 2013; Barkun 2006; Bartlett & Miller 2011; Berlet 2009; 
Birchall 2006; Bratich 2008; Brotherton 2013; Brotherton & French 2014; Brotherton, 
French & Pickering 2013; Buenting & Taylor 2010; Clarke 2007; Coady 2006c; Darwin, 
Neave & Holmes 2011; Douglas & Sutton 2008, 2011; Ebel-Lam et al. 2010; Fenster 2008; 
Goertzel 2011; Goshorn 2006; Jolley 2013; Jolley & Douglas 2014; Knight 2002, 2008; 
Lantian 2013; Lee 2011; Leman & Cinnirella 2007; Mole 2006; NIST 2011; Oliver & Wood 
2012; Olmsted 2011; Parish & Parker 2001; Prasad et al. 2009; Sampson 2010; Shermer 
2011; Soukup 2008; Stempel, Hargrove & Stempel 2007; Sternheimer 2007, 2010; Sunstein 
& Vermeule 2009; Swami 2012; Swami et al. 2011; Taibbi 2008; Thresher-Andrews 2013; 
Van Prooijen & Jostmann 2013; Warner & Neville-Shepard 2014; Wood et al. 2012).  
Multiple institutional orders are represented in the texts listed above, including 
government agencies, news media, popular and trade presses, academia, and think 
tanks.  In Table 1, I display the types of texts and their sources that I analyze in the 
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following chapter.  The categorizations and selections are not necessarily reflective of 
some objective reality, but rather they are designed to provide a loose organization to 
show institutional structure within the insider claimant domain of the 911TM’s 
countermovement.  Therefore, while these data are naturally occurring, their selection 
and organization is contrived (Speer 2002).   
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Sampling texts for discourse analysis is often purposive due to researchers’ 
needs to gain theoretical insight into a particular phenomenon (Phillips & Hardy 2002).  
Like Glaeser and Strauss’s (1967) grounded theory methods, theoretical sampling is used 
in discourse analysis to target the object(s) of interest.  In terms of selecting texts to 
analyze, “the question of what and how much to sample depends largely on the object 
of study, but researchers can try to capture ‘important’ texts” (Phillips & Hardy 2002:73).  
The exemplars I have chosen are not necessarily representative of the larger body of 
anti-conspiracists’ texts, but these texts are significant nonetheless for they present 
common lines of analysis (e.g., Aaronovitch 2010; Byford 2011; Meigs 2006; Morello 
2004), scientific reification of the conspiracy label (Swami et al. 2010; Wood & Douglas 
2013), and are in some cases book-length analyses of the 911TM (Kay 2011) and its 
claims (Popular Mechanics 2006).  Of the many debates that have taken place between the 
911TM and its countermovement antagonists, I use Jonathan Kay’s debate with Richard 
Gage, Paul Zarembka, and Barrie Zwicker on The Agenda with Steve Paikin (Paikin 2011) 
because it was referenced to me during my participant observation, and because 
Jonathan Kay is an exemplar countermovement antagonist by the fact that he produced 
an entire book directed at the 911TM.  For similar reasons, I selected the debate on 
Democracy Now! (2006) between the filmmakers of Loose Change and editors of Popular 
Mechanics’ (2006, 2011) book due to the exemplar status of Popular Mechanics as a 
countermovement antagonist and the prevalence of references to Loose Change by the 
911TM and its countermovement antagonists.  
Presentation of Data and Plan of Analysis 
 While transcribing interviews from Manhattan and reviewing posts with the 
911TM Facebook group, I made notes about recurring topics and themes.  In addition to 
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these, I kept in mind when organizing my data the theoretical implications of the 
interactional dynamics of the public problems marketplace (Benford & Hunt 2003), the 
discursive function of the conspiracy label (Husting & Orr 2007) in the discursive fields 
(Snow 2004a) and multi-institutional politics (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008) of the 911TM 
and its countermovement antagonists.  Data are presented in a narrative format, 
highlighting the interactions between and among the 911TM and its countermovement 
antagonists.  I focus on statements made about the 911TM by its countermovement 
antagonists and how the 911TM responds to those claims and framing techniques.  I 
position statements from my participants gleaned from my interviews and participant 
observations against statements derived from texts of countermovement antagonists by 
keying in on one main line of reasoning used by countermovement antagonists, which is 
that the 911TM are “just asking questions” (Aaronovitch 2010; Byford 2011; Meigs 2006; 
Morello 2004).  Along with my focus on this one analytic category imposed by the 
911TM’s countermovement antagonists, I focus exclusively on empirical claims about 
WTC 7 as well as references to the conspiracy label. 
 The data presented show, express, and highlight discourse among the 911TM 
and its countermovement antagonists, and I also provide critical analysis throughout my 
discussion.  Presenting discourse among the Truthers and Deniers of “9/11” has 
sociological features in that I present data that highlight or outline the presence of a 
discursive field within movement-countermovement dynamics.  It has critical 
sociological aspects in that I make efforts to work toward emancipatory knowledge 
production for the 911TM (Ali 2002; Humphries 2000), and it has aspects of my status as 
a member of the 911TM in that I make employ certain assumptions and representations 
that align with its interests over those of its countermovement.  I describe how I arrived 
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at the data I present, and I include a discussion of why it is important to bring into the 
narrative I construct.  What is presented has been selected to demonstrate one possible 
stream of talk or line of reasoning based around central claims by the 911TM and its 
countermovement antagonists.  This narrative represents interactions that occur within 
the insider and outsider claimant domains, as well as between them, and together this 
discourse among the Truthers and Deniers of “9/11” form the discursive field of the 






DISCOURSE AMONG THE TRUTHERS AND DENIERS OF 9/11 
  Having originally planned a slightly different structure to this dissertation, I 
requested comments from movement members in the 911TM Facebook group that they 
wished to express to the public via my own work.  My request, in part, was as follows:  
“I would like to open chapter 2 with quotes from members of this social movement 
about what woke you up, why you joined, and/or what motivates you to do what you 
do with this [Facebook] group and ‘out there’ in the offline world.”  I found one of these 
comments to be an insightful declaration of what many of my participants view as their 
raison d'être within the 911TM, which is reproduced here, verbatim and in full.  The 
following passage is from a quite active member of the group, one Arlyntha J. Love, who 
has requested I use her offline name in full as opposed to her Facebook handle, Lyrantha 
Jen L: 
We're not here to get famous. Were people in the civil rights movement 
searching for fame? It's a cause, and we're simply the people who believe in it - 
that the government lied to the public and the world about their level of 
knowledge of and potential involvement in the attacks and what actually 
happened. We want the truth. We want people to be held accountable where 
necessary, and so far, no one has been. In the grief over the worst attack in the US 
since Pearl Harbor, our own leadership was opposed to even investigating this 
attack and instead insisted on feeding us a story. Everyone in leadership seemed 
to have known who did it and how and why, very quickly, and yet told us that 
the incompetence in the intelligence community was so ubiquitous, that "no one 
envisioned flying planes into buildings" was seemingly an acceptable excuse. 
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The burden of finding the truth has been placed onto the public to learn that in 
the months and years prior to the attacks, there actually had been scenarios of 
jets being used as weapons and crashed into targets, including the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon in drills and exercises by NORAD. And then we learned 
that information gathered by a SOCOM intelligence unit called Able Danger, had 
it not been suppressed by lawyers and bureaucrats in the Defense Department 
and FBI, could have led to Muhammed Atta's arrest before these events; but 
instead, this information was ordered destroyed by officials in the Pentagon - an 
amount of information equal to about 2.5 terabytes of data on the movements of 
Atta and his terrorist cell's activities. The FBI repeatedly denied being made 
aware of alleged hijackers who had stayed in Shreveport, Louisiana and were 
reported by a man named David Graham in 2000. The President and Vice 
President at the time testified in secret behind closed doors, and weren't under 
oath, so there's no record of what they knew, how soon they knew it, what they 
did.  
 
It's riddled in mystery that all of these anomalies in addition to many others 
were not being investigated, were left to the public to find through digging of 
news articles and unanswered Freedom of Information Act requests. And then 
anyone who fell into a dissent of the 9/11 Commission Report's narrative of the 
attacks and saw a cover-up, was ridiculed and dismissed as being out of their 
wits. What kind of nation has this become where daring to question government, 
after a massive cover-up in the preventable deaths of some 3,000 people, is 
shunned and silenced from the top of Capitol Hill, to the corridors of the Justice 
Department, to even our children's classrooms?  
 
I think many people have some general idea of what the truth about the attacks 
may be; but even if we had it rolled out to us tomorrow in a blue binder, what 
next? And then what? The prospects are alarming for everyone, to say the least. 
July 19, 2013 at 1:26am · Like · 2 
Ms. Love’s question at the end is one she posed directly to the group later that same day: 
Lyrantha Jen L9/11 Truth Movement 
July 19, 2013 · 
 
This is a question I've thought about and think the movement needs to also 
address. Consider the truth about the attacks, who was involved, who did what, 
how and when, was given to us tomorrow in a binder, in an announcement, in 
confession, in breaking news - however you could imagine. And then what? 
What happens next? Why is there so much trust from many people that the 
system would suddenly be swept of corruption and be renewed somehow and in 
our favor?  
What is the endgame for the truth movement now that we are coming to 
terms with the reality that we will not get the justice that we seek, that the 
victims of the attacks and subsequent wars will not get the justice deserved. 
What are the prospects of the movement today considering these factors? 
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One commenter replied, “Damn good question LJL. It's just fantasy and very unrealistic 
too think that everything would be right in the world and that most Truthers would get 
what they want after prosecution of the main characters of this event when the ruling 
1% still will have control of what goes on in our lives......” [sic], and Ken Doc said, “It's 
probably the most difficult question to answer. We know, they know we know and they 
aren;t doing a damn thing about it except trying to discredit us” [sic].  
Just Asking Questions? 
  Members of the 911TM are often scrutinized for “just asking questions.”  So 
popular is this criticism that in the Afterword to Popular Mechanics’ (2006, 2011) book, 
Debunking 9/11 Myths, which is held by the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists to be 
a definitive account of why most or all of the 911TM’s beliefs about “9/11” and 
September 11 are erroneous (e..g., see Kay 2011; Shermer 2011), James Meigs commented 
that a “common refrain in conspiracy circles is the claim that ‘We’re just asking 
questions’16” (2006:92, 2011:122).  Among the earliest17 to make such an observation was 
Carol Morello (2004), a staff writer for The Washington Post.  Morello’s (2004) article, 
“One Man's Unorthodox Ideas About the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon Go Global in a 
Flash. Welcome to the Internet, Where Conspiracy Theories Flourish,” is also among the 
earliest to use the phrase, “9/11 Truth Movement,” in which he employs it in reference 
to ‘David Ray Griffin being an unlikely recruit to the then nascent movement.’  Referring 
to “a growing number of Web sites, books and videos contending that something other 
than a commercial airliner hit the Pentagon,” Morello (2004:na) claims that “[m]ost make 
their case through the selective use of photographs and eyewitness accounts reported 
during the confusion of the first hours after the attack. They say they don't know what 
really happened to American Airlines Flight 77 and don't offer other explanations. The 
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doubters say they are just asking questions that have not been answered satisfactorily” 
[emphasis mine].  Several other countermovement antagonists have taken an issue with 
the 911TM questioning the official story of “9/11” and the events of September 11. 
The Construction of an Analytic Category 
  After researching “the dozen major conspiracy theories that form the body of 
[his] book, [David Aaronovitch] began to see that they shared certain characteristics that 
ensured their widespread propagation” (2010:10).  Third in his list of the seven ‘ties that 
bind all conspiracy theories’ is the heading, “Just Asking Questions,” of which the body 
is reproduced here in full: 
Since 2001, a primary technique employed by more respectable conspiracists has 
been the advocation of the “It’s not a theory” theory.  The theorist is just asking 
certain disturbing questions because of a desire to seek out truth, and the reader is 
supposedly left to make up his or her mind.  The questions asked, of course, only 
make sense if the questioner really believes that there is indeed a secret conspiracy.  
[emphasis mine] (p. 12) 
In a 2009 adaption for Australia’s Inquirer of his 2010 book, Voodoo Histories:  The Role of 
the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History , Aaronovitch can be seen working out 
this line of thought when he states that, in addition to ‘conspiracists who portray 
themselves as heroes and skeptics,’  
there is the violent innocence of much conspiracism, in which the theorist is 
``only asking questions'' about the official version of the truth and doesn't go so 
far as to have a theory themselves, other than it is impossible that John F. 
Kennedy was shot by Lee Harvey Oswald alone, or that the moon landing 
happened in the way the world imagined, or that al-Qa'ida terrorists hijacked 
four planes. ``I'm not saying he wasn't born in Hawaii,'' argue sophisticated 
``birthers'' of Obama, ``all I'm saying is why won't he produce his birth 
certificate?''  [emphasis mine] (Aaronovitch 2009) 
Aaronovitch even uses this as a way to label movement members, noting in particular 
one “leading ‘disturbing question’ figure on the edges of the 9/11 Truth movement” 
(2009).  Just as it did not originate with him, this “just asking questions” analytic 
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category imposed by anti-conspiracists onto the 911TM does not stop with Aaronovitch 
either.   
  In his ‘critical analysis of conspiracy theories,’ Jovan Byford explains “what 
David Aaronovitch (2008) [sic] calls ‘it’s not a theory’ theory’” [italicized in original] 
(2011:90) by stating that “[t]his is where a conspiracy theory is articulated in the form of 
a question.  Rather than purporting to have all the answers, the writer ‘merely’ poses a 
set of questions, hinting at some hidden ‘truth’ that is yet to be uncovered or 
demonstrated” (90).  Citing Brian Keeley’s (1999) article, “Of Conspiracy Theories,” 
Byford notes that “the rhetoric of just asking questions” is usually directed at “an official 
explanation, which is perceived to be the product of deception and which the writer sets 
out to undermine and cast doubt on” (2011:90-1).   Although he provides no direct in-
text citation (a reference is included in his bibliography), and although he mistakenly 
includes in his text a backslash in 911Truth.org’s web address, Byford cites the 14 
questions posed by 911Truth.org’s (2010) pamphlet as one example of how the 911TM 
engage in this rhetorical strategy, which he states is not all together unwarranted in the 
case of “real conspiracies” [emphasis mine] like “the Watergate affair” (91).  “However,” 
says Byford, “in the case of conspiracy theories, the rhetoric of ‘just asking questions’ and 
calls for ‘open dialogue’ or ‘independent inquiry’ are for the most part disingenuous” 
[emphasis mine] (2011:91).   
  According to this countermovement antagonist, the disingenuous nature of the 
inquiry involves four facets or dimensions (he does not specify).  These qualities include 
the rhetorical fallacy of “moving the goal posts” (Byford 2011:91) by bringing in more 
and more purported facts and questions; “a form of agenda setting” where non- or anti-
conspiracists are expected to entertain ‘disturbing questions;’ the notion that asking 
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questions “simply obscures the mountain of ‘errant data’ hidden in the conspiracy 
theorists [sic] own back yard;” and, ultimately, that such inquiries “also serve the 
purpose of placing the ball in the corner of the dissenters” (2011:92).  “By posing a set of 
questions,” Byford continues, “conspiracy theorists throw the gauntlet in to the face of 
the sceptics [sic] and challenge them to disprove that a conspiracy exists” [italicized in 
original] (2011:92).   
Byford (2011) provides a clear example of this line of reasoning directed at the 
911TM.  “The 9/11 conspiracy theorists,” he asserts, 
claim that the official account of the attacks never produced an answer to what 
they deem to be a key question, namely why George W. Bush, who was visiting a 
Florida school at the time, continued ‘reading about a goat’ to a classroom of 
children, even after he was told that the first of the towers had been hit.  By 
asking questions which point to such ‘errant data’, conspiracy theorists present 
their own alternative account as a more ‘complete’ and therefore better 
explanation.  [emphasis mine] (2011:92)   
Byford does not explain what he means by “errant data,” he does not say why this 
information can be considered as such, and his index lists page 92 as the only page 
where the term appears in his book.  Since Byford (2011) cites Keeley (2006), we will 
assume that he is taking up the term “errant data” to mean either “(a) unaccounted-for 
data; [or] (b) contradictory data,” as Keeley (2006:52) defines it.  Lastly, and more 
pointed to the content of the 911TM’s claims, although the question Byford (2011) cites 
has arisen from time to time in my experience with the 911TM, this has not been a central 
question for most of the people I interviewed and with whom I interacted online. 
  If we look to the document from which Byford draws his main examples of the 
“rhetoric [that] underpins 9/11 conspiracy theories,” which is from the “website 
9/11Truth.org [that] contains a downloadable ‘factsheet’ that poses 14 questions 
everyone should ask about the attacks on New York and Washington” (2011:91), we see 
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that Byford does not represent an accurate description 911Truth.org’s (2010) question 
pertaining to President Bush’s time in the Florida classroom.  The actual question reads 
as follows:  “Why did George Bush enter a Florida school at 9am when a plane had been 
hijacked at 8:31 and the first tower was hit at 8:46, then continue reading about a goat 
after the second tower was hit at 9:03?”  According to The Terror Timeline (Thompson 
2004:345) and The 9/11 Commission Report (Zelikow 2004:5), the first plane was actually 
known to be hijacked at “8:21,” 10 minutes earlier than claimed in 911Truth.org’s (2010) 
pamphlet.  Regardless of this error, The 9/11 Commission Report makes mention of George 
Bush’s statement that he believed “the incident must have been caused by pilot error” 
(Zelikow 2004:35), but it does not say why he chose to remain in the classroom.   
  If The 9/11 Commission Report does not account for George Bush’s behavior in the 
classroom, the errant data is unaccounted for, which is in line with what Byford (2011) 
suggests 911Truth.org’s (2010) pamphlet implies.  However, if the assumption on the 
part of the 911TM is that the Secret Service should have escorted Bush from the 
classroom with or without his permission, then the errant data is contradictory.  As 
stated abvoe, this question resides at the less popular and extreme ends of the 911TM’s 
questions about “9/11” and September 11, but the question of Bush’s behavior in the 
classroom the morning of September 11, 2001, is asked by the 911TM nonetheless.  
Because the tactic of “just asking questions” is proposed to be an important component 
of the 911TM due it its imputed status as being composed of “9/11 conspiracy theorists” 
(Byford 2011:92), and because this particular question has been identified as an exemplar 





Digging Deeper in to Disingenuous Claims                                                                                         
For one example on a variation of this question, Griffin opens his book, 9/11 
Contradictions:  An Open Letter to Congress and the Press, with the question, “How long did 
George Bush remain in the classroom” (2008b:2), and he reframes the question in his 
conclusion of the chapter as, “Why was the president allowed to linger a full half-hour at 
the school after it was known that America was, as Card put it, ‘under attack’?” 
(2008b:10).  Summarizing the implications of this question, Griffin states the following: 
This question was of great concern to families of the 9/11 victims.  One of the 
central questions raised by the Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 
Commission—as Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the chair and vice-chair of the 
Commission admit—was:  “Why was President Bush permitted by the Secret 
Service to remain in the Sarasota elementary school where he was reading to 
children?”  Kean and Hamilton’s 9/11 Commission, however, provided no 
answer.  Its only response to this question was to say:  “The Secret Service told us 
they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think it 
imperative for him to run out the door.” [Zelikow 2004:39).  That response 
implied that the president’s options were limited to (a) running out the door or 
(b) remaining at the school another half hour.  But there was a third option:  The 
Secret Service could have simply walked the president out of the room, put him 
in the limo, and whisked him away.  (2008b:10)     
The Family Steering Committee formulated hundreds of questions for each agency of 
the federal government they believed to be responsible for national defense 
(911IndependentCommission.org 2003a), with just one of those question stated as, 
“What plan of action caused you [George W. Bush] to remain seated after Andrew Card 
informed you that a second airliner had hit the second tower of the World Trade Center 
and America was clearly under attack? Approximately how long did you remain in the 
classroom after Card’s message?” (911IndependentCommission.org 2003b).  As opposed 
to notifying his readers about the dozens of other questions entertained by credentialed 
experts, and as compared to informing his audience that many of these questions 
originated with families of the victims of the attacks, Byford (2011) cites one question of 
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fourteen from one SMO within the 911TM that operates solely on the Internet.  With this 
in mind, I will pose questions of my own:  Why has Jovan Byford (2011) misrepresented 
the nature of 911Truth.org’s (2010) question, why has he ignored David Ray Griffin’s 
(2008b) work in this capacity, why did he not mention the Family Steering Committee, 
and why did he select this particular question instead of one of the more empirically-
based questions on 911Truth.org’s (2010) list, such as those pertaining to the collapse of 
the WTC buildings?  
  To answer my question I will simply state that Jovan Byford (2011) operates as a 
countermovement antagonist to the 911TM.  He has no interest in maintaining their 
legitimacy, and he states this fairly clearly.  In the final section of Byford’s conclusion to 
his book, “Combating conspiracy theories” (2011:152), Byford provides insight into his 
aspirations for the future of the 911TM.   
Society should be able to go about its business without having to respond to real 
or anticipated challenges from conspiracy theorists, especially as the latter operate 
according to standards of evidence and proof that can never be met.  As we have seen in 
previous chapters, an essential feature of the conspiracy theory is the continuous 
shifting of goalposts and the constant demand for new evidence, in an endless and 
insatiable spiral of suspicion and mistrust of official sources.  As Philip Zelikow, 
executive director of the government sponsored 9/11 Commission argued in 
2004, one should avoid at all costs engaging in an endless game of ‘Wack-a-mole’ 
with conspiracy theorists, as the incessant stream of challenges and questions 
popping up all over the place, [sic] makes it a game that can never be won 
(Morello, 2004).  What is more, engaging conspiracy theorists in debate imbues their 
views with legitimacy:  it presents conspiracy theories as a valid (even if not normative) 
stance in a matter of public controversy and an opinion that deserves to be heard.  Doing 
so only increases the likelihood of conspiracy theories being accepted as a view that 
cannot, or should not, be rejected outright.  [emphasis mine] (p. 153)  
 This passage is in need of attention because it indicates several features of anti-
conspiracy discourse that Byford (2011) relies upon and implements. 
  In light of the fact that Byford (2011) has directed these assertions to a complex, 
multi-faceted social movement, a citation to a news article antagonistic toward the 
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group (i.e. Morello 2004) and a peer reviewed article on “AIDS denialism” (Byford 
2011:91; see Smith & Novella 2007) do not provide adequate justification to address the 
beliefs and argumentations by the 911TM’s tens of thousands of members and dozens of 
SMO’s about the empirical reality of the events of September 11 .  Byford’s (2011) tendency to 
cite 911Truth.org, David Ray Griffin’s works, and citations to only a few other sources 
does not indicate that he has systematically collected adequate data to generalize to the 
entire 911TM.  In addition to this, Byford (2011) relies on the logic of anti-conspiracy 
discourse (Goshorn 2000; Truscello 2011) to link the 911TM with people who believe in 
conspiracy theories about unrelated issues, such as “AIDS denialism.”   
For example he links the two in one instance by stating that “[i]n the case of 
conspiracy theories that claim to be about science or expertise, such as those promoted 
by AIDS denialists or the 9/11 Truth Movement…” (2011:80), and he also states, that  
when exponents of the 9/11 Truth movement started to pose question about the 
causes of the attacks, they were also not exercising some intrinsic aversion 
towards ‘complex causal schema’, but were drawing on an established tradition 
of explanation and a pattern set by responses to Pearl Harbour, the 1995 
Oklahoma bombing and other events from the past that 9/11 was compared to 
for different reasons.  This opens the possibility that conspiracy theories are not 
the product of individual information processing, but one of a number of 
available ‘collectively (ideologically) conditioned patters of misinterpretations’ 
(Ichheiser, 1943: 145) that people can draw on as they attempt to make sense of 
events in the world.  Put differently, it is not the (biased) process of attribution 
that generates conspiracy theories; rather, the extreme form of personal 
attribution is constituted within a particular, conspiracy-based, shared social 
explanation (see Edwards and Potter, 1992).  (p. 138) 
To the point that this is part of the anti-conspiracy discourse that functions to obfuscate 
the claims of the 911TM, Byford’s (2011) argument is that a common thread (“just a 
theory” theory, or “just asking questions”) runs through all “conspiracy theories,” hence 
AIDS denialists and members of the 911TM operate by the same strategies and tactics.  
Moreover, Byford’s (2011) reasoning is that the 911TM began questioning the events of 
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September 11, not for the reasons they state, but due to a pre-established “conspiracy-
based, shared social explanation.”  Finally, by citing the executive director of the 9/11 
Commission and main author of its report, Philip Zelikow (2004), Byford relies upon a 
clearly antagonistic character for his rhetorical strategy of appealing to authority as to 
why (a) all 911TM members are conspiracy theorists and (b) why they should not be 
worthy of serious debate or attention otherwise. 
Questioning 9/11, WTC 7, and the Conspiracy Label 
  The countermovement antagonists discussed thus far have not actually obtained 
data from the 911TM via interviews or surveys of “conspiracy theorists,” nor from any 
other primary data source other than a few texts apparently chosen without analytic or 
theoretical pretenses.  Instead, their information about the 911TM comes from literature 
on it and its members and from its intellectual organizers’ texts, but this is not to say 
they are all together wrong when they claim that the 911TM employs questions about 
the official story as one of its main tactics.  Of the earliest sources to question the official 
story was Eric Hufschmid (2002) in his book, Painful Questions:  An Analysis of the 
September 11th Attack; in 2004 David Ray Griffin published his much criticized 
(Aaronovitch 2010) debut into the movement with The New Pearl Harbor:  Disturbing 
Questions About 9/11 and the Bush Administration; the following year, Rowland Morgan 
and Ian Henshall (2005) produced a title called, 9/11 Revealed:  The Unanswered Questions; 
and Steven Jones has couched his work in this rhetorical style with his 2006 article, 
“What Accounts for the Molten Metal Observed on 9/11/2001?” and his 2007 book 
chapter, “Why Indeed Did the World Trade Center Buildings Collapse?”  This theme has 
also made its way into the scholarly canon that attempts to explain conspiracy theories, 
with one study published in Frontiers in Psychology titled, “‘What About Building 7?’” 
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(Wood & Douglas 2013), and another article in Applied Cognitive Psychology titled, 
“Unanswered Questions” (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham 2010).  Both of these 
articles are worthy of a brief discussion for they represent much of the anti-conspiracy 
discourse produced by psychologists on the nature of “conspiracy theories,” specifically 
those attributed to the 911TM.   
 Constructing and Keying the Conspiracy Label 
  Academics have revealed the discursive function of the conspiracy label 
(deHaven-Smith 2013; Goshorn 2000; Husting & Orr 2007; Manwell 2010), largely 
supporting Wood and Douglas’s findings that ‘conspiracists dismiss the conspiracy 
label’ “as needlessly loaded and derogatory, consistent with [other] recent scholarly 
characterizations (Bratich, 2008)” (2013:7).  Also in support of Wood and Douglas’s 
(2013) findings, one member of the 911TM I interviewed in 2011 stated that employing 
the conspiracy label is “easy, it helps people sleep at night knowing that they can label 
somebody like [himself] as a ‘conspiracy theorist’.”  Later in the interview, this person 
described that when they discuss their beliefs about “9/11” with people who do not 
share them, they normally bring up “Building Seven,” and from this the following 
exchange took place: 
I: And what is “Building Seven?”  
P3: Building Seven is a forty seven story skyscraper that fell at 5:20 in the 
afternoon of 9/11 at nearly free fall speed, and it looks like—fifteen 
hundred architects and engineers have said that it looks like an 
implosion, a controlled demolition of the building.  And that’s what I say 
to them, “do you know about Building Seven?”  Ten years later, people 
don’t know about it, and I say that is, is ridiculous that you don’t know 
about such a tragedy. 
I: Why should people know about Building Seven? 
P3: Because it just adds to, it adds to my credibility, because people can 
write me off as a “conspiracy theorist,” but when people start taking me 
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seriously—“okay, I want some concrete evidence,” go look at Building 
Seven, you can see for yourself.  And it really is the smoking gun.   
I: You’ve mentioned that term, “conspiracy theorist,” a couple times.  
What does that word mean to you? 
P3: That word is a label, it’s words, it’s a combination  of words to put… 
I: Or that term, “conspiracy theorist”… 
P3: Yeah, it’s just, whatever the definition of the word is, I don’t care, it’s just 
another label for me.  I’m just a kid who’s asking questions, and you 
shouldn’t treat me with such a hostile nature, because, like I said, there’s 
a lot of hostility here.  It’s just another label.  I just want the truth.  You 
can call me a “Truther,” you can call me this, you can call me that, I don’t 
call myself anything.  I’m just my name, [NAME WITHHELD], that’s 
what I am.  I’m not anything else. 
I: Do you think the terms “conspiracy theorist” and “Truther” are used 
more as a negativism in the larger society and mass media, or are they 
just describing a certain type of person neutrally? 
P3: Without a doubt they are using that as a negative.  It’s just “conspiracy 
theorist,” and then they’ll show—the way they do this on the news is 
where they’ll show a conspiracy theorist, like the word, and then they’ll 
show a picture of a crazy guy, and they’ll be like, “hmmm, wha t do you 
think?”  And they don’t really out and out say it.  They definitely use it 
as “crazy person.”  So, that’s basically what they want to say, but they’re 
just a little bit nicer about it. 
I: Okay, is there anything else that you think is important that people 
might want to know about? 
P3: That we aren’t here to spit on the graves of the dead.  That we want 
justice for them, and I’m sure if they were here today and they watched 
those buildings come down—if nobody was in those buildings—they’d 
be like, “what the hell just happened to my office, and what just 
happened to where I worked and where I put all my time and energy 
into?”  We’re not here to spit on the graves of the dead.  We’re here to 
honor and respect them, and we’re here to bring out the truth.   
Like many in the 911TM, this person tends to focus on concrete, empirical phenomena 
related to September 11, but when discussing this with the public they are often 
confronted with the conspiracy label, which they know is a label used to discredit and 
stigmatize them and their message.  Wood and Douglas’s (2013) study supports these 
findings, but their disrespect for their human subjects is shown when they continue to 
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employ the conspiracy label to name their non-conventionalist (“pro-conspiracy 
theory”) commenters that they analyzed on news websites (discussed below). 
  Many anti-conspiracists (Berlet 2009; Byford 2011; Kay 2011; Shermer 2011; 
Sunstein & Vermeule 2009) recognize that real conspiracies do in fact exist, but they 
distinguish between “real conspiracies” and “conspiracy theories” by attributing 
psychological and social psychological origins to the latter.  “To understand the 
psychological origins of conspiracy theories,” notes one psychologist (Brotherton 
2013:9), “we first need to be clear about what we mean by ‘conspiracy theory’.”   
Brotherton defines a “conspiracy theory as an unverified claim of conspiracy which is 
not the most plausible account of an event or situation, and with sensationalistic subject 
matter or implications” (2013:9).  Other psychologists propose other definitions, such as 
that a “conspiracy theory is defined as a proposed plot by powerful people or 
organizations working together in secret to accomplish some (usually sinister) goal 
(Coady, 2006a; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994)” (Wood et al. 2012:1), that 
conspiracy theories are “defined as allegations that powerful people or organizations are 
plotting together in secret to achieve sinister ends through deception of the public 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Wood et al. 2012)” (Wood & Douglas 2013:1), and that 
“[c]onspiracy theories can be described as attempts to explain the ultimate causes of 
events as secret plots by powerful forces rather than as overt activities or accidents 
(McCauley & Jacques, 1979)” (Jolley & Douglas 2014:35).   
Michael Shermer, an avid anti-conspiracist who used “the 9/11 truthers…as a 
case study in how to test the validity of a conspiracy theory” (2011:211), notes that the 
“term conspiracy theory is often used derisively to indicate that someone’s explanation for 
an event is highly improbable or even on the lunatic fringe, and that those who proffer 
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such theories are most probably crackpots” [italicized in original] (2011:208).   As 
Shermer (2011) makes clear, anti-conspiracists use the term “conspiracy theory” as a 
way to indicate that an interlocutor is discreditable (Goffman 1963), and the constructed 
stigma associated with the beliefs espoused by those labeled “conspiracy theorists” is 
known by sociologists to function discursively as a ‘transpersonal strategy of exclusion’ 
(Husting & Orr 2007)—this much is known by the 911TM as well.   
  On the 911TM Facebook group, Ken Doc posted a photo (see Figure 12) and a 
link to a YouTube video (StormCloudsGathering 2013) that both contest the use of the 
term “conspiracy theorist,” and on that same day one member of the group responded 
with the following comment, reproduced here verbatim and in full: 
The most recent study was published on July 8th by psychologists Michael J. 
Wood and Karen M. Douglas of the University of Kent (UK). Entitled “What 
about Building 7? A social psychological study of online discussion of 9/11 
conspiracy theories,” the study compared “conspiracist” (pro-conspiracy theory) 
and “conventionalist” (anti-conspiracy) comments at news websites. 
 
The authors were surprised to discover that it is now more conventional to leave 
so-called conspiracist comments than conventionalist ones: “Of the 2174 
comments collected, 1459 were coded as conspiracist and 715 as conventionalist.” 
In other words, among people who comment on news articles, those who 
disbelieve government accounts of such events as 9/11 and the JFK assassination 
outnumber believers by more than two to one. That means it is the pro-
conspiracy commenters who are expressing what is now the conventional 
wisdom, while the anti-conspiracy commenters are becoming a small, 
beleaguered minority. 
http://sgtreport.com/.../new-studies-conspiracy.../ 
April 18 at 4:15pm · Like · 3 
This is the exact same text that appears on the webpage of the accompanying 
abbreviated web link.  The link takes one to SGTReport.com (2014), who links to 
ZenGardner.com (2014) as their source, and who in turn links to PressTV.com where it is 
revealed that the original author is Kevin Barrett (2014), who has authored the 9/11 
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Truth books Truth Jihad:  My Epic Struggle Against the 9/11 Big Lie (Barrett 2007) and 
Questioning the War on Terror:  A Primer for Obama Voters (Barrett 2009). 
Figure 12.  Keying of the Conspiracy Label 
   
  Barrett’s (2014) article expands on the contestation of the use of the conspiracy 
label, citing several academic sources that have taken up the challenge of combating its 
symbolic violence.  These references include Lance de-Haven-Smith’s (2013) Conspiracy 
Theory in America, an article by Laurie Manwell (2010) that appeared in an edition of 
American Behavioral Scientist that deHaven-Smith edited, and cited as well is Ginna 
Husting and Martin Orr’s (2007) article, “Dangerous Machinery:  ‘Conspiracy Theorist’ 
as a Transpersonal Strategy of Exclusion.”  Barrett’s (2014) main point is that it is 
documented that the conspiracy label is used by anti-conspiracists as an irrational and 
antagonistic argumentation method, and that it is those who are targeted with the 
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conspiracy label, especially those within the 911TM as Wood and Douglas (2013) found, 
who more often rely upon empirical and rational argumentation methods. 
  I pointed out with a comment to the 911TM Facebook group member that in 
Wood and Douglas’s (2013) conclusion “they say that 'conspiracists don't like to be 
called conspiracy theorists,' but throughout the article they use such language to name 
their subjects.”  To this, the commenter replied with the following (reproduced verbatim 
and in full): 
It's possible that Wood & Douglas continued to use the term "conspiracy 
theorist" so that people reading the article would not be confused about the 
particular group of people under discussion. They could have used the term 
"conspiracy investigators," a more accurate description which is less derogatory, 
but I doubt that would have put the message across in the same way. 
Terminology aside, the overall message is positive and confirms what many of us 
believe - that we are not the crazy ones   
April 19 at 7:00am · Like 
Again, Wood and Douglas’s (2013) findings are confirmed, but to my current point, I 
responded with the following, which failed to elicit a response other than Ken Doc’s link 
to an essay titled, “33 Conspiracy Theories that Turned Out to be True” (Elinoff 2010): 
From their Abstract: "We examined a large sample of conspiracist (pro-
conspiracy-theory) and conventionalist (anti-conspiracy-theory) comments on 
news websites in order to investigate the relative importance of promoting 
alternative explanations vs. rejecting conventional explanations for events. ... The 
data also indicate that conspiracists were largely unwilling to apply the 
“conspiracy theory” label to their own beliefs and objected when others did so, 
lending support to the long-held suggestion that conspiracy belief carries a social 
stigma. " 
They could have continued to use the "pro-" and "anti-" language, but instead 
they elected to use the term "conspiracists," which was developed and used by 
Daniel Pipes [1997], Chip Berlet [2009], and others to denote a form of conspiracy 
theorists who tend to be bigots (See Goshorn 2000 "Strategies of Deterrence and 
Frames of Containment"). As you point out, [NAME WITHELD], they could 
have used any of a variety of terms to describe those posting conventional views 
and those posting "conspiracy theories," but their use of a term that their subjects 
reject subverts the "respect for persons" requirement established in the Belmont 
Report's guidelines for protecting human subjects: "Respect for persons involves 
a recognition of the personal dignity and autonomy of individuals, and special 
protection of those persons with diminished autonomy."  
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"Terminology aside, the overall message is positive and confirms what many of 
us believe - that we are not the crazy ones," but this is in not, in fact, what Wood 
and Douglas are saying in there paper! They cloak their statements in an 
objective-sounding voice, but their definition of conspiracy theories at the 
beginning indicates they view these beliefs as irrational and paranoid, which is 
not very comforting from a scientific or ethical standpoint, especially one from 
within the movement. Give us an example of how their article is positive, 
confirming what many of us believe.   
April 19 at 9:29am · Like 
The fact remains that Wood and Douglas (2013) refused to acquiesce to their research 
subjects’ preferences of not being labeled as “conspiracy theorists,” but their article also 
fits with the pattern of the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists’ eagerness to frame 
the movement’s questions as a sure sign of “conspiracism,” even though movement 
members often proffer empirical claims to support or preface those questions. 
 Reifying the Conspiracy Label  
Wood and Douglas (2013) derived the preface of their title, “‘What about 
Building 7?’” from a recurring and prominent question posed by the 911TM, and this 
they gathered from comments left on news articles relating to “9/11” on four 
mainstream news websites (ABC, CNN, the Independent, and the Daily Mail).  
“Conspiracist comments were identified as any that either directly put forward a 
conspiratorial account of the events of 9/11, in whole or in part;… [or] that otherwise 
favorably referenced common tropes of the 9/11 Truth Movement and its associated 
body of arguments, such as cryptic allusions to the fate of World Trade Center (WTC) 
Building 7…” [emphasis mine] (2013:4).  “Therefore,” they go on to say,  
a comment on an article about a new book on 9/11 reading “Does the book 
explain how WTC7 imploded from fire, how a single passport was found intact 
within hours, how Bin Laden was in the American hospital in Dubai weeks 
before, how fighter jets were diverted 1000s of miles away, how NORAD was 
ordered to stand down… ” was coded as conspiracist. While this comment does not 
directly allege conspiracy, it refers obliquely to many common 9/11 conspiracist 
arguments and seems clearly intended to raise doubt regarding conventional 
explanations of 9/11.  [emphasis mine] (Wood & Douglas 2013:4)  
198 
 
 The questions raised by the commenter can be, and indeed they should be, read as an 
intention to raise doubt about the official story of 9/11, but we see here the pattern that 
raising questions about “9/11” and the events of September 11 brings about the 
conspiracy label with no attempt to answer or refute the questions.  This is ironic in light 
of Wood and Douglas’s findings of “disdain for the term among conspiracists” (2013:7).  
“Conspiracists,” they found, “did not appreciate being called conspiracy theorists” 
(2013:8), and my data show that one reason for this, as discussed by Husting and Orr 
(2007), is that the label is used in a way that allows its issuer to avoid addressing 
empirical claims. 
  Like many academic papers (Alvesson & Sandberg 2011), Wood and Douglas 
(2013) present their research article as one that fills in gaps of prior literature on the 
subject.  They cite many sources, including five citations of Swami et al.’s (2010) study, 
“Unanswered Questions.”  Swami et al.’s (2010) “Preliminary Investigation of 
Personality and Individual Difference Predictors of 9/11 Conspiracist Beliefs” is an 
attempt to expand “the dearth of empirical research on the psychological factors 
associated with [conspiracist] beliefs” (2010:749).  Swami et al. generalize from their 
study of 257 men and women “representative of the British population” (2010:752) the 
general identity of “the 9/11 conspiratorial individual as a believer of other conspiracy 
theories, exposed to 9/11 conspiracist ideas, politically cynical, agreeable, defiant of 
authority, supportive of democratic practice and inquisitive” [emphasis mine] (760).  In 
explaining this last finding, Swami et al. (2010) state that “intellectual curiosity, and 
active imagination, and a proclivity for new ideas may result in greater exposure to 
conspiracist ideas, which in turn enhance monological belief systems” [emphasis mine] 
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(759).  The monological belief systemxxvi is a component of what anti-conspiracists term 
the “conspiracist worldview,” which is summarized by Wood and Douglas as “a belief 
system conducive to conspiracy beliefs in general (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 
2010; Wood et al. 2012)” (2013:1).  Rather than debunking the actual claims of so-called 
conspiracy theorists, most anti-conspiracists analyze the “conspiracist worldview” in 
order to further delegitimize it.        
  As made known in the previous chapter, a host of behavioral and social 
scientists, along with journalists, philosophers, and humanists, have already in the 21st 
century published many texts that attempt to explain conspiracy theories and conspiracy 
theorists (Aaronovitch 2010; Bale 2007; Banas & Miller 2013; Barkun 2006; Bartlett & 
Miller 2011; Berlet 2009; Birchall 2006; Bratich 2008; Brotherton 2013; Brotherton & 
French 2014; Brotherton, French & Pickering 2013; Buenting & Taylor 2010; Byford 2011; 
Clarke 2007; Coady 2006c; Darwin, Neave & Holmes 2011; Douglas & Sutton 2008, 2011; 
Ebel-Lam et al. 2010; Fenster 2008; Goertzel 2011; Jolley 2013; Jolley & Douglas 2014; Kay 
2011; Knight 2002, 2008; Lantian 2013; Lee 2011; Leman & Cinnirella 2007; Oliver & 
Wood 2012; Olmsted 2011; Parish & Parker 2001; Prasad et al. 2009; Sampson 2010; 
Shermer 2011; Soukup 2008; Stempel, Hargrove & Stempel 2007; Sternheimer 2007, 2010; 
Sunstein & Vermeule 2009; Swami 2012; Swami et al. 2010, 2011; Taibbi 2008; Thresher-
Andrews 2013; Van Prooijen & Jostmann 2013; Warner & Neville-Shepard 2014; Wood 
2013; Wood & Doulas 2013; Wood, Douglas & Sutton 2012).  The hegemonic, anti-
                                                                 
xxvi Michael Wood, Karen Douglas, and Robbie Sutton (2012) have made use of the concept of 
“monological belief systems” in their work, and they provide a general description:  “Over time, the view 
of the world as a place ruled by conspiracies can lead to conspiracy becoming the default explanation for 
any given event—a unitary, closed-off worldview in which beliefs come together in a mutually supportive 
network known as a monological belief system (Clarke, 2002; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010, 2011)” 
[italicized in original] (1). 
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conspiracist discourse (Goshorn 2000; Husting & Orr 2007; Truscello 2011) that arises 
from such texts  explains that the questions and ensuing answers that the type of people 
who join the 911TM (i.e. “conspiracists” and/or “conspiracy theorists”) have about 
“9/11” and September 11 arise from heuristic mistakes, reliance on errant and fortuitous 
data, closed or isolated social networks, social psychological needs to inflate self-esteem 
and explain a complex world with simplistic justifications, and a deep distrust of 
authority, especially government sources.  Together, these compose the “conspiracist 
worldview.”  From this corpus, researchers like Wood and Douglas (2013) and Swami et 
al. (2010) are able to authoritatively cite the existence of a “monological belief system” at 
the center of the “conspiracist worldview,” and then they can reify (Berger & Luckmann 
1966) such constructs with their own studies.   
   Wood and Douglas (2013), for example, cite the disputed and unscientific work 
(discussed below) of one self-acknowledge countermovement antagonist to the 911TM 
to guide their rationale for explaining its member’s debating tactics, which can be found 
in the following passage from their conclusion:   
The 9/11 Truth Movement is, by and large, a movement of converts—most 
“Truthers,” at some point, became convinced that their previous belief in the 
official story was wrong (Kay, 2011).  Therefore, in debating with those who hold 
the positions they previously held, they might repeat the arguments that first 
caused them to doubt the conventional narrative and shaped their subsequent 
thinking accordingly.  On the other hand, the actual content that the discussions 
centered upon was often highly technical, and many arguments were unlikely to 
have been generated entirely by the people doing the commenting.  While some 
commenters made intuitive judgments about the physics of crashing airplanes 
and collapsing buildings, many others relied on arguments advanced in websites 
or documentaries devoted to either advancing or debunking 9/11 conspiracy 
theories.  With the amount of information to choose from, however, the 
arguments commenters chose to put forward may still reveal useful information 
about their own decision-making.  (p. 8) 
Examples given below from my interviews and participant observations can be read to 
confirm that “Truthers” converted from a belief in the official story of “9/11” by 
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witnessing information about the actual events of September 11 that contradicted their 
previously held beliefs.  The issue, though, is with the “conspiracist worldview” and 
how it is advanced against the interests of the 911TM in light of the fact that many of 
their claims are about empirical observations of September 11 that contradict the official 
narrative of “9/11” (e.g., the collapse of WTC 7). 
 Johnathan Kay:  An Exemplar Case of Anti-conspiracy Discourse 
  An active countermovement antagonist who also puts forward the claim that 
“most Truthers prefer to focus on questions” [italicized in original] is Jonathan Kay 
(2011:66), whose book, Among the Truthers:  A Journey Through America’s Growing 
Conspiracist Underground, presents the culmination of three years that he spent 
“interviewing Truthers, reading their literature, attending their events, and surfing their 
discussion forums” (xxiii).  I will come back to how he approaches the issue of “just 
asking questions,” but first I will highlight a ‘typification of Truthers’ he provides that 
seems to at once reinforce yet move beyond Swami et al.’s (2010) description of “the 
9/11 conspiratorial individual.”  In a chapter titled, “Why They Believe:  A 
Psychological Field Guide to Conspiracists,” Kay “offers readers a typology of the 
different varieties of conspiracist [sic], along with sketches of a few typical specimens,” 
and he notes that “[t]he organizing principle in this chapter is not the type of conspiracy 
theory being embraced, but rather the underlying psychological function that 
conspiracism performs for the affected individual” (2011:150).  Like the rest of the 
chapters in his book, “Why They Believe” is not about countering or debunking the 
claims put forward by his “specimens,” but rather it is about explaining the 




Johnathan Kay’s Construction of Conspiracist Cranks 
  The ‘variety of conspiracist’ most notable for my purposes is that of the 
‘conspiracist crank,’ because it is through the works of these intellectual organizers 
within the 911TM that its other member often come to and promote 9/11 Truth, as 
Wood and Douglas (2013) note.  “As a conspiracist,” Kay (2011:190) asserts,  
the crank’s defining feature is an acute, inveterately restless, furiously contrarian 
intelligence.  Many cranks have an Asperger’s-like obsession with arithmetic, 
flowcharts, maps, and lengthy data lists.  Like [Ignatius] Donnelly, they are 
unable to take any expert’s word on even the most technical subject.  The crank 
can be satisfied only once he [sic] has personally established the truth of his 
theories using nothing but primary sources and the rules of logic. 
 What drives cranks on an emotional level isn’t the substance of their 
theories:  Many of the Truther cranks I’ve interviewed—including David Ray 
Griffin, Barrie Zwicker, and Paul Zarembka, all discussed in this book—treated 
the issue of 9/11 Truth in large part as a debating exercise, and seemed curiously 
detached from the profoundly disturbing implications that flow from their 
claims.  What cranks truly crave is the exhilarating sense of independence, 
control, and superiority that come from declaring oneself a self-sufficient 
intellectual force.  Conspiracism is a natural outlet for this craving since 
conspiracy theories always exist in opposition to some received truth that enjoys 
the blessing of experts, and because the associated claims are regarded as daring 
and controversial.  (p. 190) 
“Typically,” Kay goes on to note, “the crank is a math teacher, computer scientist, chess 
player, or investigative journalist—careers in which the mind is trained to tease complex 
patterns out of empirical data” (2011:191).  With a description like this, and because he 
presents his book as a ‘serious attempt at understanding conspiracism,’ one might 
expect Kay (2011) to back up these claims with quotes, observations, or other forms of 
data from the people he interviewed and studied for his book, but he provides scant 
evidence to support these assertions, as was discussed in one critical review (Bauer 
2012).   
  As his first example of a “crank conspiracist” from the 911TM, Kay recounts his 
interview with Barrie Zwicker, “an amiable crank who became Canada’s leading 9/11 
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Truther in the aftermath of a long career as a mainstream journalist” (2011:191).  As 
reported in Among the Truthers, Zwicker requested a quid pro quo for his interview, 
where he would interview Kay “about [his] nonbelief in Trutherdom” [italicized in 
original] (Kay 2011:191).  Kay states that during their interview Zwicker would “hit 
buttons on a chess clock to regulate our usage of time—making sure we each questioned 
the other for exactly the same number of minutes.  For reasons that seem obvious to me 
from such experiences,” he concludes, “there are no crank women, only crank men” 
(2011:191).  To this point, Zwicker took the opportunity on The Agenda with Steven Paikin 
(Paikin 2011; see also The Agenda with Steve Paikin 2011) to say that Kay had ‘lied 
about him personally,’ particularly noting that he ‘does not own a chess clock,’ and that 
Kay’s (2011) book-length representation of the 911TM and its members could be 
summed up with one word, “condescension.”  
 Jonathan Kay’s Agenda 
    In an early effort to participate with the 911TM Facebook group, I posted 
Jonathan Kay’s (2010) editorial on a Master’s student, Joshua Blakeney, and his major 
professor, Anthony J. Hall.  The article holds in contention Blakeney earning a 
scholarship in the amount of “$7,714 to pursue his conspiracy theory that the 9/11 
attacks were staged by Washington.”  Kay’s (2010) closing question to his readers was, 
“Does anyone else see a problem with that?”  Taking my grievances with his article to 
the 911TM, my questions to the 911TM Facebook group were as follows:  “What are 
your thoughts on this article? What does it mean when academics are attacked for 
thinking and questioning freely? Is this just a matter of free speech vs. free press? How 
do you think this might affect new academics who want to study the issues of 9/11 
under a different paradigm than the dominant one?”  No substantive answers were 
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given, but one active member in the community replied in a comment with a solitary 
link (see eddielinks.org 2011) to a webpage containing a YouTube video (see The 
Agenda with Steve Paikin 2011) titled, “The Truth is Out There”  (Paikin 2011).  
  A little more than a year later, I shared the same episode (Paikin 2011) with the 
911TM Facebook group in the hopes that they could help me answer a specific question 
about it.  What follows is the thread on the 911TM Facebook group that I posted 
regarding Paikin’s (2011) episode, “The Truth is Out There,” as well as material from 
that episode that highlights interactions between the 911TM’s intellectual organizers and 
one of the movements most active countermovement antagonists: 
Richard G Ellefritz9/11 Truth Movement 
March 26, 2013 · 
Something bothers me very much about Jonathan Kay's reply to Steve Paikin's 
question here, but I can't quite put my finger on it. Does Barry Zwicker have it 
right in his initial response? http://youtu.be/aewTJUQs1LQ?t=12m11s  
The Agenda With Steve Paikin - 9/11 Truthers Versus Skeptic Jonathan Kay 
Mirrored from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dHbZi80IBNU 
http://www.youtube.com/user/AgendaStevePaikin 
youtube.com|By muskduh 
Like · 0· Share · Comments · 4 
 The question by Paikin and answer by Kay to which I referred in my post is reproduced 
here: 
Steve Paikin:  John, as we listen to this conversation here, you know, people 
watching this at home might think there’s nothing particularly crazy sounding 
about what anybody’s saying.  They seem like perfectly reasonable, intelligent 
people.  What concerns you about what you’re seeing here?  (12:11-12:25) 
Johnathan Kay:  What concerns me is the idea that you have intelligent people, all 
well-educated, who are suggesting, or who are receptive to the idea, that teams 
of hundreds of CIA agents spent months boring holes into columns inside the 
World Trade Center—WTC One, Two, and Seven; did this in an office building 
that has what, fifty, sixty, seventy thousand people there every day?  Brought in 
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tons of explosives, then, murdered thousands of people—all done in secret—
with no one realizing this for ten years; all as a pretext to attack Afghanistan and 
Iraq, despite the fact that they then allege that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers 
were from Saudi Arabia.  So this complete fantasy—and that is being taken 
seriously by, not only by the intelligent people on this panel, but millions of 
intelligent Americans and Canadians.  It disturbs me that so many people inhabit 
a world of fantasy.  (12:26-13:23) 
Kay’s statements in this passage were perplexing to me because I too had spent several 
years studying the 911TM, “9/11,” and the events of September 11.  I was wondering 
who the source was for his theories about the “teams of hundreds of CIA agents [who] 
spent months boring holes into columns,” about why it is a necessity these agents would 
be viewed suspiciously by the tens of thousands of occupants, and why he assumes that 
the 911TM’s activities in the years after the attacks meant that ‘no one realized this for 
ten years.’ 
  These questions arise partly from my own research into the events of September 
11, but participants in my research with the 911TM also brought to my mind these 
criticisms of Kay’s statement.  The following, for example, is my first interview with a 
member of the 911TM in 2011, and it highlights how one person in the movement 
describes a possible process in planting explosives in the Twin Towers: 
I: The only question that I have is, what brings you to ground zero today? 
P4: Well, I’ve been—are you, this is going now {referring to the voice 
recorder}? 
I: Yeah 
P4: Okay, so, uh, yes:  Well I’ve been coming for a few years, truth be told, 
and there are a number of aspects to 9/11—the events of 9/11 are, say 
“suspect,” they don’t add up to me.  It’s important because that’s the 
cause for the wars, the violations of civil liberties, and it’s important for 
me to be here to learn more and to just express concern about those 
issues. 
I: And you’re expressing concern through holding your sign?  
P4: Yeah, yeah. 
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I: It says, “9/11 Truth Now.” 
P4: Yes. 
I: And, then your t-shirt, which says, “Investigate 9/11.  Honor the fallen 
by relentless pursuit of the truth.” 
P4: Right. 
I: Okay. 
P4: Yup.  So, to me, it’s just as now, it invites to me a lot of discussion, which 
I enjoy.  What else?  And to learn more, and to be enlightened, edified by 
it.   
I: So you come down here to learn, and not necessarily to teach other 
people? 
P4: Well, I do enjoy the discussions, because I’ve heard other things from 
other people.  Like I came last year, there was a forum at INN media, 
and people were like, “How could the buildings been loaded with 
explosives?”  And the guy came forward, he said, “I used to work down 
here,” he says, “before, when I would come to the towers beforehand, 
there were guards around the elevator towers, and it turns out there was 
a large renovation project going on.”  That ties into another architect 
who said, “We believe the explosives were planted in the elevator shafts.  
That way, no one would really know about the way the buildings come 
apart.”  So things like that I learn more and more. 
I: Right, can I ask you a question about that? 
P4: Sure. 
I: Are the elevator shafts around the core columns, or near them? 
P4: I believe there’s a perimeter column, then there’s the interior, and I 
believe they’re inside.  So you could go work inside there, and no one 
would necessarily know… 
I: Right, and you would have access to that. 
P4: Right.  There was this big project.  I mean, here we go with speculation, 
but apparently one of the former presidents’ cousin was part of the 
board of this.  I mean, that’s more… 
I: His brother and his cousin were.  {Referring to G.W. Bush} 
P4: Yeah, yeah, so uh. 
I: In terms of the security of the World Trade Center. 
P4: Exactly, Securacom. 
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I: So, you believe that the World Trade Centers were demolished with 
explosives? 
P4: Probably.  What I really, ultimately hope is a fair trial.  Put suspects on 
trial because then the conspiracy theories wouldn’t be theories anymore, 
they would be admitted evidence, and we would know more of the truth 
with subpoena power.  Just like Martin Luther King—I don’t know if 
you’re familiar, but in ninety nine, James Earl Ray was acquitted, 
essentially, and by a case that proved him innocent of the crime.  So the 
official record now, you know, differs from the truth and the trial. 
Our interview concluded soon thereafter when another person invited themselves into 
our conversation (discussed below).  Another member I interviewed in 2011 told me that 
they had worked at the WTC, and that ‘it was common to see all sorts of contract 
workers in and out of those buildings every day.’  As we can see from the above 
statements, it does not necessarily follow that Kay’s assertions accurately represent 
claims by the 911TM about how they believe demolition material was planted in the 
three WTC buildings.  One intellectual organizers even claimed before Kay (2011) 
published his book that demolition material was likely planted just days or weeks before 
the hijackings, which allegedly provided the cover for the demolition operation 
(Lindauer 2010)18.     
  Here I provide the entire rest of the thread of the post I made regarding the 
exchange of interest on “The Truth is Out There” on The Agenda with Steve Paikin: 
Ken Doc:  I'm listening to this in full right now..... very non bias interview on 
TVO. 
    March 26, 2013 at 4:45pm · Like · 1 
Ken Doc:  As for your question Rich..... I'd have to say that Kay likes to use 
Strawman arguments mixed in with Occams Razor. Kay ignores the SCIENTIFIC 
process and resorts to name calling instead of denunking the evidence. 
    March 26, 2013 at 4:46pm · Like · 1 
Ken Doc:  He also lumps all conspiracy theorists into one category. He does this 
for EVERY SINGLE debate he does. 
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    The second half of this interview is making me mad because he continues to 
use the same tactic over and over again. 
    March 26, 2013 at 5:09pm · Like · 2 
Richard G Ellefritz:  I can see that too. I'll look for his other interviews. 
     If Kay doesn't want to get into the facts, evidence, and science of what the 
experts of the 9/11 Truth Movement say, experts like Richard Gage, Paul 
Zarembka, Barry Zwicker and others (D.R. Griffin), then where did he imagine 
the 'CIA drilling holes in the steel for weeks' scenario coming from? It seems like 
in order to avoid grappling with the actual questions brought up by these 'well 
educated intellectuals', he just imagines his own scenario. Or, is there somebody 
out there saying that the CIA was drilling holes in steel for weeks? Susan 
Lindauer has said something like the FBI finding out that there was going to be a 
terrorist attack, and then planting explosives very quickly in order to heighten 
the shock of terrorism, but even if this is where Kay is getting HIS scenario, I 
haven't seen very many people in the 9/11 Truth Movement overall support this 
idea. 
    I think, along with those things you point out Ken, that this is a very weak 
point in Jonathan's argument: If he doesn't want to get into the details of how the 
buildings were demolished by explosives, then where did he get this scenario? If 
it came from a non-expert in the 9/11 Truth Movement, then this is just a further 
example of him avoiding their actual statements and questions. If he made it up, 
then it just goes to show that he's really not interested in the factual or evidence-
based claims, but rather in demonizing the 9/11 truthers through repetition and 
a slipshod handling of facts. 
    Demonization, scapegoating, 'slipshod handling of facts', repetition, guilt by 
association and circular reasoning: These are the tactics that James Meigs of 
Popular Mechanics says that conspiracy theorists use, but I see them as the tactics 
that people like Jonathan Kay, Michael Shermer and James Meigs use when 
trying to label the 9/11 Truth Movement as just a bunch of paranoid and crazy 
conspiracy theorists. 
    March 27, 2013 at 9:54am · Like 
Nobody responded to or “liked” my final comment, which I stand by (excluding the 
typos) as an analysis of the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists, but Ken Doc’s 
statements are in line with Barrie Zwicker’s from the episode. 
  The second part of my question in the original post was about Zwicker’s reply to 
Kay, which was that Kay  
is just stating as bald assertion that it’s inconceivable that those things you 
described—and I don’t subscribe to all of them, or things like that—could have 
happened.  That’s just your bald assertion.  In your book, you spend three 
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quarters of one page—that’s page twenty, under the heading “Caveats”:  “This 
book is not intended as a rebuttal to conspiracists.”  In other words, you’re 
saying ‘I’m not going to deal with evidence in this book.’  (13:30-13:55)   
To this last statement by Zwicker, Kay said “that book has been written in 2005 by 
Popular Mechanics” (13:55-13:57).  Kay avoids addressing empirical claims about the 
events of September 11 by stating that “[t]hose seeking a point-by-point rebuttal to the 
claims of the 9/11 Truth movement already have several fine resources at their disposal.  
In particular,” Kay (2011:20) recommends 
the 2006 book Debunking 9/11 Myths:  Why Conspiracy Theories Can’t Stand up to the 
Facts, authored by the editors of Popular Mechanics magazine; Mark Roberts’ Links 
for 9/11 Research; the websites 911 Myths, Debunking 911, and the blog Screw 
Loose Change.  Readers who wish to devote more time to the issue might also 
consider reading the Final Report of the 9-11 Commission, released in 2004; 
Lawrence Wright’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 2006 account of the history of 9/11, 
The Looming Tower; and, for those who share [Kay’s] interest in technical material, 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s exhaustive Final Reports of 
the Federal Building and Fire Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster (a 
twenty-million-dollar effort that took three years to produce, and drew on the 
efforts of three hundred staff and external experts).     
Intellectual organizers within the 911TM take issue with Jonathan Kay’s avoidance of 
addressing empirical claims about September 11, and as well they take issue with his use 
of the conspiracy label.  I address that issue above and further below, but I will state 
briefly a pattern that the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists have in addressing and 
avoiding the movement’s empirical claims. 
  Whereas several of the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists do not even cite 
one source that refutes their claims (e.g., see Banas & Miller 2013; Douglas & Sutton 
2011; Stempel et al. 2007; Sunstein & Vermeule 2009; Swami et al. 2010; Wood & Douglas 
2013; Wood et al. 2012), Kay (2011) is not the only anti-conspiracist to cite the very 
reports contested by the 911TM (e.g., see Chandler 2012; Griffin 2010a; Ryan 2012) to 
show why it is true that they ‘live in a fantasy universe.’  For instance, Jeffrey Bale 
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‘distinguishes between bogus conspiracy theories and genuine conspiratorial politics’ by 
pitting “what has become a veritable cottage industry of recent books suggesting that 
someone other than al-Qā’ida was behind the 9/11 attacks” (2007:45-6, n. 1) against 
what he promotes as the definitive account of the attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report.  
Karen Sternheimer’s (2007, 2010) “Sociology of Conspiracy” also treats the 9/11 
Commission’s report as the authority on the 9/11 attacks even though it has been 
thoroughly interrogated and debunked by members of the 911TM (see Griffin 2005).  
And, while they do not cite any of David Ray Griffin’s works, especially his 2007 book, 
Debunking 9/11 Debunking:  An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the 
Official Conspiracy Theory, Warner and Neville-Shepard say that “[they] believe the 
evidence in Popular Mechanics presents a thorough refutation of the truther conspiracy” 
(2014:12). 
   The opening of the episode, “The Truth is Out There,” shows how experts and 
professionals within the 911TM proceed with their reframing activities when responding 
directly to claims by their countermovement antagonists.  After interviewing Jonathan 
Kay alone, Paikin begins the second part of the episode19 with the following:   
Steve Paikin:  And joining us now on the debate:  In San Francisco, California, 
Richard Gage, founder of Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth.  And, with us 
here in studio, Barrie Zwicker, producer of The Great Conspiracy:  The 9/11 News 
Special You Never Saw, and author of Towers of Deception; Paul Zarembka, editor: 
The Hidden History of 9/11.  And we welcome back Jonathan Kay, author of Among 
the Truthers.  Okay gentlemen, I wanna start by having Richard first, and then 
you two gentlemen here in the studio, tell me one thing—‘cause we don’t wanna 
do the whole program on this—but tell me one thing you heard in the interview I 
just did with John Kay that you want to either address, set the record straight, 
confront, whatever.  Richard, go ahead, you first. 
Richard Gage:  Indeed.  This individual prefers to characterize us as conspiracy 
theorists, but the fifteen hundred architects and engineers that I represent—
Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth at AE911Truth.org— don’t have any 
conspiracy theories.  What we have is scientific, forensic evidence found at the, in 
the debris piles of World Trade Centers One, Two, and Seven that is clear 
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evidence of explosive demolition of all three of these buildings.  And we don’t 
have this person talking about this evidence; he just prefers to call us names.  
We’re talking about the destruction of, for instance, of World Trade Center 
Seven:  A forty-seven story skyscraper that drops cleanly, suddenly, uniformly, 
symmetrically at free-fall acceleration, straight down into its own footprint in the 
exact manner of a classic controlled demolition.  Why are we not talking about 
that evidence which has caused so great of concern to the hundreds of—fifteen 
hundred architects and engineers?  And there’s explosives found in the World 
Trade Center dust in a, documented in a peer reviewed paper.  We need to be 
talking about this, not defending ourselves against, uh, being called, uh, having a 
“middle-aged crisis,” as Jonathan, in his book, refers to us as.  (0:45-2:11)  
Steve Paikin:  Richard, thank you.  Paul, what one thing would you like to tackle 
here? 
Paul Zarembka:   Well, the main thing that went through the whole interview, I 
thought, was he was doing a psychoanalysis of us—and he knows me from, 
what, an hour or two—and it’s impossible to learn another human being in that 
short period of time.  So I assert that it’s absolutely impossible for him to know 
my psychology.  It’s as simple as that. 
Steve Paikin:  He’s lumping you in with? 
Paul Zarembka:  With “Truthers,” with a capital T.  All of us are alleged to be the 
same, it makes absolutely no sense.  For example, even—I’m gonna be frank—
even your introduction, when you talk about moon landing [sic] and stuff like 
that, I’ve never been interested in any of those other topics.  The only serious 
topic where the word “conspiracy” applies that I’ve seriously investigated is 
9/11, and it applies to George Bush.  George Bush has a 9/11 conspiracy theory.  
(2:13-3:05) 
To note, for much of his psychoanalysis of these particular “conspiracist cranks,” Kay 
relies on “James Bennett, one of the cocreators of the well-traveled anti-Truther blog 
Screw Loose Change” [sic, italicized in original] (2011:192), and “Phil Molé, a Chicago-
based freelance writer and veteran debunker who investigated the 9/11 Truth 
movement for a 2006 article in Skeptic magazine” [italicized in original] (2011:192).  In 
the end, Kay’s analysis is the application of the “conspiracist worldview” produced by 
the body of anti-conspiracist literature noted above.  
    Barrie Zwicker’s response to Steve Paikin’s (2011) opening question highlights 
the problem with the application of the “conspiracist worldview”: 
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Steve Paikin:  Barrie Zwicker, what one thing do you want to deal with in the John 
Kay interview? 
Barrie Zwicker:  Well, one thing is that he said that we, “Truthers”—and it’s true 
that we’re all lumped together with the moon hoax people and little green people 
and all sorts of people who believe strange things.  It’s severely dehumanizing of 
those of us who are thoughtful and who respect evidence.  He said that the hard kernel 
is that we distrust all authorities.  That’s completely untrue in my case.  There’s lots 
of authorities that I respect.  We were just talking before this show about 
politicians.  I think most of ‘em do a darn good job, I respect them.  So I really 
find that his demeanor in the interview is very similar to the book that you’ve 
written, John, which is really a profound—I’m going to hold back here—it’s a 
profoundly dishonest book that consists of a farrago of vast omissions, especially 
omissions about any evidence about the subject ostensibly you deal with, which you then 
replace with nasty name calling and innuendo and all sorts of sly putdowns of all sorts of 
really good people.  And actually, when I finished the book—you know, there’s a, 
um, there’s a way of approaching the truth, many ways, and one of them is that 
you ask yourself, or you are asked, “what’s the first word that comes into your 
mind after you see this sculpture or whatever,” and the big word that comes into 
my mind after reading your book is condescension on your part. [emphasis mine] 
(3:40-5:14) 
After reading this statement, one might be able to understand Zwicker’s point later in 
the episode when he tells Johnathan Kay that during their interview for the book, 
Zwicker “wanted to keep track of [his] time so [he] didn’t talk too much and have a 
chance to hear [Kay] when [he] asked [Kay] a question” (Paikin 2011: 15:20-15:40)   Kay, 
reporting in his book that Zwicker was “[o]ne of the oddest interviews” (2011:191) he 
conducted, interpreted the interview as a sign that, in some cases, “cranks are high 
functioning intellectuals frustrated by a menial profession” (2011:191), or that “many 
come to their crankdom in middle age, or at the end of their working lives, as they are 
casting about for some project to occupy their hyperactive minds” (2011:191). 
  Zwicker’s extended comment above ends the “Truthers’” opening remarks on 
The Agenda with Steve Paikin, and after he announces that the book can be summed up 
with the word “condescension,” Paikin asks for Kay’s rebuttal: 
Johnathan Kay:  In a way, that’s a fair criticism.  I don’t take the idea of George 
Bush and Dick Cheney bombing the World Trade Center seriously, and as a 
result I have written a book that, by necessity, may appear condescending to 
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those who do.  My book is a serious attempt to explain why so many intelligent 
people—and I credit everyone on this panel with being intelligent—why they 
believe things that I think are plainly irrational.  And, by the way, I’d like to say 
that the Wall Street Journal had a review of my book on Saturday, and one of the 
proudest things I, for me, about that review was that they said that I painted a 
fairly affectionate portrait of conspiracy theorists, and that I do not mock them— 
and the book was not written in a tone of mockery….  [emphasis mine] (5:17-
5:55)    
Incidentally, the particular Wall Street Journal review Kay referred to states that, 
“[r]eporting without mockery, Mr. Kay has a knack for making even the silliest 
conspiracist sound sympathetic” [emphasis mine] (Bunch 2011), and this was among the 
many reviewers who found that the only fault with Kay’s (2011) work was that it too 
one-sidedly blamed liberal academia for the growth of conspiracism of the 21st century 
(Ceren 2011; Pitt 2011; Roberts 2011; Singal 2011).  Among the more critical reviews of 
his book (Cole 2011; Flynn 2011; Schneider 2011), one critic asserts that Kay’s (2011) 
“treatment of several subjects is unwarrantedly brief and misleading—perhaps because 
he regards Wikipedia entries as reliable, comparable to Snopes ([see Kay 2011] p. 241),” 
and this same reviewer also “found flawed logic and factual mistakes galore” (Bauer 
2012:177) along with a “lack of evidence- or logic-based argument in [Kay’s 2011] 
book…” (2012:178).   
 Jonathan Kay’s Use of Anti-conspiracy Analytic Categories 
  Returning to the anti-conspiracist analysis of the “it’s not a theory theory” 
(Aaronovitch 2010; Byford 2011), here is how Kay (2011) presents his analysis of the “just 
asking questions” factor that is present within the 911TM: 
Following in the tradition of Bertrand Russell’s famous essay about JFK, most 
Truthers prefer to focus on questions.  Among the “10 reasons for starting a new 
9/11 investigation” listed on the leaflets they distribute at Ground Zero, for 
instance, are such entries as, “What force pulverized most of the concrete and 
office material of the Twin Towers into dust, and was able to eject steel beams 
into buildings over 400 feet away?” and, “Why was there no mention in the 9/11 
Commission Report of WTC Building 7?”   [italicized in original] (p. 66) 
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No data is given to show that “Truthers” consciously or knowingly model their behavior 
after Russell’s (1964) essay, but in Paul Zarembka’s (2008) edited volume, The Hidden 
History of 9-11, David Ray Griffin (2008c) has followed in Bertrand Russell’s (1964) 
footsteps with a brief essay, unmentioned by Kay (2011), which is titled, “Sixteen 
Reasons to Question the Official Story About 9-11.”  For my purposes in this 
dissertation, Griffin (2008c) addresses WTC 7 in three of the sixteen points, which are 
reproduced here: 
12. The official explanation of the destruction of the Twin Towers and WTC 7 
contradicts all prior history with regard to steel-frame high-rise buildings:  that 
they have never collapsed for any reason other than being brought down by 
explosives in the procedure known as controlled demolition. 
13. Firefighters, emergency medical workers, police officers, city officials, WTC 
employees, and television and print journalists reported explosions going off in 
the Twin Towers and WTC 7. 
15. The National Institute of Standards and Technology has repeatedly 
postponed its report on the collapse of WTC 7, which perfectly exemplifies the 
standard features of a classic controlled implosion and has been identified as 
such by numerous experts.  (p. xviii) 
To note, Kay (2011) reproduced the entire list of Bertrand Russell’s (1964) “16 Questions 
on the Assassination,” and the questions from the 911TM he presents above are those 
that I have found to be more central to many of the movement’s members than the one 
provided by Byford (2011) from 911Truth.org’s (2010) list.  Moreover, as I have also 
attended their events, I believe I came away with the very same pamphlet that Kay 
(2011) acquired, plus another (each are included in Appendix A).  Before, moving to that 
discussion, I will reveal one last feature of Among the Truthers that highlights the 
ongoing discussions. 
  Jonathan Kay presents his book as a field guide to ‘America’s conspiracist 
underground,’ because, as he states in the preface, “[y]ou can’t defeat the 
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Enlightenment’s enemies unless you understand them.  And that is the project that [he] 
asks [his] readers to embark on as they read [his] book” (2011:xiii).  In further prefacing 
his book, he describes how, “in Chapter 5—[his] field guide to the different breeds of 
conspiracy theorist—people come to their paranoias for all sorts of complicated 
reasons…[b]ut [that] they are all bound together by one increasingly common trait:  
They have spun out of rationality’s ever-weakening gravitational pull, and into 
mutually impenetrable Manichean fantasy universes of their own construction” 
(2011:xx).  This ‘mutually impenetrable fantasy universe’ is reminiscent of the 
“monological belief system” and “conspiracist worldview” that psychologists propose 
guide beliefs in 9/11 conspiracy theories (Wood et al. 2012; Wood & Douglas 2013).  
“Conspiracy theories, the subject of [Kay’s] book” (2011:xix), are put to the wayside in 
Chapter 5, “Why They Believe.”  “Much of this book,” as Kay (2011:xx) states, “is 
devoted to the task of exploring those fantasy universes and delving into the minds of 
those who create them—an inquiry that is a critical first step in defending the rationalist 
tradition.”   
  “For some Truthers,” Kay (2011:xxi) asserts, “including many of those [he] 
interviewed for this book, the idea that elements within the Bush administration used 
self-inflicted mass murder as a launching pad for geopolitical adventurism has become a 
full-time, all-consuming obsession.”  In Chapter 5, Kay “profile[s] the characteristics of 
those who don’t [resist the lure conspiracism]” (2011:150), and his first “specimen” is 
Richard Gage, “a balding, mild-mannered, middle-aged architect who heads up a 
California-based group called Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth” (2011:152).  As 
reported in the book, Gage’s “singular focus—laboriously examined in a six-hundred-
slide PowerPoint presentation he trots out at every opportunity—is the precise sequence 
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of events leading to the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings” (2011:152).   “In 
one particularly effective segment during his stump presentation,” Kay (2011) reports,  
Gage puts up shots of the localized fires that broke out in the lower floors of 
WTC Building 7 hours before it collapsed.  Seconds later, he shows footage of 
Beijing’s Mandarin Oriental hotel—which suffered an epic top-to-bottom 
conflagration in 2009, yet remained standing.  It’s a cinematic juxtaposition that 
plays to the Truthers’ strongest card:  Even many architects and structural 
engineers who’ve never heard of Richard Gage will concede that the collapse of 
WTC 7, a fairly typical 1980’s-era structure located about a football field away 
from WTC 1, was unusual.  (p. 153)  
In his profile, Kay employs slights and ridicule in his assessment of the “Truther 
Extraordinaire,” Richard Gage, who “seems curiously upbeat” (2011:155) for a ‘nutbar’ 
‘going through a midlife crisis,’ but curiously absent is any attention to the empirical 
claims about the ‘unusual collapse of WTC 7.’  
  Kay has a “master’s degree in metallurgical engineering” (2011:7), but his 
defense of rationalism and goal of explaining conspiracy theories and their believers 
helps him avoid entangling with “notebooks full of esoteric debating points about 
avionics, building demolition, NORAD flight-tracking procedures, and a dozen other 
scattered subjects” (2011:66), such as addressing how office fires caused WTC 7 to 
collapse symmetrically with a sudden onset in less than seven seconds.  Kay reasons that 
grappling with these kinds of claims makes it “difficult to put together a coherent 
narrative [of the Truthers]” (2011:66).  Within his constructed narrative of the 911TM, 
Kay retells Richard Gage’s revelation in March of 2006 when he first heard on the radio 
“David Ray Griffin, a retired Claremont School of Theology professor who’s since 
become a full-time 9/11 Truth activist” (2011:154).  Kay continues with Gage’s account: 
“Griffin was logical and methodical—almost grandfatherly,” Gage remembers.  
“He was talking about the 118 [World Trade Center] first-responders—
information that had just come out in 2005—who said they’d heard explosions 
and flashes of light, beams dripping with molten metal, all amid the collapse of 
80,000 tons of structural steel.  It hit me like a two-by-four.  How come I’d never 
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heard of any of this?  I was shocked.  I had to pull my car to the side of the road to 
absorb it all.  I knew I’d be late for the meeting.  But I didn’t care.”  
Within days, Gage was proselytizing the Truth to everyone who would 
listen—his family, his friends, even his architectural colleagues at the Walnut 
Creek firm of Akol & Yoshii.  [italicized in original] (p. 154) 
Once again, as we can see in the quotes from Kay’s (2011) interview, Richard Gage 
presents empirical claims as to his interests in 9/11 Truth, but Kay, for reasons stated, 
does not have an interest in addressing or rebutting those claims with his own 
arguments. 
  The Index of Kay’s (2011) book shows that Richard Gage is discussed on pages 
xxi-xxii, 100, 104, 105, 151-155, 159, and 211, and within those pages Gage is quoted on 
pages 100, 152, 154, and 155.  The same does not hold for Gage’s guide to 9/11 Truth, 
David Ray Griffin.  Griffin is shown in the Index of Kay’s book to appear on pages 6, 49-
50, 91, 104, 119, 154, 190, 193, and 230, but even though Kay states that “[d]uring [their] 
interview [in Griffin’s Seattle home], [Griffin] spoke to [Kay] for three hours straight—
and seemed prepared to speak for hours more had [Kay] not gotten up to leave” 
(2011:193), Kay (2011) provides no quotations from their three hour interview nor from 
any of Griffin’s books.  Kay describes Griffin as “a superstar Truther” (2011:6), 
“probably the most influential Truther alive” (2011:49), and he notes that this person 
who “wrote even more books [than a prominent JFK-era conspiracist] in the space of just 
five years, all of them based in large part on material he found while surfing the 
Internet” (2011:230), “has written [since 2004] no fewer than eleven books, in which he 
methodically examines virtually every minute of the 9/11 timeline” (2011:193).  
Excluding quotations from Griffin’s interview and books is, in effect, a way of silencing 
him, and it is a curious approach to providing one’s readers with a trustworthy ‘field 
guide to Trutherdom.’    
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  Kay references two of Griffin’s books, with his 2004 title, The New Pearl Harbor, 
described as “what would become a foundational text of the Truther movement” 
(2011:119).  Instead of reviewing, critiquing, quoting, or interrogating this “foundational 
text” of the group he is studying, Kay turns back to constructing his narrative by  
describing how “Truthers have constructed not only an alternative vision of modern 
American history, but also an alternative vision of American itself” (2011:120).  Kay is 
most revealing of the content of Griffin’s work when discussing his 2008 title, 9/11 
Contradictions:  An Open Letter to Congress and the Press, and this is to say only that it 
“includes these chapters:” 
1. How long did George Bush remain in the classroom? 
2. When did Dick Cheney enter the underground bunker? 
3. Was Cheney observed confirming a stand-down order? 
4. Did Cheney observe the land-all-planes order? 
5. When did Cheney issue shoot down authorization? 
6. Where was General Richard Myers? 
7. Where was Donald Rumsfeld? 
8. Did Ted Olson receive calls from Barbara Olson? 
9. When was the military alerted about Flight 11? 
10. When was the military alerted about Flight 175? 
11. When was the military alerted about Flight 77? 
12. When was the military alerted about Flight 93? 
13. Could the military have shot down Flight 93?  (2011:194) 
Griffin’s (2008b) book, 9/11 Contradictions, actually consists of 25 chapters, each of which 
is titled with a question about “9/11” or the events of September 11, of which Kay (2011) 
selected only the first 13.  Absent of discussing content from the chapters, readers might 
be left with the impression that they lack substance, rigor, and legitimacy, which is to 
say that they are merely “questions” produced from the “hyperactive mind” of a 





 The 9/11 Truth Movement:  Questioning Conspiracies, Answering with WTC 7 
  As stated earlier in this chapter, certainly the 911TM does have questions about 
“9/11” and September 11.  “Ten Reasons Why You Should Question 9/11,” the 
pamphlet Kay (2011) describes above, was handed to me by an anonymous member of 
the street rally across from St. Paul’s Church that I attended in 2011, as was another 
pamphlet, “Why You Should Support a New 911 Investigation!”  Both of these 
pamphlets, included in Appendix A, contain essentially the same information.  Unlike 
911Truth.org’s (2010) “Connecting the Dots:  Unanswered Questions” pamphlet that 
Byford (2011) highlights, both of those that I acquired unfold to five separate pages of 
factual information about the events of September 11 that support the 911TM’s 
adherence to questioning the official story of “9/11 .”  In my experience with the 
movement, members often do have questions, but rarely are they merely rhetorical. 
 Questioning Conspiracies or WTC 7? 
As described in the previous chapter, my shortest interview in 2011 came from a 
member of the 911TM whose motivation for attending the rally at ground zero was 
because there were “[t]oo many unanswered questions,” and that people need to ask 
themselves, “how do three towers fall straight down in one day?”  Continuing, this 
person said, “You can convince me one tower can.  You might be able to convince me 
that two towers can, but you’ll never convince me of three:  It’s a mathematical 
impossibility.  They fell straight down through the path of most resistance.”  This point 
was iterated in several interviews and on the 911TM Facebook group.  I had asked 
members of the Facebook group about which documentary woke them up to 9/11 
Truth, with one person commenting with the following:  “What woke me up to 9/11 
was listening on the radio and hearing the second tower fell. 1 tower maybe, 2 no way. I 
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don't remember when I found out about building 7, but it was shortly after. That 
absolutely sealed the deal. Everything since has only reinforced my convictions” [sic]. 
  During the 2011 rally, I purchased a button with the statement, “2Planes-
3BLDGS=911WTF?”  This arithmetical interrogative typifies what many in the 
movement believe to be the essential question of “9/11,” hence ReThink911’s campaign 
is about asking the public, “Did you know a 3 rd tower fell on 9/11?”  One member I 
interviewed in 2013 pointed out, though, “even among the 9/11 Truthers, none of us 
agree with each other a hundred percent.  Most of us agree with each other ninety, 
ninety five.”  This person related that, from their perspective, there were “two smoking 
guns of 9/11” [emphasis mine], the missing footage and indicators of a plane crash at 
the Pentagon and, secondly, the collapse of WTC 7.  Another part of this same interview 
was more revealing of the questions the 911TM has about “9/11” and September 11.  
  During this interview, which occurred just before the ReThink911 rally began, I 
asked what, if any, evidence could be presented that would change their mind about 
“9/11,” to which they responded by repeatedly asking questions about both events they 
believe to be the “two smoking guns of 9/11.”  After this, the following exchange took 
place: 
I: Would you say there are just too many questions? 
P5: Oh yeah.  There’s uh, Shanksville, you know I never talk about 
Shanksville because I just don’t know what to say.  It’s just I, I sit with 
my mouth wide open that people, um, I guess Shanksville, Flight 93 
should be a smoking gun because, if you look at the footage of where the 
plane supposedly crashed, to me, it looks like someone took a backhoe, 
dug a hole, made it look like plane crash.  There’s no plane, and the 
official story says the plane buried itself.  I, I’d like to know when in 
history that’s ever happened before.  Why were there no bodies?  The 
coroner left because there wasn’t a drop of blood.  I mean, where’s the, 
where’s the, you know one guy said it looked like someone just dumped 
a bunch of scrap metal in there to make it look like a plane.  It doesn ’t 
add up. You know you got to look at other cases where planes have 
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crashed, and then compare it to, well, why didn’t this happen, why 
didn’t that?  That’s when you go to the Pentagon, you know, there’s no 
skid marks on the lawn, there’s no, uh, you know those engines were 
made of titanium.  They wouldn’t have just vaporized.  You know, I, I…I 
barely passed chemistry when I was in high school by the skin of my 
teeth, but I understood enough about the periodic table to, to know that 
jet fuel would not burn at such a rate that it would melt titanium or steel, 
you know.  Uh, yeah, I mean, there’s a lot of questions… 
I: So why the focus on World Trade Center Seven with the ReThink911 
campaign? 
P5: I think for most people, that’s the ultimate smoking gun.  For me it’s the 
number two smoking gun.  For me, once I saw the Pentagon then I knew 
something was not right, and then Building Seven just confirmed my 
beliefs.  You know?  So when you look at those two, and if you consider 
things like Flight 93 at Shanksville a smoking gun, if you consider 
NORAD a smoking gun, okay great, like I said, the average person may 
not understand those things.  But, all you have to do is look, and, you 
know, I can’t tell you how many people I’ve talk that never heard of 
Building Seven.  “What do you mean Building Seven?  No, only the two 
towers fell.”  You know?  [laughs]  And it’s like, “Really?”  I can 
remember on 9/11 hearing about Building Seven falling down.  I had no 
reason not to believe the official story at the time, so I just assumed it 
was debris and, okay, it’s going to happen.  I mean, I’m not a physicist, 
I’m not an engineer, how would I know?  It wasn’t until this information 
was presented to me through documentaries.  [end of statement] 
I asked which documentaries he was referring to, and I was told that Loose Change, 2nd 
Edition was the catalyst to this person investigating the events of September 11.  While 
this film has been a pathway to 9/11 Truth for many in the movement, other 
documentaries are currently considered to be of more value to spreading 9/11 Truth. 
  On July 6, 2013, I submitted a poll to the 911TM Facebook group asking, “If a 
documentary or film woke you up to 9/11 truth, which one was most responsible?”  
(For these results, see Appendix B)  The top response was Loose Change, which is nearly 
always brought up if a documentary is mentioned by the 911TM’s countermovement 
antagonists20.  However, of Ken Doc’s (2012) “Top 10 9/11 Docs” on the 911TM 
Facebook group, which generated 95 likes and 169 comments to date (July 4th, 2014), 
various editions of Loose Change are mentioned as ‘other notable documentaries,’ but it is 
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9/11: Explosive Evidence - Experts Speak Out that tops the list at number one.  On a post to 
the 911TM Facebook group asking its members if they “started off with the theory that 
the Bush administration, Neocons from PNAC, the Mossad, or other agents planned 
9/11 and then started looking for evidence to support your pre-drawn conclusion,” Ken 
Doc stated that he “personally never started off thinking it was an ‘inside job’. [He] 
watched Loose Change in 2005 and [his] first priority was to prove it wrong.”  Doc 
proceeded to share a link to a thread asking members, “[w]hat first tipped you to the 
fact the official 9/11 storyline was untrue?”  In that thread’s comments, Loose Change and 
WTC 7 were frequently cited as the impetus of why members began to disbelieve in the 
official story of “9/11,” both which are empirical catalysts for change in beliefs about 
what happened on September 11. 
  As Richard Gage, founder of AE911Truth, remarked on Steve Paikin’s (2011) 
show, he and “the fifteen hundred architects and engineers that [he] represent[s]…don’t 
have any conspiracy theories.  What [they] have is scientific, forensic evidence.”  The 
collapse of the three WTC buildings on September 11 is analyzed in detail by 
credentialed experts and professionals in AE911Truth’s documentary, Explosive Evidence 
(see ae911truth 2012), which had a premier screening that I was invited to attend in 
NYC’s Upper East Side in 2011.  At time mark 5:36 of the version cited here, a scene 
begins with the refrain, “How do 2 planes bring down 3 skyscrapers?”  The 
documentary proceeds to explain the collapse of the official story according to the 
‘smoking gun evidence that is WTC 7’ as alleged by the 911TM.  Narrating, Richard 
Gage states the following: 
The new World Trade Center Building 7 looms above the site of its original.  
Building 7 was a 47-story high rise not hit by an airplane, yet it was the third 
modern steel framed skyscraper to collapse rapidly and symmetrically on 9/11.  
223 
 
It was a football field away from the North Tower, and sustained minor damage 
from falling debris.  Building 7’s precipitous collapse was blamed on normal 
office fires.  (5:49—6:21)  
While the public can watch engineers, architects, and physicists on YouTube describe 
why NIST’s (2008) report cannot explain why Building 7 collapsed “rapidly and 
symmetrically on 9/11” (ae911truth 2012: 6:09), members of the movement take the issue 
to the streets.  In 2011, several people carried signs and banners and donned shirts and 
hats meant to inform the public about the collapse of the third tower, and in 2013 
ReThink911’s campaign is almost exclusively focused on this excluded fact from 
Zelikow’s (2004) 9/11 Commission Report. 
  One person I interviewed at ground zero in 2011, who flew to New York from 
Chicago to try to “educate people about the evidence that’s been presented over the last 
ten years so they can see for themselves what really happened because the official story 
just doesn’t add up,” described to me what they believe to be “the smoking gun of 
9/11.”  This participant was among many others holding signs at the 2011 rally, with 
their sign reading, “WTC 7 Free fall collapse.  Did you know?”  Upon observing this, I 
asked during our interview, “What is the significance of Building Seven?”  To this, I was 
presented with the following response: 
P6:   The significance of Building 7 is they wanna say jet fuel caused the 
towers to fall.  I don’t agree with that analysis, but we’ll give ‘em the 
benefit of doubt, they say jet fuel caused them to fall.  Building 7 was a 
47 story building that wasn’t hit by a plane, and thus no jet fuel, but still 
collapsed at free fall speed.  There’s federal buildings in there, or federal 
offices of like the FBI, the SEC, Secret Service; it was Giuliani’s fallout 
bunker, there was FEMA in there.  It collapsed at freefall speed, and it 
didn’t get mentioned once in the official report!  Why!?  It’s a very 
important…Uh, a 30..This would’ve been the tallest building in 32 states 
in America; it falls at freefall speed at 5:20 in the afternoon in lower 
Manhattan, but they don’t mention it in the official report?  It’s things like 
that that make people question.  Like most people you ask, like we say, 
“Two buildings took out three planes!”  Like, “What?  How is that even 
possible!?”  And then you learn that the BBC predicted—they said that it, 
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BBC reported the collapse actually happening 20 minutes before it did 
happen.  It was in the background while she was reporting it.  Things 
like that.  These are why we need a new investigation.  [emphasis mine] 
The above statement was made about seven and a half minutes into an interview, and 
about four hours after the rally began.  I can only imagine this person meant to say, 
“Two planes took out three buildings,” but that they said the opposite due to fatigue.  In 
any regard, the question of the collapse of WTC 7 has been popular for members of the 
911TM, one that was taken to great lengths in the culmination of the 2013 ReThink911 
campaign.   
 Rethinking 9/11 through the Third Tower  
  In 2013, ReThink911.org (2013a) commissioned YouGov Plc to conduct a 
nationally representative online survey, and they included a similar item that 
911Truth.org (2006, 2007) had asked in its Zogby polls.  ReThink911.org’s (2013a) 
question reads as follows:  “In addition to the Twin Towers, a third skyscraper in the 
World Trade Center complex collapsed on 9/11. Were you aware of this before today?”  
Prior to the spring of 2008, I would have been one among the forty-six percent counted 
in the YouGov Plc poll who said they were not aware of this fact, and upon learning 
about it I began to question “9/11” and investigate what happened on September 11, 
just as has been described by many others within the 911TM.  Like many others in the 
movement, I have asked questions about the security failures, the flight paths, the 
destruction of the towers, and other empirical questions of the events of September 11, 
but as a sociologist my line of questions changed from asking these types of questions to 
asking questions to and about the 911TM.  Due to the efforts of people like Sooty 
Mangabey, who has given permission to use his name, and others who promoted the 
ReThink911 campaign within the 911TM Facebook group, in 2013 I eventually found 
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myself back in Manhattan asking questions to key members of the campaign, such as 
Mike Figa, who has also given me permission to use his name in this study. 
  On September 5th, 2013, Figa’s interview aired on the Internet-based radio show, 
“9/11 Free Fall” (I was listening based upon a post promoting the interview to the 
911TM Facebook group), in which Figa describes to the host, Andrew Steele, his role in 
the ReThink911 campaign.  Only partially reproduced here, this interview highlights 
how and why Figa and others at the head of the ReThink911 campaign pose the question 
displayed on posters and billboards throughout the world, “Did you know a third tower 
fell on 9/11?”  Here is a key exchange that highlights how members of the 911TM 
interact with and counteract their countermovement’s public campaigns: 
Steele:  You’re listening to this on Thursday night on No Lies Radio.  As of 
September 1st, we have signs up on taxi cabs.  If you go to AE911Truth’s 
Facebook page you’ll see there’s a picture of various activists, including Pamela 
Senzee, who’s played a large part in this ReThink911 campaign too, standing in 
front of a taxicab with a sign on the top of it, asking viewers “Do you know 
about the third tower that fell on 9/11?”  So, I mean, that’s great.  I guess I want 
to ask you, how did you come up with this?  I mean, this is a monumental thing.  
It sounds like something people kind of just fantasize about:  “You know, I wish 
we could just get Building Seven up on a billboard, on taxicabs.  Wouldn’t it be 
great if the world just switched around and did that?”  You actually made it 
happen!  How do you pursue a campaign like this?  How do you take that first 
step?  
Figa:  Yeah, actually I’ll—not to give undue attention to this particular person, 
but Pamela Geller—you probably know that she’s Islamophobic, a talking head, 
let’s say—she did a few add campaigns, one of which was on the New York City 
metro system, which had a picture of the second plane impact, which I also 
thought was pretty distasteful.  I mean, we’re talking people dying instantly.  
And she had a quote from the Quran—and I mean, of course, all these books you 
can take a random quote and it won’t sound so good—so she had this campaign, 
multiple campaigns, but they were rumored or reported to be around ten 
thousand dollars.  So, I was like, ‘if she can put this on the New York City metro 
to foster bigotry and support the lie,’ I was like, ‘well, we should do our own 
campaign.’  So that was how it started.  So [laughs] I hope she hears about this, 
but she definitely inspired a much, much bigger campaign than her various 
campaigns that were here and also in San Francisco.  So that’s it.  And  then we 
just moved it forward from there, and it turned into an anniversary event that 
really expanded.  And that’s it.  So we have one metro, there’s I think now 12 
cities, and there are some unofficial cities as well, some people doing stuff 
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independently around the world.  I’m working with people in Bethlehem, 
actually, so they’re going to be up there in Bethlehem, where I actually lived for 
two months—and in some other cities.  So it really grew.  But the one metro we 
do have is San Francisco, the Bart metro system, and that is already up.  I’m not 
sure if they’re all up, but they even put them up early.  So yeah, but the center 
piece to the campaign would be an over fifty foot billboard in Times Square.  
And we, I was actually quite surprised.  A lot of advertisers, let’s say, or 
middlemen, turned us down, but we also got approvals, and we’re quite pleased 
to get those approvals.  So on September third they should be installing the 
billboard in Times Square, and it will be an event on September eleventh itself, 
which is a Wednesday, coming up pretty soon, depending on which this airs , 
and we would like everyone to get themselves out there, and to get their friends 
in New York City to go to Times Square.  And we’ll have some speakers, and 
we’ll be doing some sort of event which is still being planned in the final stages. 
Inspired by movement opposition, the 911TM’s efforts to bring one of their central 
questions to publics around the world was met through the ReThink911 campaign. 
  Just the day before this interview aired, I had booked my flight for a 17 hour stay 
in Manhattan so that I could interview the people in attendance at the 2013 Rethink911 
rally in Times Square, and Mike Figa was among those who I interviewed.  Volunteering 
his time at a merchandise table, much as he volunteers his time for the campaign 
generally, ‘loosing thousands of dollars in the process,’ Figa related that the campaign 
was “covered in The New York Times, Russia Today, Time Magazine,” and that along with 
“a lot of donations from around the world, a lot of small donations,” the ReThink911 
campaign has been successful in spreading awareness about the third tower that 
collapsed on September 11.  During my interview with Figa, I recorded Richard Gage, 
AIA and the founder of AE911Truth, on my voice recorder in the background speaking 
on stage, encouraging those gathered for the rally to make donations at the merchandise 
table Figa was attending.  Donations would be exchanged for a DVD from AE911Truth, 
material that Figa described as “the best information out there, scientifically sound 
information, which talks about the controlled demolition of all three towers.”      
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  To summarize, the ReThink911 campaign is an effort by the 911TM to raise a 
central question in the minds of the global public:  “Did you know a 3 rd tower fell on 
9/11?”  For the 911TM, the collapse of the third tower is a “smoking gun of 9/11,” 
indicating that “9/11 was an inside job,” and the 911TM believes it has scientifica lly 
based, forensic evidence to support these claims to publics around the world.  There are 
many other outwardly directed questions by the 911TM, as exhibited by 911Truth.org’s 
(2010) pamphlet discussed by Byford (2011), the one Kay (2011) highlights, along with a 
similar one I acquired in 2011, all three of which discuss WTC 7 among several other 
empirical issues regarding September 11.  As one of my interviewees made clear, WTC 7 
is one among other “smoking gun” clues that “9/11 was an inside job,” but because the 
ReThink911 campaign made WTC 7 its main question for the public, and because the 
issue appears in nearly every member’s account of why they “investigate 9/11,” I will 
continue treat it as a special case in the proceeding section of this chapter.   
 Debunking and Denying 9/11 Truth by Default 
  At this point, it is safe to say that WTC Building 7 is considered a central aspect 
of why the 911TM considers the official story of “9/11” to be a lie, at worst, or 
incomplete, at best.  For many in the 911TM, the collapse of WTC 7 indicates that “9/11 
was an inside job,” and for others, due to its absence in the official story (Zelikow 2004) 
and unscientific treatment in NIST’s (2008) report (see Chandler 2012; Griffin 2010a, 
2013; Ryan 2012), WTC 7 indicates that people should “investigate 9/11” for themselves, 
because “there are just too many unanswered questions.”   Jonathan Kay’s (2011) 
deference to Popular Mechanics’ (2006) book, Debunking 9/11 Myths, on such questions as 
‘the unusual collapse of WTC 7’ (Kay 2011:153), and his and others’ (Warner & Neville-
Shepard 2014) reliance on Popular Mechanics’ (2006) book as their reasoning behind why 
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members of the 911TM are “conspiracy theorists,” indicates that it is worthwhile to pay 
close attention to this work in particular21. 
 Enter the Conspiracist Crank Extraordinaire 
  As discussed above, my first interview was interrupted by a bystander, and as I 
attempted to keep all of my interviews dyadic, here is how this person (P7) broached the 
“conversation” between myself and the other person I was interviewing at the time (P4): 
P7:  I’ve read all the books by David Ray Griffin, yeah… 
I:   A second gentleman has entered the conversation, and I’m just going to 
start off with the same question:  What brings you to ground zero today? 
P7:   Well, I’m from Singapore actually, and I’ve read about, you know, the 
nine one one inside job.  And I read three of David Ray Griffin’s books. 
I:   Which books were those? 
P7:   The New Pearl Harbor, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, and finally, uh, nine 
one one omission report, uh, distortions and omissions.  I’m going to get 
a hold a few more of his books within the next few weeks. 
I:   So you’re from Singapore, you read David Ray Griffin’s books, and 
that’s why you’re here at ground zero today? 
P7:   Yeah, I’m here to actually try to join the nine one one truth movement for 
the protest march, but I could not get in to pass beyond the barricade so 
that’s all I could do today.  So, I’m glad I saw you [P4] standing with this 
sign here. 
P4:   Yeah, we just got in our self with all the [garbled recording]  
P7:   Oh, okay. 
P4:   Yeah, so… 
I:   Is there a 9/11 Truth Movement in Singapore? 
P7:   Uh, no, there isn’t actually.  Most of my friends, when I tell them about 
the evidence that I’ve read, they don’t believe it, they say “it’s just 
conspiracy theory” and all that, but people who say that have not 
actually read, you know, the material. 




P7:   Yeah, they just want to push the thing aside and say “it’s a conspiracy 
theory,”  
P4:   Right… 
P7:   Actually, if you examine all the evidence that has been dug up by all the 
investigators, I mean it’s just...[noise interruption from passing 
vehicles]…I think it’s overwhelming evidence showing, you know, these 
people who are not—I mean very, very highly qualified people:  Richard 
Gage, the architect from San Francisco Bay, I guess, yeah, and many 
others who have dug up so much evidence to show for sure that this is 
an inside job, yeah.  The buildings couldn’t have come down just based 
on the fire, yeah. 
I:   Based on fire and… 
P7:   Structural damage due to fire is the official story, yeah, mmhmm. 
I:   And, so you mentioned, uh, that your friends will use the term 
“conspiracy theory” or “theorist…” 
P7:   Yeah… 
I:   How does it make you feel when they say that? 
P7:   Well, umm…. 
I:   Because you mentioned that they haven’t reviewed the evidence, do you 
want them to review the evidence, or…? 
P7:   I talk to many of them, you know, like based on the books I have read, 
and some of them, yeah, they gotta give it, you know, like some thought.  
But most of them will just push it aside, and say “it’s conspiracy theory.”  
I think people are just lazy to [sic] examine the evidence, and I think it’s 
just too scary to know that the U.S. government would actually be 
involved in bringing down the towers and creating a pretext for war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
I:   That’s interesting that you say that; do you think that people think it’s 
too scary to examine the evidence? 
P7:   Most Americans are just too afraid to believe that, you know, that, to 
imagine that the U.S. government is prepared to do such a thing—such a 
terrible thing—and such a great sacrifice of lives, and yeah.  So, I think a 
lot of them are too afraid to even entertain the thought, and that’s why 
they, they rather just brush it aside as conspiracy theory. 
P4:   I would agree.   
This interview highlights the disdain for the conspiracy label that Wood and Douglas 
(2013) highlight in their study, and it also shows the recognition by movement members 
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that the label is employed in order to avoid dealing with empirical claims, as Husting 
and Orr’s (2007) study concludes.  Moreover, it shows that David Ray Griffin and 
Richard Gage’s work with the 911TM are important to movement members.      
  The third book that the person from Singapore referred to was Griffin’s (2005) 
book, The 9/11 Commission Report:  Omissions and Distortions, in which he argues that “an 
examination is surely in order because, regardless of one’s opinion about its historical 
accuracy, The 9/11 Commission Report is one of the most important documents ever 
produced in the United States” (2005:1).  As another example of his work, Griffin’s 
(2010a) book, The Mysterious Collapse of World Trade Center 7:  Why the Official Report about 
9/11 is Unscientific and False, is a 269 page indictment of NIST’s (2008) report on the 
collapse of each of the three WTC towers.  Griffin ultimately concludes that “NIST’s 
report on WTC7 is not, as we have seen, merely ‘unscientific’ in a loose sense of that 
term.  Rather, its authors have committed scientific fraud in the strict sense by ignoring, 
falsifying, and fabricating evidence” [italics in original] (2010a:245).  David Ray Griffin is 
noted by countermovement antagonists to be among the most recognized and prolific 
members of the 911TM (see Kay 2011), and his work is inspirational for many of the 
people I interviewed, as is shown in the interview above.  As one of the most prolific 
intellectuals organizers of the 911TM (Griffin 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Griffin and Scott 
2007; Griffin 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011), I will focus on how his work is treated by 
Popular Mechanics (2006, 2011).    
 Enter the Rational Analysts, Defenders of the Official Story 
  Debunking 9/11 Myths is a self-described “in-depth investigation by Popular 
Mechanics” (2006:front cover), and it is described by Senator John McCain, who authored 
the Forward of the 1st edition, as standing “for an old-fashioned approach to facts.  It 
231 
 
relies,” says Sen. McCain, “on reporting, evidence, and eyewitnesses, and rejects 
speculation, falsehoods, and conspiracy” [emphasis mine] (2006:xv).  This book 
progresses with a series of discursive moments projected to the reader as Claim vs. Fact, 
where a claim by one or more representatives of “9/11 conspiracy theorists” is 
presented and then is rebutted with quotes and reports from experts interviewed for the 
book.  For example, here is how Popular Mechanics’ (2006) first edition addresses WTC 7 
(reproduced in full, verbatim): 
CLAIM:  Seven hours after the two towers fell, WTC 7 collapsed.  The 47-story 
building housed offices for the Secret Service and CIA, among others—and was 
therefore, conspiracists say, a repository of secrets and evidence that needed to 
be destroyed.  “Many researchers believe that shadowy elements within the 
agencies housed in WTC 7 are prime suspects in this sprawling 
conspiracy….[sic]  If they are correct, Building 7 was literally a nest of suspicious 
activity and its remaining intact may well have been a catastrophe for those who 
were counting on its destruction,” writes Jeremy Baker on the Web site 
www.serendipity.il. 
How did these “shadowy elements” engineer the collapse?  As with the 
Twin Towers, conspiracy theorists see evidence of a controlled demolition.  
According to the Web site www.911review.org, “The video clearly shows that it 
was not a collapse subsequent to a fire, but rather a controlled demolition:  
Amongst the Internet investigators, the jury is in on this one.”  (p. 53)   
Clearly, the conspiracy label is employed with the phrase, “conspiracists say,” and while 
Jeremy Baker is an active member of the 911TM (e.g., see his blog at Baker 2014), there is 
no statement throughout the book as to why his, or another claimant, should be 
considered a representative for the movement.  Moreover, aside from only leading to a 
homepage and not to the specific quote, the URL provided for Baker’s quote leads to a 
currently non-existent webpage, and it is similarly unclear why it, or any other webpage 
provided, should be considered representative of the movement.  Sociologically, these 
are poor methods for rigorously gathering “claims” from the 911TM (although, Popular 
Mechanics only claim to counterclaim “9/11 conspiracy theorists,” not the movement), 
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and this should be kept in mind considering the vast amount of esteem or regard given 
to the book. 
  In an interview for The History Channel’s documentary, “The 9/11 Conspiracies:  
Fact or Fiction,” which is “[b]ased in large part on a breakthrough exposé by Popular 
Mechanics” [sic] (History.com 2014:n.a.), Michael Shermer, whose 2011 book, The 
Believing Brain, treats “9/11 truthers…as a case study in how to test the validity of a 
conspiracy theory” (2011:211), stated the following about Popular Mechanics’ (2006) 
methods of analysis:   
I think what Popular Mechanics did with the 9/11 conspiracy theory was just 
about one of the best things ever done in the history of skepticism.  That is exactly 
how it should be done because that’s the level at which these people are dealing 
with, the little factoids.  Here’s the claim, here’s the answer, here’s the claim, 
here’s the answer.  By the end, they got nothing to stand on:  Boom, end of story.  
[emphasis in original] (costell123 2013: 12:38-12:57) 
In fact, Shermer (2011) appreciated Popular Mechanics’ (2006) approach so much that he 
emulated the style by positioning the “9/11 truthers’” claims against rebuttals from 
demolition professionals’.  As another example of regard for this work, in a segment 
titled, “Crackpot conspiracy theories enjoy mainstreaming by right,” Rachel Maddow 
(2013), holding up a copy of Popular Mechanics’ (2006) book and a copy of The 9/11 
Report:  A Graphic Adaptation (Jacobson & Colón 2006), said that Debunking 9/11 Myths is 
one of the “two of the best things ever published about the 9/11 attacks.”  Along with 
the many citations to it as the authoritative account of why “9/11 conspiracy theorists” 
are wrong, it is safe to say that Debunking 9/11 Myths is considered by anti-conspiracists 




In describing their approach to evaluating the claims of “9/11 conspiracy 
theorists,” the editors of Debunking 9/11 Myths, David Dunbar and Brad Reagan, state in 
the book’s introduction that “[t]he magazine assembled a team of reporters and 
researchers and methodically began to analyze the most common factual claims made by 
conspiracy theorists—assertions that are at the root of the majority of 9/11 alternative 
scenarios” [emphasis mine] (2011:xxi).  In fact, there is no evidence in either version of 
Popular Mechanics’ (2006, 2011) book that scientific methods were used to gather claims 
from the 911TM or others who offer alternative theories about what occurred on 
September 11, 2001.  Their citations of the web addresses from which they pull quotes 
they paint as representative claims only lead to the homepages of websites, some of 
which are clearly not dedicated to skepticism toward the official narrative of “9/11.”  
This text is promoted and endorsed as an example of science, but it can be more 
accurately described as one of many texts with the discursive field of anti-conspiracy 
discourse. 
For example, here is a reproduction of one way the team at Popular Mechanics 
represents a “claim” by “conspiracists” about WTC 7: 
CLAIM: The collapse of the buildings left an estimated 1.8 million tons of 
concrete, steel, and other debris at the World Trade Center site.  Much of it was 
cleared quickly, however, and the minimal amount of wreckage of WTC 7 
available for later investigation has generated speculation.  Some conspiracists 
point to the fast removal of debris as evidence of a government cover-up.  “The 
columns were in pieces big enough to ship in a dump truck, which is what 
happened,” writes one truther at www.debate.org.  “The WTC wreckage was 
shipped overseas to china [sic] before any experts could even examine.  Would 
experts not want to analyze the three biggest structural failures in the history of 
the world?”  (Popular Mechanics 2011:85)       
It is unclear why one anonymous “truther” from a website not directly related to 9/11 
skepticism should serve as a model statement for those who contest the official narrative 
of “9/11.”  Moreover, using the conspiracy label, in this case in the form of 
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“conspiracists,” likely biases readers in disfavor of these claims, which is a further 
indication of the disingenuous way Popular Mechanics (2006, 2011) addresses the claims 
of the 911TM.  If Popular Mechanics’ (2006, 2011) audiences are not familiar enough with 
the breadth and depth of existing research that challenges the dominant narrative of 
“9/11” with empirical facts, or if such research is considered illegitimate or 
untrustworthy due to anti-conspiracy discourse, then Popular Mechanics (2006, 2011) can 
be said to be anti-scientific since they engage in agnotological (Proctor 2008) or 
consciousness lowering activities (Schnaiberg 1994) via recourse to the conspiracy label 
and for other methodologically lacking features of their work. 
 9/11 Debunkers Debunk 9/11 Debunking  
In the introduction to Debunking 9/11 Myths, authored by David Dunbar and 
Brad Reagan, no methodology is described for how the magazine’s “team of reporters 
and researchers…methodically began to analyze the most common factual claims made 
by conspiracy theorists—assertions that are at the root of the majority of 9/11 alternative 
scenarios” (2006:xix), nor is this methodology discussed anywhere else in either of the 
book’s editions.  They state that the book is not designed to retell what happened on 
September 11, 2001, but instead their “book aims only to answer the questions raised by 
conspiracy theorists themselves” [italicized in original, emphasis mine] (Dunbar & Reagan 
2006:xx).  The 1st edition is divided into four chapters with twenty claims, and the 2nd 
edition contains five chapters with twenty five claims; “World Trade Center Building 7” 
is the additional chapter in the second addition, whereas in the first addition it was only 
treated as one claim, “WTC 7:  Fire and Debris Damage.”  Although there is no 
methodological justification presented for why the phrasing of this claim should be 
considered representative of how “9/11 conspiracy theorists” claim the collapse of WTC 
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7 is indicative of a conspiracy, most members of the 911TM believe that WTC 7 is a 
“smoking gun of 9/11,” but only some of my data reported above confirm that some 
members of the 911TM are suspicious of the building’s tenets. 
  Popular Mechanics (2006) formulate their responses to each “CLAIM” with a 
“FACT,” and the basis of the “FACT” they use to respond to the “CLAIM” about WTC 7 
is a draft version of the NIST (2008) report that Griffin (2010a) refutes.  In their first 
edition, Popular Mechanics relies on Shyam Sunder, “acting deputy director, lead 
investigator, Building and Fire Research Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST)” (2006:112), for much of their analysis of why WTC 7 collapsed.  In 
closing their CLAIM, Popular Mechanics notes that “there were a number of fuel tanks 
located throughout the building that may have supplied fuel to the fires for up to seven 
hours,” that “the tanks ultimately contributed to the building’s demise,” and that “it 
appears the fires worked in conjunction with the damage from debris to weaken the 
building’s structure, but NIST has not yet determined whether one or the other was the 
primary instigator to the collapse [of WTC 7]” (2006:56).  In a lengthy list of frequently 
asked questions about the collapse of WTC 7, NIST would later state that ‘fires being fed 
from fuel oil systems in WTC 7’ “could not have been sustained long enough, could not 
have generated sufficient heat to weaken critical interior columns, and/or would have 
produced large amounts of visible smoke from the lower floors, which were not 
observed” (2011:n.p.).   
  Here is how Popular Mechanics’ 2nd edition of Debunking 9/11 Myths treats the 
collapse of WTC 7, as well as NIST’s and Griffin’s explanations: 
NIST’s final analysis, of course, differs from what the agency first suggested to 
Popular Mechanics in 2004.  Two years earlier, FEMA first hypothesized in its 
World Trade Center Building Performance Study that WTC 7 collapsed almost 
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exclusively due to the fires; the conspiracy movement seized on this assertion, 
noting that there were no other examples of large fire-protected steel buildings 
collapsing because of fire alone.  When NIST’s final report agreed that, “This was 
the first known instance of the total collapse of a tall building primarily due to 
fires,” conspiracists pounced again.  At www.globalresearch.ca, David Ray 
Griffin wrote, “If NIST did engage in fraudulent science, this would not be 
particularly surprising.  NIST is an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce.  
During the years it was writing its World Trade Center reports, therefore, it was 
an agency of the Bush-Cheney administration.”   
Sunder prefers to focus on the evidence gathered by an investigative 
team that included 13 NIST investigators, 59 technical staffers, 15 special experts 
and consultants, contractors from the private sector, and a 10-person advisory 
committee of college professors, independent architects, and directors of energy 
and hazards research centers who provided technical advice.  “The public should 
really recognize the science is really behind what we have said,” Sunder 
concluded.  “The obvious stares you in the face.”   (2011:71) 
The second edition of Debunking 9/11 Myths was published a year after Griffin’s (2010a) 
book, The Mysterious Collapse of World Trade Center 7, which is almost entirely dedicated 
to the NIST (2008) report on the collapses of WTC Buildings 1, 2 and 7.  Popular 
Mechanics’ (2011) index shows that Griffin is cited on pages x, xi-xii, xiv, 22, 35-36, 44 
(Griffin is actually referenced on page 42, he is not mentioned on page 44), and page 
7122.  Comparatively, Griffin is indexed on pages 22 and 35-36 in the 1st edition, which in 
both instances include citations to his 2004 book, A New Pearl Harbor.  In Popular 
Mechanics second edition of Debunking 9/11 Myths, with an entire chapter that “includes 
new findings on World Trade Center Building 7” (2011:front cover), Griffin’s (2010a) 
work that challenges NIST’s (2008) report goes unmentioned and, therefore, unrefuted.  
Instead, they focused on Griffin’s ([2009] 2013) Internet article, using it as an exemplar of 
“conspiracists [who] pounced again” when NIST final report recanted initial conclusions 
about WTC 7’s collapse; and even then they pluck a quote out of context. 
  While they never mention Griffin’s (2010a) book, his 2007a book, Debunking 9/11 
Debunking, is cited in the 2nd edition of Debunking 9/11 Myths, but just once.  James Meigs 
(2006, 2011), editor-in-chief of Popular Mechanics, authored the Afterword of each 
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edition, which goes unchanged in the 2nd edition, and, taking Sen. John McCain’s (2006) 
place, he authored the Forward of the 2nd edition.  Therefore, I will reference Meigs 
solely in reference to these sections of the books.  In the opening sentences of his 
Forward, Meigs discusses the “flood of criticisms and accusations from those supporting 
[inside job] theories” (2011:ix) about Popular Mechanics’ 2005 magazine article, “9/11:  
Debunking the Myths” (Chertoff 2005), and reproduced here in full context is what 
Meigs (2011) has to say about Griffin and his work: 
A team of Popular Mechanics reporters and editors then started work on a far 
more detailed book-length version of the report.  By the time the first edition of 
this book was published in the summer of 2006, the 9/11 conspiracy furor was 
reaching a tipping point.  The flurry of books on the topic had grown into an 
avalanche, with certain writers, such as former Claremont School of Theology 
professor David Ray Griffin, building a thriving cottage industry around the 
topic.  Conspiracy fans had, with Orwellian overtones, taken to calling 
themselves “the 9/11 Truth Movement,” or simply “truthers.”  (p. x) 
…[some text omitted] 
Popular Mechanics’ 9/11 project represented one of the relatively few 
attempts by mainstream journalists to grapple seriously with the conspiracy 
theory claims.  So it was telling that most conspiracy theorists—who are eager to 
repeat any shred of mainstream reporting they believe bolsters their claims—
quickly decided that Popular Mechanics too was part of the conspiracy.  In their 
minds, all our research could therefore be rejected a priori.  We had run head on 
into a worldview that some experts call “conspiracism.”  It is a mindset that 
insists on reaching a predetermined conclusion regardless of what information is 
presented.  Any facts that don’t fit the conspiracy paradigm need to be exp lained 
away.  Since 2004, leading 9/11 theorist David Ray Griffin has written seven 
books and edited two others on the subject of 9/11.  He devoted a chapter in his 
book, Debunking 9/11 Debunking:  An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other 
Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory, to explain why, in his view, the 9/11 
reporting by Popular Mechanics and other mainstream journalists is invalid. 
 Griffin’s book devotes many pages to the idea that Popular Mechanics and 
our parent company, the Hearst Corporation, are somehow implicated in the 
vast conspiracy he sees behind 9/11.  He digs up centuries old controversies and 
finds tenuous links between the magazine’s staff and various government 
officials.  But he never explains how a magazine—much less a major 
corporation—could possibly convince its employees to help cover up the most 
notorious mass murder in our nation’s history.  Popular Mechanics has close to 30 
editorial staffers and dozens of freelance contributors.  Does Griffin imagine that 
whenever we hire new editors I bring them into a secret bunker and initiate them 
into an ultraclandestine society for world domination?  Why wouldn’t such 
prospective employees run screaming from our building?  In the years since we 
began our work on 9/11 conspiracy theories, a number of our staffers have 
moved on to other jobs.  What would stop them from revealing a conspiracy that, 
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if true, would be one of the biggest journalistic scoops in history?  Did we swear 
them all to secrecy?  As with so many conspiracy claims, the whole elaborate 
fantasy becomes practically laughable on close examination. 
 On the one hand, it’s understandable that many journalists saw these 
overheated theories as being too marginal to take seriously.  But on the other, it is 
unfortunate that so few media outlets bothered to address the many clearly 
erroneous claims of the conspiracy set.  Their reluctance to enter the fray gave 
conspiracy theorists access to uncontested ground.  As this book documents, 
many conspiracy claims rely on snippets of material from mainstream media 
outlets.  As a rule, these snippets have been quoted wildly out of context or 
reflect minor errors…. [italicized in original] (p. xi-xii) 
To note, I stopped the last sentence above in order to take it out of context.  The rest of 
the sentence is “in initial reports that were later superseded by more accurate reporting” 
(Meigs 2011:xii).   
  We will take notice of several things in the two passages reproduced above.  
First, there are no citations or references other than to Popular Mechanics’, FEMA’s, 
NIST’s, and Griffin’s works (this is not true of the Foreword in general, but we are only 
discussing here Popular Mechanics’ treatment of Griffin).  This shows that Meigs (2011) is 
aware of the contention between Popular Mechanics’ (2006) work (and its reliance upon 
official sources) and Griffin’s (2007a).  Meigs presents Griffin as an adherent to the 
worldview of “conspiracism,” as a leading “9/11 theorist” (as if “theorist” is a itself 
pejorative term), as a producer of “overheated theories,” and as a “former Claremont 
School of Theology professor” (i.e., not an expert in anything but theology).  Mixing 
these types of descriptions of Griffin is a common tactic among countermovement 
antagonists (e.g., see Aaronovitch 2010; Byford 2011; Kay 2011).  If all “9/11 theories” 
are “overheated,” and if they develop from “a worldview that some experts call 
‘conspiracism’,” then Meigs might be correct when he claims that along “with so many 
conspiracy claims, the whole elaborate fantasy becomes practically laughable on close 
examination.”  As discussed, though, Popular Mechanics’ (2006, 2011) “close 
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examination” uses only selective sources and quotes to frame for their audience the 
perspective of 9/11 Truth through the lenses of 9/11 Deniers.   
The problem with this is that Meigs has fallen into his own trap:  He defines a 
hypothetical situation in which he suggests Griffin has an unwarranted conspiracy 
theory (Keeley 2006) about the relation between the Hearst Corporation, Popular 
Mechanics, and Meigs himself.  However, upon combing through Griffin’s (2007a) book, 
Debunking 9/11 Debunking—and, this was not easy to find because Meigs offers no page 
citations—there is no record, or few explicit indications, of Griffin (2007a) suggesting 
that Meigs personally engages in the type of conspiratorial professional socialization 
that Meigs is so keen to suggest would be the key way that Popular Mechanics would 
“initiate [new hires] into an ultraclandestine society for world domination.”  This is 
known as the straw man fallacy, a rhetorical move where one purposefully 
misrepresents their opponents’ argument so as to easily knock it down.  Like Peter 
Philips and Mickey Huff’s (2010) critique of Chip Berlet’s (2009) anticonspiracist work, 
which Meigs (2006) cites as an authoritative source on conspiracism, Meigs (2006) uses 
many of the same tactics to discredit the 911TM that he proposes they use in 
constructing their claims.  In line with this, by posing such questions that Griffin (2007a) 
actually does not ask, maybe it does ‘take one to know one’ (Douglas and Sutton 2011).   
  If we could take the last statement from the extended passage above to mean that 
Meigs (2011) does not endorse the use of taking “snippets of material” that are “quoted 
wildly out of context,” then we might turn the question to why, instead of devoting a 
line by line criticism of Griffin’s (2007a) response to Popular Mechanics, Meigs instead 
conjures a hypothetical conspiracy theory imputed to Griffin.  In line with this, and as 
can be seen in the passage above (6.5), Popular Mechanics (2011) quotes a line from 
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Griffin’s ([2009] 2013) article that has almost nothing to do with the article’s topic, which 
is about the collapse of Building 7 and NIST’s (2008) report on it.  Griffin’s ([2009] 2013) 
article cited by Popular Mechanics (2011) is not easy to find because they do not cite its 
title specifically, and, like the vast majority of websites they cite, they only include a 
URL to the homepage of the website on which Griffin’s ([2009] 2013) article is published, 
but after plugging their quote into GlobalResearch.ca’s search engine, I produced 
Griffin’s (2013) article, “9/11 Truth:  The Mysterious Collapse of WTC Seven.”   
  Had Popular Mechanics (2011) not taken Griffin’s ([2009] 2013) statements out of 
context, they might have presented the following: 
With regard to the question of science: Far from being supported by good 
science, NIST’s report repeatedly makes its case by resorting to scientific fraud. 
Before going into details, let me point out that, if NIST did engage in fraudulent 
science, this would not be particularly surprising. NIST is an agency of the US 
Department of Commerce. During the years it was writing its World Trade 
Center reports, therefore, it was an agency of the Bush-Cheney administration.  
In 2004, the Union of Concerned Scientists put out a document charging this 
administration with “distortion of scientific knowledge for partisan political 
ends.” By the end of the Bush administration, this document had been signed by 
over 15,000 scientists, including 52 Nobel Laureates and 63 recipients of the 
National Medal of Science. 
We can see with this extended quotation that Griffin (2013) was saying that because 
NIST was functioning as an agency of the Bush-Cheney administration, and that because 
this administration had been indicted for its distortion of scientific knowledge (e.g.,  the 
Bush-Cheney administration is well known for their anti-science approach to climate 
change McCright & Dunlap 2010, 2011), that, by association, NIST should be suspect of 
engaging in scientific fraud in the first place.  This is to say, NIST’s legitimacy should be 
called into question.  In this way, Popular Mechanics (2011) do the very thing that Meigs 
(2011), in his remarks in the Foreword and Afterword of the 2nd edition of the book, 
holds in such abhorrence when made by “conspiracy theorists.”  If Popular Mechanics 
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(2011) are so concerned with approaching their debunking efforts from the scientific 
perspective, then why would they not be concerned with the claims of the Union of 
Concerned Scientists as Griffin ([2009] 2013) was discussing when he made the 
statement that they (mis)quoted?  This is not meant to be a question left unanswered 
intentionally, but I do not have adequate data to say specifically what their intentions 
were, and to impute intention or motive is beyond the scope of the task at hand, which is 
providing examples of contentious claims and counterframes within the discursive field 
of the 911TM. 
 Exemplary Use of the Conspiracy Label 
  Popular Mechanics (2006, 2011) and its contributors (Dunbar & Reagan 2006, 2011; 
Meigs 2006, 2011) can be said to have intentionally set out to malign the collective 
character of the 911TM (or “9/11 conspiracy theorists”).  Both editions, including the 
Forwords (McCain 2006; Meigs 2011), Introductions (Dunbar & Reagan 2006, 2011), 
bodies (Popular Mechanics 2006, 2011), and Afterwords (Meigs 2006, 2011) are replete 
with the conspiracy label.  It is used to characterize individuals in terms of a collectivist 
identification of a social imaginary that is unworthy of serious attention.  Debunking 9/11 
Myths is presented as a “serious investigation” of the claims “9/11 conspiracy theorists,” 
but it does not employ scientific standards used by sociologists and other social 
scientists when divulging the quotes they represent as “claims” and “facts.”  Griffin’s 
(2007a) criticisms of the first edition are not squarely rebutted in the second edition, and 
Griffin’s (2010a) deconstruction of NIST’s (2008) is left unattended and, therefore, 
simultaneously silenced yet unrefuted.  Popular Mechanics (2006, 2011) is hailed by the 
911TM’s countermovement antagonists as an authoritative account of how and why 
“9/11 conspiracy theorists” are wrong, yet this text itself is an example of how anti-
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conspiracy discourse utilizes rhetorical strategies to discredit the 911TM while not 
engaging in sound, rigorous, or ethical practices. 
  As a final example of a direct interaction between the 911TM and its 
countermovement antagonists, we can turn to a debate hosted by Amy Goodman of 
Democracy Now! (2006).  On September 11, 2006, the filmmakers of Loose Change, Dylan 
Avery and Jason Bermas, sat down with David Dunbar and James Meigs, editors of 
Popular Mechanics (2011) book, Debunking 9/11 Myths, with Goodman taking up 
moderator duties23.  The term, “conspiracy,” is employed several times throughout the 
debate, and it exclusively originates from the Popular Mechanics editors (one exception is 
Goodman’s utterance of the subtitle, Why Conspiracy Theories Can’t Stand Up to the Facts).  
As a clear indication of the 911TM’s recognition of how the conspiracy label functions, 
we can look to one section of the debate that is about the film’s questions of “what could 
blow a 16-foot hole on the outer ring of the Pentagon, smash through three rings, nine 
feet of steel-reinforced concrete and leave another 16-foot hole? A 757? Or a cruise 
missile?”  Reproduced here, verbatim and in full, is the relevant excerpt from Democracy 
Now!’s (2006) transcript: 
AMY GOODMAN: An excerpt of Loose Change. David Dunbar, executive editor 
of Popular Mechanics, your response? 
DAVID DUNBAR: We just looked at the physical evidence, and when the 
filmmakers can present some evidence of a cruise missile striking the Pentagon, 
we’ll be happy to look at it and evaluate it and talk to our experts. Just rolling the 
tape back a bit, the angle that the film shows of the facade of the Pentagon before 
it collapsed is a misleading picture. That gash in the E-ring was about 90 feet 
across. 
DYLAN AVERY: No, no it was not. 
DAVID DUNBAR: The wingspan of the plane was about 124 and change—not 
loose change, but that punched the hole into the building. And then the landing 
gear was more dense and heavier and continued on through a forest of columns 
to smash that exit ring. So when you see that nice round hole, that’s the exit ring 
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in — that’s the exit hole in the C-ring punched by the landing gear. And Purdue 
University did a massive computer reenactment of the crash and the aftermath, 
and they worked with the American Society of Civil Engineers to preparation of 
their report, and it’s conclusive that the plane did strike the Pentagon. 
AMY GOODMAN: Dylan Avery. 
DYLAN AVERY: The initial impact on the Pentagon was no more than 20 feet 
wide, and if you are telling me that initial round impact hole in the facade of the 
Pentagon is 90 feet, then you’re telling me that the two windows above it are 30 
feet across. 
DAVID DUNBAR: And incidentally, about the windows, I’m glad you 
mentioned that. Those were recently replaced in the Pentagon as part of a whole 
renovation program designed specifically to be blast resistant after the 
explosions at the American embassies in East Africa. 
DYLAN AVERY: I find it very convenient that Hani Hanjour decided to choose 
that one particular section of the Pentagon to hit, when he could have just dove 
straight, right into the front door. 
DAVID DUNBAR: In the world of paranoid conspiracy theories — 
DYLAN AVERY: You’re not addressing the evidence. 
DAVID DUNBAR: —there are no coincidences. 
DYLAN AVERY: You’re not addressing the evidence. 
JASON BERMAS: I would just like to say this. 
AMY GOODMAN: Jason Bermas. 
JASON BERMAS: The first official version was this thing bounced off the lawn 
and hit it, and it would appear that it would have to, because it’s such a low-level 
hit. Okay, it didn’t bounce off the lawn, because there’s no scratches on the lawn. 
On top of that, we actually interviewed the first person on the scene before the 
collapse, and he was on the lawn taking video of it for twelve minutes. His name 
is Bob Pugh, and it is no more than a 16- to 20-foot hole. And we actually have 
one of the survivors who crawled out of that hole and said she saw no plane 
debris. Her name is April Gallup. Explain to me how a woman can come through 
a hole where a 757 has just impacted the building. 
AMY GOODMAN: Ten seconds, Jim Meigs. 
JAMES MEIGS: Yes. We didn’t fact check every detail of Loose Change, but what 
we did do was look at the broad cross-section of conspiracy theories. There are 
photographs of the plane in the building of wreckage wrapped around 
reinforced concrete columns, and there is a map of the path of destruction that 
plane tore through that area. 
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The claims and counterclaims take the form of an assertion that a statement is factual 
with a rebuttal that, “no, no it [is] not.”  The conspiracy label is used in place of an 
argument against proffered assertions, and Meigs states that a “broad cross-section of 
conspiracy theories” were looked at instead of evaluating the truth-value of details in 
the arguments from the 911TM.  The debate continues in this fashion. 
    The final section of the debate reveals an important pattern in the interactions 
between members of the 911TM and their countermovement antagonists.  Goodman 
uses the final minutes of the show to focus attention on the question of the collapse of 
WTC 7, and that section of the transcript is reproduced here, verbatim and in full: 
AMY GOODMAN: Now, we only have a few minutes, and I want to get to 
Building Seven. Dylan Avery what is your thesis of what happened to Building 
Seven? 
DYLAN AVERY: Sure. Well, basically, which is — this is one thing that a lot of 
people don’t know about September 11th, myself included, until I started doing 
the research. At 5:20 p.m. on September 11th, World Trade Center Building 
Seven — it was a 47-story steel-frame skyscraper 300 feet to the north of the 
North Tower — at 5:20 p.m. this building collapses in under seven seconds 
completely into its own footprint into a debris pile about six or seven stories 
high. Now, it wasn’t hit by a plane. It was hit by debris from the North Tower 
when it fell. But, if you look at all the buildings surrounding the World Trade 
Center, and if you actually look at Building Five, which is right underneath both 
the Twin Towers, that building is engulfed in flames for hours after Building 
Seven even collapses. 
So, we have all the buildings surrounding the Twin Towers heavily engulfed 
with debris, some engulfed in flames. We have World Trade Center Building 
Seven, which has isolated fires on floor seven and twelve. It has smoke coming 
from its south face, and these guys claim that 25% of the building was scooped 
out. Even if 25% of the bottom of the building was scooped out, that still does not 
account for the building falling in perfect freefall into — 
AMY GOODMAN: And your thesis about what happened? What do you 
believe? 
DYLAN AVERY: It would have had to have been a controlled demolition. That’s 
the only way to prove — that’s the only way to explain what we saw with our 
own eyes, and any attempts to discredit that are just not scientifically sound. 
JAMES MEIGS: You know, this is a wonderful example of how conspiracy 
theories work. Any time there’s a little bit of doubt, a little bit of area where we 
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don’t know everything, then the answer immediately is, well, someone must 
have blown it up. It’s a form of argumentation that’s also used by Creationists. If 
they can find one little gap in the evolutionary record, they say evolution’s a 
hoax. Or Holocaust deniers — 
DYLAN AVERY: Mr. Meigs, with all due respect, these are two completely 
different things. 
JAMES MEIGS: Holocaust denial works with very similar logic— 
DYLAN AVERY: Oh, my God! 
JASON BERMAS: Oh, man! 
JAMES MEIGS: And, but what we see here is — one of our sources was Vincent 
Dunn, the retired deputy fire chief for the New York City Fire Department, who 
wrote the textbook, The Collapse of Burning Buildings. And what he explained is 
that the building was extremely unconventional. It had this giant Con Ed 
substation with enormous trusses carrying extraordinarily high loads, very 
vulnerable to fire and other kinds of damage. It was not a conventional 
skyscraper by a long shot. Those fires burned unfought for seven hours, fed by 
diesel tanks that were in the building to fuel backup generators. And when those 
trusses ultimately failed, the building did collapse in its own footprint. That’s 
what happens when a building’s internal supports fail. 
AMY GOODMAN: We only have about one minute and we have to divide it. 
Can you respond to that point and make your larger point? 
JASON BERMAS: Please let me respond to that. 
DYLAN AVERY: Go ahead, Bermas. 
JASON BERMAS: On top of everything he said, that’s where everybody rushed 
to for the local government, okay? We have somebody who was on the 23rd 
floor, okay, working with the local government, being escorted by fire fighters. 
He gets down to the eighth floor, “huge explosion in Building Seven.” “Bomb 
goes off.” Okay, this is his words, not mine:  "Why are there explosives in 
Building Seven." On top of that, there have been five different reasons why it fell. 
They’re trying to say generators, there was a big fuel tank, there’s a 20-story 
thing scooped out of the building, all of which is false, because they don’t know. 
DYLAN AVERY: They keep changing their explanations for why the building 
fell. 
JASON BERMAS: And I would say this, the 9/11 Commission Report actually 
has the nerve in a footnote to say that it collapsed in 18 seconds. Look for 
yourself and time it. It’s no more than 7 seconds. 
AMY GOODMAN: And who do you believe blew up Building Seven? 
DYLAN AVERY: We don’t want to try to implicate anybody. We’re just trying to 
tell people to go out and research for themselves. But, I mean, you have to ask 
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yourself, who could have possibly placed explosives inside Word Trade Center 
Building Seven, secretly without anyone noticing, and especially the Twin 
Towers? 
JASON BERMAS: Especially because the CIA, the DOD, the Secret Service are 
all located there. 
DYLAN AVERY: Yeah, I mean, that building was a government hotspot. 
AMY GOODMAN: Ten seconds, Jim Meigs. 
JAMES MEIGS: You know, conspiracies have a way of constantly expanding. 
You just listed a whole range of government agencies. Apparently the fire 
fighters we talked to, we at Popular Mechanics, other journalists, our friend David 
Corn at The Nation is accused of being part of this massive cover-up. The fact is, 
there are always little details that don’t always add up until you finish your 
research. 
DYLAN AVERY: Mr. Meigs, you’re still not addressing the evidence. 
JAMES MEIGS: But when you really dig down, every single one of these has a 
clear explanation. And if there’s areas that don’t, let’s continue to dig. We should 
be skeptical. We should ask questions. By all means, we fully support the effort 
to get to the bottom of any remaining questions. 
AMY GOODMAN: We’re going to have to leave it there. David Dunbar and Jim 
Meigs of Popular Mechanics, and Jason Bermas and Dylan Avery of Loose Change, I 
want to thank you all for being with us. 
Instead of focusing his response on Avery’s and Bermas’s empirical claims, Meigs 
instead dons the hat of an expert in the social psychology of conspiracy theories, 
supplanting attention to the empirical claims with the argument that Creationists and 
Holocaust deniers use similar tactics in their argumentation styles as Avery and Bermas 
were using.  This was flatly denied by Avery and Bermas, and this is where Meigs 
makes an appeal to the authority of “the retired deputy fire chief for the New York City 
Fire Department” before moving to an argument now discredited by NIST (2011) and 
abandoned by Popular Mechanics (2011), that office fires fed by diesel fuel tanks led the 
building to fall into its own footprint.  In his final issuance of the conspiracy label, this 
time using the term “conspiracies” to mean “conspiracy theories,” Meigs constructs a 
straw person argument by promoting the idea that Avery and Bermas believe he, 
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Popular Mechanics, firefighters they interviewed, and others are “part of this massive 
cover-up.”  As Avery stated, Meigs was “still not addressing the evidence.”  
 Conclusion:  Reflecting on 9/11 Truth 
  I opened this chapter with a statement by a frequently active member of the 
911TM Facebook group, Arlyntha J. Love (a.k.a. Lyrantha Jen L), and this comment 
latter turned into a question for the entire group:  “What happens next?”  This question, 
considered by Ken Doc to be among the hardest to answer, is premised on the 
assumption that “9/11 was an inside job,” which movement members arrive at through 
such revelations as the collapse of WTC 7.  Replying to this question, Sooty Mangabey 
promoted the ReThink911 campaign, just as he had promoted it several times in posts 
and other comments to the group:  “ReThink911 - if they get the proper funding it'll be a 
HUGE step forward for the truth movment- the biggest to date. So if you haven't 
donated, please do NOW! And share on your FB wall as well. Thanks!” [sic]  After 
spreading awareness about such issues as the collapse of WTC 7, or even after achieving 
widespread knowledge of it through the ReThink911 campaign, Ms. Love and others in 
the movement wonder what will become of society once people realize that elites and 
central institutions are sometimes at the center of heinous crimes.  In the presentation of 
discourse among the Truthers and Deniers of 9/11 in this chapter, I have at several 
instances allowed the 911TM’s many voices to be heard in relation to what their 
opposition say about the movement.  Several times during my interviews and 
participant observations, I was asked about my own beliefs about “9/11,” and these can 
be most succinctly shown in my responses to when Ms. Love and Mr. Mangabey both 
queried back to me with regard to my intentions for my studies with the 911TM.    
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  What follows are key responses to my July 18 th, 2013, post to the 911TM 
Facebook group where I requested statements about what woke them up to 9/11 Truth 
and what its members would like to be made known to the public through my work: 
Ryan Rabalais:  It was obvious when the towers collapsed. The problem was that 
the media was telling us that we weren't seeing what we were seeing. 
July 19, 2013 at 12:54am · Unlike · 2 
Sooty Mangabey:  Alright then Richard- I'll take the bait buuuut-!I searched your 
posts, I saw the Scholars for 9/11 truth banner on your homepage [see Figure 
13]- but that doesn't really assuage my assumptions (wow alliteration anyone?) ? 
PHD and thesis aside- These are 3,000 people that were murdered by our own 
government on 9/11. After that over 1,000,000 people (at least) have died in the 
name of it. Do YOU think we've been lied to? Or are we some side-show that you 
choose to write about because it's amusing or a 'phenomenon' that needs 
recording. Get on the record here and tell us what you think happened- thanks! 
July 19, 2013 at 1:34am · Edited · Like · 1 
Lyrantha Jen L:  What is the topic of this dissertation you're writing and how 
exactly do you plan to represent us and our views in this supposed paper? I 
notice all the social scientists who come here soliciting perspectives never 
actually tell us anything about who they are, what they believe, and what the 
topic and main thesis of their work is. And then we don't even get a follow-up. 
July 19, 2013 at 1:44am · Edited · Like 
Lyrantha Jen L:  I don't care about people learning what we're about, it's just 
poor character to mislead in order to get that information when we're so willing 
to discuss it with just about anyone anyway. 




Richard G Ellefritz:  Thanks, all. 
In response to Sooty Mangabey: 
I personally believe that 9/11 was a false flag, domestic terror operation carried 
out by professionals and experts with the capability to rig three buildings with 
explosives, fly two airplanes into the twin towers, give stand down and shoot 
down orders for flights 77 and 93, respectively (I am open to the possibility of a 
missile or other, non-plane object hitting the Pentagon). This network of people 
had the power and influence to use mass media to influence most people to 
believe that Osama bin Laden planned and coordinated the attacks from caves in 
Afghanistan (and erase WTC 7 from public memory); the 9/11 Commission 
Report was fraudulent, as were the FEMA and NIST reports; and let us not forget 
the U.S. military grade anthrax mailed out in letters to U.S. officials shortly after 
Sept. 11. The loss of American lives that day calls for investigations and trials for 
the high crimes of mass murder and treason. The lies to the American people and 
subsequent wars of aggression, and the 1 million plus lives lost and decimated 
civilizations (and ongoing acts of aggression) in the Middle East, are among the 
most egregious offenses I am aware of in the history of the world (save, possibly, 
for the atomic bombs dropped in Japan, the Holocaust, the Cultural Revolution 
in China and other mass murders associated with communism, etc.). However, 
as 9/11 was the pretext for wars of aggression abroad and reductions of U.S. civil 
liberties, and because the official, predominantly known story is a  lie, knowing 
and spreading the truth about 9/11 is not only just and righteous in and of itself, 
it is a way to begin to mend and heal from the long train of abuses and 
usurpations to liberty and justice we have witnessed from this SCAD and others 
like it. 
With that said, no, the 9/11 Truth Movement is not a hobby, novelty, or just 
some random phenomenon I happened to be studying. Professionally, it is an 
investment for and risk to my career as a sociologist, but the movement is also 
deserving of having its own story told in a non-slanderous, non-partisan way 
that shows its depth, complexity, and potential to identify and solve public 
problems (e.g., corruption, conspiracy, and other state-corporate crimes). 
You can check out some of the videos I've posted on my page to see a 
presentation I've done on the movement, as well as my introduction for Richard 
Gage's film when he came through OKC on his tour for Explosive Evidence. I 
went to NYC, "ground zero" on Sept. 11, 2011 to interview members of the 
movement, and my participation on this group page is an extension of that 
project. I might go back this year, but as I have to pay for this out of my own 
pocket, because there is no funding for this type of research if I am unwilling to 
portray the movement as ineffectual and its members as mentally unstable, I will 
likely use the data I have already gathered. 
July 19, 2013 at 11:41am · Edited · Like 
Richard G Ellefritz:  In response to Lyrantha Jen L, whom I thank for your 
lengthy response that I will likely use in whole: 
The topic of my dissertation is the 9/11 Truth Movement. I had planned on 
writing about the sociology of conspiracy, but that topic is too broad for a 
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dissertation, and Lance deHaven-Smith's new book, Conspiracy Theory in America, 
pretty much addresses most of the issues with which I was concerned. 
I plan to represent the movement and its members as they are, in their own 
words, by their own actions, and in the context that SCADS and other state-
corporate crimes are regular occurrences throughout history. One way to do this 
is through participatory research: http://what-when-
how.com/sociology/participatory-research/ So, involve yourself to the extent 
you wish, and please follow up with me. 
I cannot yet say for certain what my final explanation is for the 9/11 Truth 
Movement, for one thing because of the ongoing participatory nature, but also 
because I am using the grounded approach 
http://www.groundedtheoryonline.com/what-is-grounded-theory I will say 
that people like Michael Shermer, Jonathan Kay, and others who misrepresent 
the movement and its members are in need of a substantiated rebuttal. 
July 19, 2013 at 11:34am · Like · 1  
Lyrantha Jen L:  Thanks for the explanation. I studied sociology as a minor in 
college so I can relate. I consider myself as an advocate for finding out what 
really happened that day since 2003. And right now it seems the movement 
reached a peak of awareness and being covered in media up until about 2009-10, 
and following the defeat of the Gallop suit in court, it seems that we lack 
direction in how exactly to get accountability. We really need to address this. 
July 19, 2013 at 12:05pm · Like · 1 
Sooty Mangabey:  ReThink911 is a fantastic place to drop a few hard-earned 
coins- that will be the most exposure 9/11 truth has received to date. Thousands 
of people will be donating their time to make sure the message is well-received. I 
encourage you and everyone here to donate! 
July 19, 2013 at 12:09pm · Like 
This series of exchanges indicates that members of the 911TM are sensitive to how the 
collective character of the movement is represented to the public, and it highlights my 
reflexivity vis-à-vis 9/11 Truth and sociology. 
  ReThink911 eventually did ‘get the proper funding,’ and posters and billboards 
were placed in 12 cities worldwide asking the public, “Did you know a 3rd tower fell on 
9/11?”  Dutifully promoting ReThink911’s campaign on several posts, Sooty suggested 
to Ms. Love that spreading awareness through the campaign should be the definitive 
goal of the 911TM at that time.  Ms. Love, though, replied as follows: 
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Sooty the question is what happens next. We have to address the future how it's 
going to be and what we can do to prepare for it since we have been unable to 
defeat it. People become aware, and then what? What comes after awareness? 
For now the goal is continuing to do that - raise awareness - but we have to 
convert the awareness that the system is not in our favor, into action. Are we 
showing it in how we treat ourselves and others? What we choose to eat? What 
we choose to consume from businesses? The curricula we teach our children? 
Are we going to choose to continue a life within a corrupt system whose failure 
is certain, or are we going to begin taking steps to gradually prepare to abandon 
it and pursue a different type of lifestyle elsewhere, be it the countryside or a 
different nation?  
July 19, 2013 at 12:37pm · Like · 3 
As pointed out by their countermovement antagonists, certainly the 911TM has 
questions, both for the public and for themselves, and while their countermovement 
antagonists view their investigation as a symptom of errant thinking and a pathological 
social psychology, movement members continue to attempt to raise awareness through 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Fifty-one years ago, Peter Berger (1963) published Invitation to Sociology, which is 
a book that introduces readers to many of the fundamental assumptions and practices 
sociologists use in the endeavor to understand society, social behavior, and ways of 
knowing the social world.  Although not without due criticisms, Berger offers many 
insights that have inspired generations of sociologists (Christiano 1990; Persell 1990), 
among them being his constant refrain that there is an inherent debunking quality in 
sociological studies.  Of the book’s many insightful adages, one particularly relevant 
statement is that it is the sociologist who “rejects the pretense that thought occurs in 
isolation from the social context within which particular men [and women] think about 
particular things” (1963:111).  When thinking about “9/11,” the events of September 11, 
and the people who and ideas and facts that challenge the official story of how and why 
the attacks occurred, several social forces are in operation when people either adhere to 
a belief that everything is as it has been made to seem or come to know that so-called 
“9/11 conspiracy theorists” have been socially constructed as a “conspiracist 
phenomenon” (Kay 2011:183).  Anti-conspiracy discourse, produced by a plethora of 
social actors representing myriad institutional orders, encourages and facilitates 
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skepticism of claims that “9/11 was an inside job,” and it is this social force that limits 
the capacity for rational and empirically based discourse about the 911TM and its 
claims. 
As demonstrated in this dissertation and other analyses of anti-conspiracy 
discourse (Aistrope 2013; Asadi 2010; deHaven-Smith 2013; Goshorn 2000; Husting & 
Orr 2007; Pelkmans & Machold 2011; Truscello 2011), many of the 911TM’s members 
and countermovement antagonists recognize and openly discuss and debate the 
function of the conspiracy label.  That the conspiracy label is used to discredit and 
defame the collective character of the 911TM and others who question the official story 
of “9/11,” might seem obvious at first thought.  However, it is this obviousness that 
sociologists must look through in order to uncover undergirding social forces that might 
influence how we think about such things as radical social movements and catastrophic 
events in history.  Once again, Berger’s (1963) wisdom is instructive: 
The sociologist moves in the common world of men [and women], close to what 
most of them would call real.  The categories [the sociologist] employs in his [or 
her] analyses are only refinements of the categories by which other men [and 
women] live—power, class, status, race, ethnicity.  As a result, there is a 
deceptive simplicity and obviousness about some sociological investigations.  
One reads them, nods at the familiar scene, remarks that one has heard all this 
before and don’t people have better things to do than to waste their time on 
truisms—until one is suddenly brought up against an insight that radically 
questions everything one had previously assumed about this familiar scene.  This 
is the point at which one begins to sense the excitement of sociology.  (1963:23). 
As a socially constructed category that constitutes subjects as “conspiracy theorists” and 
their beliefs and claims as “conspiracy theories,” the conspiracy label has become 
common parlance to ridicule, stigmatize, and silence interlocutors for crossing symbolic 
boundaries of permissible discourse.  In sociological studies, “the excitement of finding 
the familiar becoming transformed in its meaning” leads to a fresh perspectives that 
make “us see in a new light the very world in which we have lived all our lives” (Berger 
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1963:21).  The conspiracy label is one such familiar category in need of critical 
sociological attention and rethinking in the way it is typically used. 
For many members of the 911TM, the recognition of the problematic nature of 
the collapse of Building 7 led them to radically question their given reality.  Like many 
others in the movement, I believe this fact should radically challenge the beliefs of those 
who unquestioningly or determinedly subscribe to the official story of “9/11.”  
However, at base, this dissertation has supported bodies of literature that show that 
countermovements employ counterrhetorical strategies and discursive obstructions in 
order to undermine their opponents’ interests (Benford & Hunt 2003; Best 2008; Ibarra & 
Kitsuse 2003; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996; Shriver et al. 2013), and it has also been 
demonstrated in this document that for the 911TM the conspiracy label performs the 
discursive function of maligning its collective character while averting serious or 
rigorous treatment of its empirical claims (deHaven-Smith 2013; Husting & Orr 2007; 
Pelkmans & Machold 2011; Truscello 2011).  What this dissertation adds to our 
sociological knowledge is that discursive fields are an important social force to consider 
as always-already contextual factors in movement-countermovement dynamics, and 
that movements and their countermovements have unequal access to the symbolic 
resources within those fields, with the latter group benefiting more than the former.     
The discourse between the 911TM and its countermovement antagonists differs 
from the discourse within each claimant group.  The 911TM already “knows” that “9/11 
was an inside job,” and their countermovement antagonists already “know” that the 
movement is a “conspiracist phenomenon.”  Among countless other issues, what the 
911TM’s members discusses among themselves is how and why Building 7 serves as a 
“smoking gun” for 9/11 Truth, and why the conspiracy label should not legitimately 
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function to obfuscate their empirical claims.  These discourses take place while the 
conspiracy label continues to be discussed among the 911TM’s countermovement 
antagonists as a legitimate analytic category in further need of rhetorical employment 
and scientific investigation.  The micropolitics of the conspiracy label, i.e. the label’s 
employment in text and talk with the intent to malign the individual and collective 
character of its targets, helps produce and operates within a discursive field that shades 
and masks the empirical claims of the 911TM by painting the movement and its 
members as incredible and unworthy of serious or rigorous attention.  Where serious or 
rigorous attention is claimed to be given (e.g., Popular Mechanics 2011), the analysis is 
sourced to the very contested texts the 911TM holds in contention (e.g., Griffin 2007a; 
2010a, 2013), and it is bookended with the assumption that the conspiracy label provides 
the explanatory power behind the 911TM’s attention to what is portrayed as a non-
problem, i.e. the collapse of WTC 7.  
Movement-countermovement dynamics produce a unit of analysis for which it is 
not easy to produce data.  In this dissertation, discourse among the Truthers and Deniers 
of 9/11 serves as a demonstration of how one or more discursive fields surrounds and 
penetrates the communicative interactions between a social movement and its 
countermovement antagonists.  Much like the 911TM members are brought together in 
their claimsmaking and framing activities, its countermovement antagonists, 
representing a variety of institutional orders (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008,) are loosely 
coupled via their counterframing efforts (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996).  Whereas 
journalists, psychologists, philosophers, and professionals in other areas rely upon the 
institutional logics of their areas of expertise to analyze the 911TM (Thornton et al. 2012), 
all of them put into use the conspiracy label to stigmatize and discredit the 911TM.  
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Consequently, the conspiracy label helps produce and operates within anti-conspiracy 
discourse (Goshorn 2000) at the detriment of the 911TM regardless of what claims are 
put forward and from whom claims originate.  Paralleling another study on a similar 
topic, “[w]hat we see here is a discursive field in which different actors attempt to 
position themselves and their adversaries—to mobilize the trappings of legitimacy and 
authority, and to deny standing to others” (Aistrope 2013:117).  In terms of the 
discursive field of the 911TM, and within the dramas of social movements (Benford & 
Hunt 1992) and conspiracy (Wexler & Havers 2002), audiences in public domains are 
presented with the question of who are the true protagonists and antagonists in the 
narrative of “9/11.”  
The Discursive Field of the 9/11 Truth Movement 
Movement-countermovement interactions do not take place in a social vacuum, 
and audiences are not passive receptors who change their interpretations based on direct 
effects of the most active party.  To be effective, social movements must employ frames, 
or interpretive schema, that resonate with or approximate existing interpretive schema 
in audiences (Benford & Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 1988).  Audience perceptions of a 
social movement’s legitimacy involve its empirical claims as much as the audience’s 
culturally inherited background assumptions.  In the U.S., a tipping point exists for the 
interpretation of how and why the events of September 11 happened, beyond which 
empirical claims perceived as too far outside normative explanations are unacceptable 
or unthinkable, or doxic (Entman 2004).  The conspiracy label is one discursive 
mechanism employed that ensures if and when empirical claims are issued about a 
historical event such as the attacks on September 11 those claims will likely be treated as 
arising from an incredible and untrustworthy source (Husting & Orr 2007).  Social 
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movements attempt to reach their goals of persuading audiences to readjust their 
interpretations of reality out in the open where audiences are located, and in doing so 
they invite oppositional forces to counteract, in real time or asynchronously, their 
claimsmaking and framing activities.  
Resistance to the narrative of “9/11” and attempting to engage the public in 
discourse about the events of September 11 are powerful acts (Foucault 1980), but in the 
context of the dominant narrative of “9/11” and interpretation of the events of 
September 11, straying too far from the dominant narrative leads to being labeled as a 
“conspiracy theorist” (Pelkmans & Machold 2011).  Only by shedding the conspiracy 
label can the 911TM attempt to project their truth-claims as such, but because they 
oppose a dominant narrative generated and circulated by powerful actors who occupy 
legitimate institutional orders (i.e. government, mainstream news media, and academia), 
they will likely not succeed in reframing their discourse as factual, valid, or trustworthy 
(Pelkmans & Machold 2011).  To do so, the 911TM would have to garner enough public 
support and allies in mainstream media organizations to fight upstream in the 
downward thrust of the cascading network activation of frames put forward since 
September 11, 2001 (Benford & Hunt 2003; Best 2008; Entman 2004).  Alongside efforts to 
gain support from the public and media who likely buy into the official story of “9/11,” 
the 911TM have oppositional forces in core institutional arenas who play a part in 
affecting which narrative, the 911TM’s or the official one, will be considered legitimate. 
Staying within the framework that The 9/11 Commission Report was an accurate 
account of the events of September 11, or that it was flawed but for the most part 
factually correct, affords one an insider status because they have aligned themselves 
with the narrative of “9/11” generated and circulated by powerful actors legitimized by 
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core social institutions.  In doing so, one will likely find their beliefs and behaviors 
largely uncontested, and when they are contested they can rely upon the conspiracy 
label to quickly and effortlessly rebut the contenders.  Among the discourse that takes 
place within the 911TM, such as that information produced by SMO’s like AE911Truth 
are used to inform street activism and public campaigns, like that of the ReThink911 
campaign, its members also spend significant amounts of energy discussing how and 
why the conspiracy label should not function as a legitimate threat to their collective 
character.  The conspiracy label is legitimized by the interactions between academics 
who construct and reify it, journalists who employ it as the bases of their analyses, and 
for trade journalists who similarly use it as the ultimate explanation for why divergent 
beliefs from the official story of “9/11” exist and propagate.  Thus is constructed the 
discursive field of the 911TM, as is depicted in Figure 14.    
Certain claims made about the 911TM by its countermovement antagonists are 
clearly based upon facts.  “The rhetoric of just asking questions” (Byford 2011:90), as an 
analytic category imposed by the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists, is present 
throughout the claimsmaking and framing activities of the 911TM and their 
countermovement antagonists.  However, how the rhetorical aspects of the questions 
asked are interpreted depends upon one’s standpoint in relation to the orthodoxy to 
heterodoxy of the official story of “9/11.”  For the 911TM, raising the question of WTC 7 
is a way to raise awareness in the public about the fact that the official narrative of 
“9/11” (Zelikow 2004) is missing a key component that calls into question other events 
of September 11.  For the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists, questions raised about 
WTC 7, or about any other aspect of the official story, signals that “9/11 conspiracy 
theories” are being proffered or endorsed.   
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Figure 14.  The Discursive Field of the 9/11 Truth Movement 
 
Since they deny the existence of any major problem relating to the narrative of 
“9/11,” the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists can justifiably (within the logic of 
their discourse) issue the conspiracy label.  Some anti-conspiracists recognize that there 
are always going to be flaws in official stories due to the complexities of physical and 
social realities, but taking unorthodox positions such as these allows one to ultimately 
recede to the orthodox positon that “9/11 was an outside job.”  By denying that there are 
any facts that cannot be legitimately explained by authorities aligned with and 
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defending the official narrative of “9/11,” the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists 
must resolve to an explanation of why certain facts are interpreted as signs of 
conspiracy.  Problem denial is the most efficient of counterframing strategies (Benford & 
Hunt 2003), and it is demonstrated repeatedly when the 911TM’s countermovement 
antagonists frame the question of Building 7’s collapse as one best left to the experts and 
professionals, such as those at the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST 2008).  This same strategy is used in direct exchanges between members of the 
911TM and their countermovement antagonists when either a claim is replaced with a 
straw person argument or when a claim is ignored altogether.  The next part of the 
strategy is an attack on the collective character of the 911TM, which is to merely 
substitute the conspiracy label for the substance of a logically coherent and factually 
substantiated rebuttal.     
So well established within the 911TM is the narrative that “WTC 7 is a smoking 
of 9/11” that members use it as a way to establish or repair their credibility in the eyes 
of the public, because if it is an uncontestable, empirical fact that Building 7 did not 
collapse from jet fuel fires as is alleged of the Twin Towers, then claiming that WTC 7 is 
a signifier of a conspiracy makes one not a conspiracy theorist.  The 911TM’s 
countermovement antagonists key into the 911TM’s claims about the collapse of WTC 7, 
explaining to their audience that it is a non-problem because its mystery has already 
been solved by the very social agents the 911TM believe to be complicit in the cover up 
of what actually occurred on September 11.  Countermovement antagonists use such 
logic as further evidence of the conspiratorial nature of the 911TM, which provides 
further justification for their logic that the 911TM is, at base, a “conspiracist 
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phenomenon.”  As deHaven-Smith’s (2010, 2013) and Husting and Orr’s (2007) works 
make clear, though, this is the exact function of the conspiracy label.   
Interactions between the 911TM and their countermovement antagonists take 
place discursively (i.e. not through physical altercations) in public arenas, which allows 
for rhetorical assaults that need not follow strict rules of debate, science, or logic.  In the 
sciences, the peer review process accounts for unstated assumptions, inherent biases, 
logical leaps, lack of empirical evidence, and over-extension of claims.  In journalism, the 
pursuit of profits and pandering to the partisanship of audiences leads at best to a thin 
illusion of objectivity (Parenti 2007).  For instance, Popular Mechanics (2006) and the 
official FEMA and NIST reports they rely on are rebutted by 911TM members (Griffin 
2007a, [2009] 2013, 2010a), and Popular Mechanics (2011) ignores key rebuttals (Griffin 
2010a) while counterframing others (Griffin 2007a, [2009] 2013) with tactics such as 
keying, ignoring, and problem denial (Benford & Hunt 2003).  Popular Mechanics’ (2006, 
2011) book is presented by several of the 911TM’s countermovement antagonists as a 
definitive account of how and why detractors from the official narrative of “9/11”  are 
merely “conspiracy theorists,” and therefore wrong in their assertions.   Ignoring key 
statements and texts by Griffin is one of Popular Mechanics’ tactics in opposing efforts to 
challenge the official story of “9/11.”  Reviewers and editors of scientific articles are 
often familiar enough with a body of research to know when key texts and facts are not 
accounted for, but the publishing business of the popular press does not hold to these 
same standards.   
The imputations and refutations of the existence or non-existence of the 
problematic nature of the collapse of WTC 7 has taken place between the 911TM and its 
countermovement antagonists in a public arena.  As Ken Doc, Mike Figa, David Ray 
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Griffin, and other intellectual organizers within the 911TM have stated, bringing their 
message to the public is an important component in the process of attaining justice for 
the crimes of September 11.  The public nature of their claims helped organize their 
countermovement when the 911TM’s antagonists began publishing works that cite each 
other as sources as to why the 911TM is organized around a non-problem and, therefore, 
why the 911TM is merely “conspiracist phenomenon.”  Debates and arguments that the 
911TM and its countermovement antagonists have made show various characteristics of 
the interactional dynamics of framing and claimsmaking tactics, with each party 
“attempt[ing] to prevail in public definitions of imputed problem conditions” [italicized 
in original] (Benford & Hunt 2003:155).  Interactants in the public problems marketplace 
do not have equal footing, as we can see with the endorsement of Popular Mechanics’ 
(2006) from media, academic, and public policy sources.  Moreover, the employment of 
the conspiracy label by each countermovement antagonist harnesses its known 
discursive power to further delegitimize and marginalize the 911TM and its members, 
and this ‘transpersonal strategy of exclusion’ (Husting & Orr 2007) is known to them to 
work in this way, as can be readably seen in Michael Shermer’s (2011) admission about 
the “derisive” nature of the conspiracy label.  
ReThink911’s entire campaign is based upon whether or not the public knows 
about WTC 7’s collapse.  It was inspired by those who would continue to spread 
Islamaphobic and militaristic propaganda, which is in effect a discursive barrier to the 
911TM.  If Entman’s (2004) cascading frame activation model is correct (see Figure 7), 
then even public campaigns to spread awareness about the 911TM’s “strongest card” is 
likely an uphill battle in a downpour of anti-conspiracist propaganda.  During direct 
interactions, countermovement antagonists counterframe the 911TM’s claims with 
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rhetorical fallacies (i.e. the straw person argument), and in more abstract interactions, 
such as ReThink911’s response to public campaigns that assume the veracity of the 
official story of “9/11” as a self-evident truth, the official narrative of “9/11” already 
exists as a main component in the anti-conspiracy discourse.  The 911TM already had an 
uphill battle in combatting the weight behind the official story of “9/11,” but its 
countermovement’s employment of the conspiracy label in the context of anti-
conspiracy discourse detracts the 911TM’s energies and distracts public attention away 
from investigating its empirical claims.   
Limitations & Future Research 
 Probably the biggest drawback of this particular study is my own dual status as a 
sociologist and member of the 911TM.  This study is largely sympathetic to the 911TM, 
and therefore any claim to objectivity would be moot.  If my thesis is correct, that 
because the conspiracy label will override rational and rigorous analysis of the 911TM’s 
claims, then it would be difficult in the first place to produce any study sympathetic to 
its claims that could be read as objective.  The analysis in this dissertation is intended to 
demonstrate that the conspiracy label is used to discredit the 911TM without first giving 
due diligence to their empirical claims, and this is a strategy that is recognizable as a 
component of the movement-countermovement dynamics of the 911TM and its 
countermovement opposition.  As a sociologist, my interests are in how groups operate 
and interact within society, and so my status as a sociologist does not necessarily move 
the 911TM forward in its efforts to make publicly known the flaws in the official story 
and to bring the true perpetrators of the events of September 11 to justice. 
 Sociologically, this critical ethnography is limited to only that portion of the 
911TM with whom I personally interacted with and observed.  Therefore, my claims 
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about the 911TM as a whole can be held suspect.  As one example, there are people I 
interviewed and observed who reported that they believe mini nuclear weapons, 
directed energy weapons, and remote pilot technologies were used in the events of 
September 11.  I have not given these claims attention, nor were other claims, such as 
that Israeli agents were involved in the planning, carrying out, and/or cover up of the 
events of September 11.  I have avoided all of these issues because in my opinion they 
are not central to the 911TM.  WTC 7 is mentioned in nearly every account by 911TM 
members and SMO’s, and therefore I focused on that aspect.  However, I also avoided 
these other issues for several reasons, including the fact that I have not personally 
studied them in much detail, that some of the claims seem fairly outlandish, and because 
I do not want to be issued the label of “anti-Semitic” by countermovement antagonists.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, these are methodological issues with studying “9/11,” the 
events of September 11, and the 911TM.  The taboo associated with questioning the 
official story of “9/11” limits what researchers are willing to ask and report, and this is 
in tandem with how the taboo influences how the reports will be interpreted by various 
audiences.  Therefore, an inherent limitation in this study is my own unwillingness to 
entertain certain claims by the 911TM due to my fear of stigmatization. 
Many of the 911TM antagonists’ analyses are rooted in two pieces of popular 
press, Richard Hofstadter’s (1964) oft cited24 (e.g., see Dimitriadis 2011; Howell 2012; 
Moynihan 1985; Parsons 1970; Smith 1977) news magazine article, “The Paranoid Style 
in American Politics,” and a somewhat obscure newspaper editorial by Tom Bethell 
(1975), titled “The Quote Circuit,” which spawned a series of studies testing its “large 
explanations” hypothesis (Ebel-Lam et al. 2010; Leman & Cinnirella 2007; McCauley & 
Jacques 1979).  Future research should trace the origins and development of the 
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conspiracy label, and efforts should be made to note any patterns used before and after 
the 911TM developed.  If similar tactics were used before the 911TM existed, this would 
further strengthen the argument that anti-conspiracy discourse is the product of social 
actors who intend to use those methods to discredit people who question official 
narratives of historically important events (for recent work on this, see deHaven-Smith 
2013).  Tracing the historical trajectory of anti-conspiracy discourse can further help 
sociologists understand how countermovements produce subjects through discourse 
(Foucault 1980; van Dijk 2009), and continuing a line of research on the conspiracy label 
can uncover the various ways that it threatens open, democratic discourse (Husting & 
Orr 2007). 
As stated previously, it is as infeasible to study the entire 911TM and all of its 
countermovement antagonists as it would be to provide an exhaustive analysis of all 
their claims and frames.  The focus in this study has been on the movement-
countermovement dynamics of the 911TM and its countermovement, particularly with 
an emphasis on how anti-conspiracy discourse functions.  Therefore, reviewing how a 
particular claim or frame is articulated by either party is less fruitful than demonstrating 
the discursive field of the 911TM.  This was accomplished by focusing on one claim, i.e. 
the WTC 7 problematic collapse, and one framing strategy, i.e. the various ways the 
conspiracy label is employed and rebuked.  Future research with the 911TM might focus 
on one or more claims that the movement debates, such as whether or not a missile 
instead of Flight 77 hit the Pentagon, and future research might divulge framing 
strategies related to how the movement portrays itself, its opponents, and its audiences.  
Moreover, a systematic content analysis of methodically collected texts by the 911TM’s 
countermovement antagonists will more rigorously show what strategies and tactics are 
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used to undermine the 911TM, and this will benefit social scientists and social 
movements interested in how to achieve social change. 
By applying social constructionist analyses of how and why the 911TM has been 
constructed as a social problem, we might be able to avoid threats to communicative 
action and the free exchange of ideas that are necessary for democracies to prevail.  The 
use of labels to categorize individuals and groups as inferior to others has had terrible 
and horrific consequences throughout the history of human civilizations.  The 
construction, reification, and continued use of the conspiracy label as an analytic 
category for human subjects is an irony the IRB should consider remedying in future 
studies.  Without giving rigorous attention to the grounds, warrants, and conclusions of 
claims about such things as why and how the events of actually September 11 
transpired, social analysts risk playing a part in the continuing cover up of what is 
known by many to have been a historically tragic event with disastrous consequences 
for the future of human civilizations.  New social movements of the 20 th century have 
led to improving the human condition by bringing attention to the fact that all people 
should have equal access to civil liberties and protections under the rule of law, that 
governments sometimes engage in fraudulent activities that lead to war and genocide, 
and that the continued exploitation of human beings and the natural environment has 
potentially catastrophic consequences for human civilization, such as global climate 
change and the continuing threat to human rights by authoritarian political regimes.  
Without systematic reflection upon the hegemonies, ideologies, and discourses that 
influence how we think about such socially constructed categories as “conspiracy 
theorists” and “9/11 Truthers,” the existing ruling systems of authorities and their truth 




1 A nationally representative Scripps Howard telephone survey that was conducted July 6 -24, 2006, found 
similar results as the 2006 Zogby poll (911Truth.org 2006), which was conducted in May of that year.  
Thomas Hargrove and Guido Stempel (2006) report tha t “[m]ore than a third of the American public 
suspects that federal officials assisted in the 9/11 terrorist attacks or took no action to stop them so the 
United States could go to war in the Middle East,” and that “[s]ixteen percent said it's ‘very l ikely’ or 
‘somewhat l ikely’ that ‘the collapse of the twin towers in New York was aided by explosives secretl y 
planted in the two buildings’.” 
2 The co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton (2007), indicate in several 
instances of their insider narrative of the structure and operation of the 9/11 Commission, Without 
Precedent:  The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, that Phill ip Zelikow played a central role in organizing 
both the 9/11 Commission and The 9/11 Commission Report:  Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.  Kean and Hamilton state that “Zelikow drove and organized the 
staff’s work” (2007:38), and that, “[o]f course, before the report could be published, it had to be written” 
(2007:271).  Continuing, Kean and Hamilton state that the “question was how the fact-finding being done 
by our staff teams could feed into the chronological format envisioned for the report.  Originally, there 
was a suspicion among staff that Zelikow and May would attempt to draft the entire report, which was a  
point of some tension, particularly because the prospective outline was not circulated to the staff teams” 
(2007:271).  At several points, Kean and Hamilton note that Zelikow was one among several peo ple to 
provide the initial outline and drafts of the report, and that, among other material for the report, “Philip 
Zelikow drafted chapters on the response in the days after 9/11, and the recommendations —what 
became the last four chapters of the report” (2007:273).  In The Commission:  The Uncensored History of 
the 9/11 Investigation, by Philip Shenon (2008), we further learn about Zelikow’s role as the executive 
director of the 9/11 Commission.  As Kean and Hamilton (2007) point out, Zelikow was intimatel y involved 
in the hiring and placement of the staff members of the 9/11 Commission, and these staffers were largely 
responsible for gather and organizing data that would eventually find its way into a the final report, which 
was fully outlined, mostly organized, and partially written by Zelikow (Shenon 2008).  Even though other 
people were involved in authoring the final version of The 9/11 Commission Report, Zelikow’s role as 
executive director substantiates my use of his name as its central author.  
3 Les Visible’s (2008) blog, “9/11 is the Litmus Test,” includes an embedded YouTube video, titled “Nine 
Eleven IS the LitmusTest” [sic] (Snordster 2013).  This version currently (March 24, 2014) has 48,494 
views, but two mirrors of the video on YouTube each ha ve thousands of views.  “9-11 Is the Litmus Test” 
(Ahijab 2011) has 6,156 views, and “9/11 Is the Litmus Test” (911TimeForTruth 2012) has 2,001 views.  
The fact that the embedded video in the blog is the newest of the three, and that it has the most views, 
indicates that there might have been a previous version with potentially many more thousands of views.  
“The 9/11 Truth Movement” Facebook page includes many links to these videos and references to the 
phrase, and a Google search currently returns more than 28,000 results for the phrase.  
4 “Deniers,” “Debunkers,” “Truth Deniers,” and variations of these terms are commonly used by members 
of the 9/11 Truth Movement to identify their adversaries.  The 9/11 Truth Movement Facebook group has 
a search function that returns several hundred results for these terms.  What follows is the most recent 
(as of June 10, 2014) example of a post that uses a variation of the “Denier” label: 
 
[Name Omitted]9/11 Truth Movement 
May 31, 2014 at 9:29am ·  
It's  crazy that all these "Truth Deniers" are so easy to discredit everything you say. But cannot 
explain how or why WTC7 comes crashing down at freefall. All I 'm asking i s to hear me out and 
not be so closed minded. Spreading the truth. 
Like · 10  Comment 8 · Share ·  
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5 By “narrative of 9/11,” I refer to how the term, “9/11,” has been employed discursively in reference to 
the actual events of September 11, 2001, as well as to other events, such as the anthrax letters mailed in 
the following weeks to media and political elites and the responses to the events of September 11, 2001.  
The narrative of “9/11” generally represents the official narrative put forward by political and media elites 
that is robustly described in Robert Entman’s (2003, 2004) “cascading activation model.”   This model 
depicts how elites’ initial frames were adopted and promoted in mass media outlets, and how lower -level 
political officials became more and more reluctant over time to challenge it for fear of reprisal and 
sanction.  David Altheide (2006) has robustly described the politics and discourse of fear that were 
generated by political elites and major news media in the hours and years after the attacks occurred, and 
these discussions of terrorism, victimization, and fear in relation to al Qaeda, Afgha nistan, and Iraq are 
part of the narrative of “9/11.”  Public challenges have a difficult time altering the dominant narrative of 
“9/11” because they have to gain access to and then legitimacy within mass media outlets.  The 911TM 
put forward a counter-narrative (Levis 2002; Schechter 2011) that challenges the official, dominant 
narrative, and that is part of the subject of this dissertation. 
6 I distinguish between what I refer to as the narrative of “9/11” and the events of September 11, 2001.  
The former is the official story or the commonly known and discursively transmitted conceptual schema 
of what happened on September 11, 2001, and why, including the ensuing Global War on Terror, and the 
latter refers to the specific occurrences or events that happened on that date alone involving the four 
airliners, Flight’s 11 (North Tower, Building 1), 77 (Pentagon), 93 (Shanksvil le, PA), and 175 (South Tower, 
Building 2).  As shown by 911Truth.org’s (2006, 2007) Zogby polls, a large part of the U.S. public is 
ignorant of the collapse of WTC 7, or they are unconvinced that it should be included as part of the 
narrative of “9/11,” as indicated by their responses that it should not have been included in The 9/11 
Commission Report.  As an occurrence on September 11, 2001, that is geographically (i.e. it happened in 
Manhattan) and conceptually (i.e. it was another building to experience a total structural failure leading 
to collapse) related to other events, I include the collapse of WTC 7 as part of the events of September 11, 
2001, or just September 11 as I use in this dissertation.    
7 The image used in Figure 1 is taken from the Facebook page, “Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth,” 
which can be found at the following URL:  http://tinyurl.com/oey523y.  The same image minus the purple 
frame, logo, and text can be found in an article on AE911Truth’s website by Chris Rocco (2012), and this is 
where the caption to Figure 1 originates, which is the caption used for the same image in that article. 
8 While succinct biographical statements could be found through Internet searches for Richard Gage and 
Barrie Zwicker, Paul Zarembka’s information was drawn from his biography in the list of contributors to 
the second edition of his edited volume, The Hidden History of 9/11: 
Paul  Zarembka is professor of economics at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Editor 
s ince 1977 of Research in Political Economy, this  series of twenty-four annual volumes addresses 
economic and political issues from the perspective of the social classes involved.  He is the author 
of Toward a Theory of Economic Development and editor of Frontiers in Econometrics. … 
Zarembka is also coeditor of Essays in Modern Capital Theory.  He has been a  senior researcher at 
the International Labor Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, and a  Fulbright-Hayes lecturer in 
Poznan, Poland.  Currently working within the Marxist tradition on a book on the accumulation of 
capital, he has been a   union president on his campus and is currently i ts grievance officer for 
academics.  (Zarembka 2008:ix) 
Reproduced here is a short biographical description of Richard Gage: 
Richard Gage, AIA, is a  San Francisco Bay Area architect of 25 years, a member of the American 
Institute of Architects, and the founder and CEO of Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth 
(AE911Truth.org), a  501(c)3 educational charity representing more than 2,000 degreed/licensed 
architects and engineers who have signed a petition calling for a  new, independent investigation, 
with full subpoena power, into the destruction of the Twin Towers and the 47-story World Trade 
Center Building 7 on 9/11. The more than 17,000 non-A/E s ignatories include many s cientists, 
attorneys, and other responsible, educated citizens in the US and abroad. They ci te overwhelming 
evidence for explosive controlled demolition.  (AE911Truth 2013a) 
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And, lastly, here is a short biographical description of Barrie Zwicker: 
Barrie Zwicker is an independent documentary producer, author and social and political activist. 
His  latest production is the 75-minute THE GREAT CONSPIRACY: The 9/11 News Special You Never 
Saw, on DVD and VHS (order by phoning 1-416.651-5588). Its world premiere was Sept. 9th 2004 
in New York City. Reviews have been highly positive.    
 Zwicker instigated and was Director of the International Ci tizens' Inquiry Into 9/11, held 
at The University of Toronto 25-30 May 2004. It featured 40 presenters from three continents. 
Video from the Inquiry i s being incorporated into numerous documentaries including The Great 
Conspiracy. The inquiry organization, Skeptics' Inquiry For Truth (SIFT) is incorporated and 
continues as an educational and activist group.     
 Zwicker has worked in journalism and communications s ince he was 16, when he joined 
the Russell (Man.) Banner as a Printer's Devil. He worked on major newspapers including The 
Vancouver Province, The Detroit News, the Flint Journal and the Lansing State Journal, for a year 
at Canada's largest-circulation newspaper, The Toronto Star and for eight years at "Canada's 
National Newspaper," The Globe and Mail. While the Globe's education writer, he won a ll three 
top awards of the Education Writers' Association of North America.   
 Zwicker taught journalism part time for seven years at Ryerson Polytechnic University. 
His  courses were "Media and Society" and then "Media, Ethics and the Law."  (GreatConspiracy.ca  
2005) 
9 According to Dictionary.Reference.com, “contentious” has the following definitions: 
1. tending to argument or strife; quarrelsome: a contentious crew. 
2. causing, involving, or characterized by argument or controversy: contentious issues. 
10 The following is taken from ReThink911’s (2013a) website: 
ReThink911 is a global public awareness campaign launched on September 1, 2013 to educate the 
public and galvanize support for a  new investigation into the events of September 11, 2001. Led 
by the group Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth and supported by a  coalition of organizations, 
ReThink911 ra ises public awareness by introducing viewers to the destruction of World Trade 
Center Building 7 and informing the public that over 2,000 architects and engineers have signed a 
peti tion ca lling for a  new investigation into the destruction of Building 7 and the Twin Towers.  
 
In September 2013, the ReThink911 campaign ran ads in 12 ci ties ads posing the s imple question, 
“Did you know a 3rd  tower fell on 9/11?” in reference to World Trade Center Building 7. 
ReThink911’s September 2013 ads included: 
 
 A 54-foot-tall billboard at 47th Street and 7th Avenue in New York’s Times Square, 
 45 taxi  top ads in Washington D.C. 
 60 taxi  top ads in Boston, 
 30 taxi  top ads in Chicago, 
 A bi llboard on Dallas’ Stemmons Freeway near the Feizy Center, 
 100 poster on San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit 
 A mobile billboard in San Diego and Los Angeles from Sept. 5 to Sept. 11 
 A 60-foot-tall billboard in Toronto’s Dundas Square, 
 300 posters on Ottawa buses, 
 8 trans it shelter posters in downtown Vancouver, 
 A bi llboard and four s treet boards in downtown London, and, 
 150 s treet posters in downtown Sydney. 
 
At the ta il end of the successful September 2013 campaign, ReThink911 ra ised $25,000 in three 
days  to keep the ReThink911 billboard in Times Square through the month of October. 
ReThink911 then raised $24,000 in three days in late October to sponsor a  billboard across the 
s treet from the New York Times Building and Port Authority during the month of November, and 
s ince extended the billboard through December. The billboard asks the New York Times about its 
lack of coverage of questions concerning the destruction of World Trade Center Building 7. 
In November, ReThink911 successfully ra ised $75,000 for a  major winter campaign in Ottawa and 
Toronto. In Ottawa, ReThink911 ads will be seen on the backsides of 40 buses from December 12 
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to January 9. In Toronto, the ads will run throughout the month of January on 800 bus and subway 
cars . 
 
ReThink911 will continue to launch new ad campaigns every one to two months until awareness 
of Bui lding 7’s  destruction becomes widespread. 
11 “Remember Building 7 is a non-partisan campaign led by 9/11 family members to raise awareness 
of the destruction of World Trade Center Buil ding 7 through television and other forms of advertising, and 
to shift public opinion such that the New York City Council and Manhattan District Attorney will  be 
compelled to open an investigation into Building 7′s destruction” (RememberBuilding7 2011). 
12 The following passages are from NYC CAN’s website for the High-Rise Safety Initiative, which 
 
i s  a  ballot measure that will appear on the November 4, 2014 ballot in New York City. If approved 
by voters , i t will require the NYC Department of Buildings to investigate high-rise building 
col lapses in NYC that occurred on, or any time after, September 11, 2001. Its  provisions exclude 
the col lapse of the World Trade Center Twin Towers, but apply to the collapse of World Trade 
Center 7 and any high-rise collapse that may occur in the future. 
…[some text omitted] 
Before 9/11, no high-rise building had ever collapsed as a result of fire. High-rises are built to 
withstand all types of office fires, including that which occurred in World Trade Center 7, which is 
why i ts  collapse has great significance for architectural and engineering professionals in New York 
Ci ty and across the globe. There are valuable lessons to learn from its collapse, lessons that can 
and will save l ives. 
Al though the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued a  report on World 
Trade Center 7 in 2008, i t was imperfect first and foremost because the destruction of the steel in 
the building’s cleanup necessitated over-reliance on a computer model for i ts investigation. 
Experts  dispute NIST’s conclusions, ci ting the omission of cri tical structural features from the 
model and the model’s failure to reproduce the observed free-fall motion. Curiously, NIST refused 
to release modeling data on the grounds that its release “might jeopardize public safety,” thus 
preventing engineers from being able to independently veri fy i ts model and findings. A new 
investigation by the Ci ty of New York will a llow for these shortcomings to be addressed, thus 
furthering our understanding of how World Trade Center 7 col lapsed and leading to safer building 
des ign in the future. 
13 The picture and comments for Figure 4 can be found at the following URL:  
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=4799952433099&set=gm.10151319476241782&type=1&the
ater.  For further examples of this type of claimsmaking by the 911TM (i.e., through Internet memes) see 
the first page of the Appendices.    
14 The terms “dialogic” and “dialogism” do not appear in the index, and an electronic search returns no 
results for these terms.  The term “discourse” appears half a dozen times, and in one instance they use it 
interchangeably with language (Thornton et al. 2012:149).  Thus, dialogism and discourse are under 
theorized in their work. 
15 In the video description to “9/11 Conspiracy Solved,” AlienScientist (2012) states the following:  “Special 
thanks to Michael C. Ruppert, Mark H. Gaffney, and Kevin Ryan for solving the crimes of 9/11 with their 
amazing research. This video is a compilation of evidence they have uncovered.”  Therefore, it is logical 
that people who find the video (in)credible will  also find these works, for the most part, (in)credible as 
well. 
16 It is unclear from where Meigs (2006, 2011) retrieved this quote as he cites no source nor does he 
discuss data gathering techniques or interviews that indicate this is, in fact, a quote often used “in 
conspiracy circles.” 
17 A LexisNexis search for “9/11 Truth Movement” was further refined with the phrase, “just asking 
questions,” of which Morello’s (2004) news article was the earliest to employ it. 
18 Another intellectual organizer, Jeremy Baker, who is quoted by Popular Mechanics (2006) in reference 
to the 911TM’s claims of how and why WTC 7 collapse, has written a blog titled, “How Many ‘Secret 
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Agents’ Did it Take to Screw Up 9/11?”  In it, Baker (2010) concludes the following:  
 
We may never be able to prove how many people took part in the planning and execution of the 
attacks of September 11th, but the assumption that a  small army of conspirators was required to 
‘do’ 9/11 is  unprovable at best and, for many good reasons, highly unlikely. At a  time when 
erroneous conjecture and uneducated opinionating have lost all meaning in a  criminal 
investigation of l iterally s tunning magnitude, the quality of the answers—but also the quality of 
the questions—must be responsibly evaluated.  (n.a.) 
19 Paikin’s (2011) episode is broken into two parts, an interview with Jonathan Kay and then a debate 
between him and members of the 9TM.  What follows is how the webpage describes the episode, 
apparently titled “Friday May 13 2011”:  
The Interview: Jonathan Kay: It's All a  Conspiracy Is bin Laden really dead? Did we really land on 
the moon? Author Jonathan Kay spent time researching conspiracy theories for his new book 
"Among the Truthers". Kay s its down with Steve Paikin to tell us what h e believes is behind the 
ri se in conspiracy theories. Producer: Wodek Szemberg The Debate: The Truth is Out There 
Birthers, truthers and conspiracy theorists. People who don't believe that US President Obama is 
American-born. People who don't believe that Osama bin Laden was killed. Why don't people 
"bel ieve"? Is it cynicism run amok? Or are there legitimate reasons for questioning what we're 
told? Guests: Jonathan Kay Barrie Zwicker Richard Gage Paul Zarembka Producer: Wodek 
Szemberg. 
The episode can also be viewed at the following webpage 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dHbZi80IBNU). 
20 As of May 24th, 2014, a LexisNexis search for “9/11 Truth Movement,” controlling for moderately similar 
articles, returns 242 news articles.  When refined with the phrase, “Loose Change,” 24 articles are 
retained, and a majority of these criticize the 911TM.  Moreover, Loose Change is mentioned in peer 
reviewed articles (Banas & Miller 2013; Sunstein & Vermeule 2009) and books (Byford 2011; Kay 2011; 
Shermer 2011) that criticize the 911TM.  This is a point that needs further empirical attention in future 
research.  
21 The 9/11 Commission Report (Zelikow 2004) is sometimes cited by the 911TM’s 
countermovement antagonists as why the movement’s “conspiracy theories” are false (e.g., see 
Bale 2007; Sternheimer 2007, 2010), but because it was not written explicitly to counterac t “9/11 
conspiracy theories,” I will not go into detail with it in this dissertation. 
22 A point of interest might be that Richard Gage is not cited nor are any of his projects with 
AE911Truth, such as his 2008 documentary, Blueprint for Truth—Popular Mechanics’ 2011 book 
moves from “Fruehan, Richard” to “Garcia, Andrew” on page 212 in their Index.  Gage’s work 
with AE911Truth is almost exclusively focused on analyzing the collapse of the WTC buildings, 
and so if Popular Mechanics wanted to address the most serious claims about WTC 7, they might 
have included in their analysis his work on the subject. 
23 The following description has been excerpted from the introduction to the transcript of the September 
11, 2006, debate between the Loose Change fi lmmakers and editors of Debunking 9/11 Myths: 
 
Today, a  debate about 9/11. Ever s ince the attacks took place, many people across the country 
have ra ised a number of questions about what actually happened on that day in New York, 
Washington and Pennsylvania. Websites, articles, books and documentaries have put forward a  
variety of alternate theories to the government’s account of what happened. 
 
The most popular of these is a documentary called * "Loose Change."* The 80-minute film first 
appeared on the web in April 2005. Since then, it has had at least 10 mi llion viewings and is 
described by Vanity Fa ir as "the first Internet blockbuster." As  the popularity of "Loose Change" 
has  soared, a book dealing with the questions i t and others have raised about 9/11 has been 
published. It’s called * "Debunking 9/11 Myths : Why Conspiracy Theories Can’t Stand Up to the 
Facts"* put together by the editors of the magazine, Popular Mechanics.  (Democracy Now! 2006) 
 
In the section pertaining to this debate, I quote from Democracy Now!’s (2006) transcript, which, as 
stated on the webpage, might deviate slightly from the participants’ statements.  Efforts were made to 
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